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Summary
The Introduction – together with the conclusion – provides a framework for the
three substantial contributions of this PhD project. It begins with sketching a
puzzle that motivates research on the political economy of structural reforms in
Europe, namely the inconsistency between the commitment of governments to
reform and the actual reform track record across the countries. It discusses the
nature and findings of the relevant multidisciplinary political economy litera-
ture. Paper One addresses the puzzle why the first major post-war overhaul of
the German political economy – the ‘Agenda 2010’ reforms – was undertaken
in 2003 by a social-democratic government and not by any of the conservative
governments that preceded it. It finds that the lack of government cohesion, the
federal legislative system and corporatist structures remain important determi-
nants for institutional stability and change in Germany. Paper Two develops
a theoretical argument as to why corporatist European economies may live
through extended periods of economic underperformance without significant
reform. Building on this argument, it presents a formal model, from which it
derives a set of determinants for structural reforms, and finally illustrates these
by exploring the causes for reform in Germany and Sweden. Paper Three uses
a new database on labour market reform to show that corporatist structures
have an intermediating effect on the determinants of structural reform policies.
It finds evidence that the interests of employer organisations and trade unions
matter for the labour market reform trajectories in countries with corporatist
features. Political partisanship and economic crises matter more in pluralist
countries. Finally, the Conclusion summarises the findings of the three papers.
Subsequently, it outlines the limitations and draws up some wider implications
for the theories of institutional change and for public policymaking.
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Preface and acknowledgements
Otto von Bismarck famously said that politics was ‘the art of the possible’. In
the context of the expansionary foreign policy of the European powers in the
19th century, Bismarck warned against policy objectives that were outside the
reach of the respective sovereign. Bismarck’s words must echo in the minds
of many European politicians when faced with the challenge of adjusting the
institutional structures of their countries, in view of growing global competi-
tion, fast advances in technology and an ageing population. In fact, for a long
time structural reforms to Europe’s labour markets and welfare regimes was
considered almost impossible.
This policy problem has been with me since my Master’s thesis (Diplomar-
beit) at the Department of Economics at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University
of Munich in 2004. Prof Monika Schnitzer, my supervisor in Munich, suggested
investigating the political economics literature on structural reforms and its
explanatory power. These were turbulent political times, just after the Ger-
man government under Gerhard Schröder had successfully implemented the
most significant post-war overhaul of the German labour market and welfare
system. The reforms came as a surprise not only to the stability-oriented
Germans, but also to many researchers, for whom inertia and gradualism had
become a hallmark of policymaking in Germany and other European coun-
tries. Against this political and academic background, I decided to pursue the
investigation of the political economy of structural reforms in the context of a
doctoral degree programme.
When I first joined the European Institute of the London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science as a research student in 2005, I was confronted
with a different form of political economy research than I had known. It is
more informed by the institutional analysis of political scientists and the broad
perspective of macroeconomists, than the relatively narrow, rational choice
perspective of micro-based political economics. The interaction between in-
stitutional structure and macroeconomic performance in the comparative cap-
italism literature, in particular, seemed to offer scope for important insights
also on the determinants of structural reform policies.
I began the research project – as much as possible keeping an open mind on
possible results – with a case study of the Agenda 2010 reforms in Germany.
This already provided much evidence that structural reform trajectories in
Europe are only understood against the background of the close interlocking
of the political and economic sphere. This first impression was confirmed by
interviews and background discussions with government officials and labour
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representatives as well as with some of the engineers of theModell Deutschland,
such as the former chairmen of Deutsche Bank and Allianz SE. It was also
confirmed by insights gained as a staff member of the European Central Bank,
where I spend time twice and – in the view of my supervisors – in culpable
negligence of my research work at the LSE.
The subsequent research done for the PhD project includes, in particular,
a rational choice model of a ‘coordinated’ European political economy and a
quantitative investigation on the determinants of structural reforms in Europe.
These benefited from my tenure as a visiting research student at the Graduate
School of Arts and Sciences at Columbia University. The third paper, in
particular, would not have been possible without the ‘Social Reforms Database’
of the Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti in Milan and the Institute for the Study
of Labour in Bonn, in the development of which I was involved as one of the
‘country experts’.
The final output of this research effort are three academic papers. While
each of the three papers addresses the same broad set of questions, they reflect
my interdisciplinary background as an economist and political scientist. Bridg-
ing the divide between the two disciplines has been difficult, sometimes leaving
me with a feeling of academic schizophrenia. Nonetheless, I sincerely hope the
results provide some indication that there is additional value in looking across
the social sciences for answers to empirical questions.
Some words of thanks are in order. I should like to thank, in particular, my
first supervisor and Doktorvater, Dr Bob Hancké, for inviting me to come to
the European Institute, and for accompanying my research project with pro-
fessional guidance and fatherly friendship. My thanks also goes to my second
supervisor, Prof Willem Buiter, for giving important impulses, particularly
in the early stages of the research. Further, I am grateful to Dr Waltraud
Schelkle and Dr Christa van Wijnbergen as well as many other staff members
of the European Institute for their continued advice and support. Among my
peers, I have to single out Dr Costanza Rodriguez d’Acri, who accompanied
this project from start to finish, as well as Dr Lior Herman. And I should
not forget to I thank all the supportive friends and colleagues in the European
Institute’s Jean Monnet Room, aka ‘J14’.
Last and most importantly, my deep-felt gratitude goes to my family, who
has been extremely supportive of the ‘perennial student’, both emotionally
and pecuniary. Here, I would like to mention my parents, Dr Rolf and Juliane
Freier, my dear grandfather, Gotthold Meyer, and my wife, Christine Herion.
London and Frankfurt a.M.
June 2012
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Preface to revised version
The following PhD thesis has been significantly revised following its first sub-
mission in June 2012. Important revisions include, among others, the addition
of a definition and a discussion of the term ‘structural reforms’ in the introduc-
tion to the PhD project. Paper One now comprises a theoretical contribution
in form of an ‘enhanced veto player framework’ and the empirical section of
the paper has been revisited. The theoretical discussion and model in Paper
Two have been revised to provide a clearer perspective on the role of govern-
ment in ‘coordinated market economies’. An additional subsection has been
introduced to provide some intuition on how this type of economy can move
from one coordinated equilibrium to another. The quantitative analysis in
Paper Three has been given a stronger theoretical underpinning and is based
on an alternative measure for corporatism. Estimations have been rerun and
results are presented in a more concise and clear way. The Conclusion has
been revised to emphasise more strongly important differences between the
three papers of the research project.
I would like to thank the examiners, Dr Vassilis Monastiriotis (London
School of Economics) and Prof David Rueda (University of Oxford), for their
constructive comments and suggestions, which have allowed for a substantial
improvement of the analysis.
Frankfurt a.M.
August 2013
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Introduction
Political economy of structural reforms:
An interdisciplinary analysis of the state
of play
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1.1 Introduction
Structural reforms have been on the policy agenda since the oil crises of the
1970s when – for the first time since the Second World War – economic growth
stagnated and unemployment rose in most of the Western world. When the
established, demand-oriented Keynesian policies failed to sustainably address
the problem, policymakers started turning to an alternative, supply-side policy
paradigm.1 To reduce rigidities and other inefficiencies in the structure of
the economy, the policy approach suggests reforms to deregulate product and
labour markets, privatise state enterprises, liberalise trade and exchange rate
regimes, practise fiscal discipline and reduce tax rates, among other things.
At international level, this policy paradigm found its definitive policy for-
mulation following the end of the Cold War in the so-called ‘Washington Con-
sensus’ (Williamson 1994a, 17f.). In the European Union (EU), the commit-
ment to supply-side reforms were jointly and formally adopted in the 2000 Lis-
bon Agenda, which famously aimed to make Europe ‘the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’ within ten years.2 In spite
of persistent criticism, particularly from the political left, and repeated revi-
sions of the specific policy recommendations, the market-oriented, supply-side
reform agenda has broadly remained in place through the 1990s and 2000s.
Accordingly, it is reflected in numerous international and intergovernmental
policy statements and publications.3
In short, the three decades before the global financial and economic cri-
sis of the late 2000s saw wide political agreement on the appropriateness of
market-oriented structural reform, both at international and European level.
However, the reform track record of European countries, in particular, displays
1 Building on insights of neoclassical economics, the so-called ‘neoliberal paradigm’ advo-
cates promoting growth and employment by ‘liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights,
free markets, and free trade.’ (Harvey 2005, 2).
2 To reach this ambitious goal, the EU member states were urged to adopt a wide
array of policy measures, including more investment in research and development, improved
skill levels of young people and increased work participation of women. But the Lisbon
Agenda also called for extensive supply-side reform; it contained policy prescriptions for
the liberalisation of the product market, for the reform of labour regulation and for the
modernisation of welfare institutions.
3 For example, structural reforms have been an important policy objective of the OECD
through the 1990s and 2000s (OECD 1996, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) and remain so today.
Similarly, the G7 countries agreed on an ‘Agenda for Growth’ in September 2003, a joint
commitment of the governments to supply-side ‘structural policies that increase flexibility
and raise productivity growth and employment.’ (Group of Seven 2003) The G7 ‘Agenda
for Growth’ was expanded into the G20 ‘Accord for Sustainable Growth’ in 2004.
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large disparities between this aspiration and policy reality. In its 2004 World
Economic Outlook ‘Fostering Structural Reforms in Industrial Countries’ the
IMF finds the following:
Reflecting a broad consensus about the substantial benefits of struc-
tural reforms, a general, worldwide trend toward more market-
friendly regulatory frameworks and policies has prevailed since the
early 1980s. The scope and speed of structural reforms has, how-
ever, differed widely across countries and sectors. Among industrial
countries, the variation is especially large in Europe where, despite
welcome steps, excessive product and labor market regulations con-
tinue to be obstacles to growth and employment. (IMF 2004, 103)
On the one hand, the United Kingdom followed much of the rest of the
Anglo-Saxon world – the United States, Australia, New Zealand in particular
– and implemented far-reaching liberal-market reforms in the early 1980s. For
example, the highly-contested Thatcherite policies of the 1980s – rolling back
the influence of the trade unions, the liberalisation of markets and reduction
of tax rates – fundamentally realigned its socio-economic structures (Reitan
2003). Similarly, most of the transformation countries in Eastern Europe im-
plemented radical market-oriented reform after the fall of the Iron Curtain,
broadly following the blueprint of the Washington Consensus (Roland 2004).
On the other hand, the implementation of supply-side structural reforms
in the countries of the western European continent is perceived to have fallen
short of the commitments made. To some degree, this perception relates to
the inability of these countries to reach the arguably overambitious goals set
forth in the Lisbon Strategy (Collignon 2008, Wyplosz 2010, Lundvall & Lorenz
2012). In 2009, the Swedish presidency of the EU proclaimed: ‘[I]t must be
said that the Lisbon Agenda, with only a year remaining before it is to be
evaluated, has been a failure.’4
The overall negative assessment of the Lisbon Agenda, however, obscures
significant variation in the structural reform trajectory also in countries of con-
tinental Western Europe. In the ongoing crisis in Europe, these divergences in
structural reform paths among countries that share the euro as their currency
4 Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, 2 June 2009, reported on EurActive.com,
http://www.euractiv.com/priorities/sweden-admits-lisbon-agenda-failure/
article-182797 (retrieved 01.02.2012 17:29) Already in 2003, a mid-term review of the
Lisbon Strategy – the so-called ‘Kok Report’ – finds that ‘progress to date has been
inadequate.’ (Kok 2004, 39)
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have gained new policy relevance. European policymakers widely hold the
view that the woes in Europe’s crisis countries are attributable – to a signif-
icant degree – to the failure of these countries to implement market-oriented
structural reforms. This resulted in unsustainable competitive divergences
with other European countries that adjusted the structures of their economies
more successfully.5 To overcome the crisis, it is argued, the ‘more vulnerable
countries must leave no doubts about their willingness to reform.’6
This renewed political attention to structural reforms underlines the salience
of political economy research on reform trajectories in Europe: Why have
countries of the western European continent not implemented more radical
supply-side reforms in view of the broad policy consensus on these policies?
Why do these European countries – which are commonly held to be quite
similar in terms of socio-economic and political structure – display significant
divergence in their structural reform trajectories? Why do some countries re-
form their structures while others do not, in spite of institutional arrangements
commonly held to impair prospects for growth and employment? In terms of
social science research, what political, economic and social factors determine
whether or not structural reforms are implemented in European countries?
To contribute to the understanding of of structural reform trajectories in
Europe, this PhD project puts forward three academic papers on the politi-
cal economy of structural reforms in Europe. In doing so, it faces the chal-
lenge that previous political economy research on structural reforms has over-
whelmingly been conducted separately in the social sciences, particularly by
economists and political scientists. In fact, political economy is no clearly
bounded discipline, but the label given to research on the interface between
politics and economics in different social science disciplines.7 Consequently, the
5 It is argued that in Europe’s monetary union – in which competitive currency de-
valuation is no longer possible – competitiveness and by implication supply-side structural
reforms, particularly of the labour market regulation, are particularly important (ECB 2011,
OECD 2012).
6 State of the Union 2012 Address to the European Parliament, European Commission
President José Manuel Durão Barosso, Strasbourg, 12 September 2012, http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm (retrieved 16.01.2013 17:35)
7 Political economy research is the study of a ‘political economy’. Given that the word
‘political’ denotes ‘relating to the body of citizens or state, [...] a political economy, there-
fore, is a particular kind of economy. In the literal meaning of the words it is that kind
of economy which has relation to the community or state [...].’ (George 2006, 55-56) The
classic political economy of Adam Smith, Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes or Karl Marx
is widely understood to be the study of the effect of public policy on economic and social
welfare. In this tradition, researchers in political science have continued to emphasise polit-
ical and market institutions, and political and market power in their analyses (Hall 1997).
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political economy of structural reforms is generally not an interdisciplinary but
a multidisciplinary field of research, consisting of research contributions from
economics and political science, each with their own, non-overlapping scientific
discourses. The three papers of this PhD project build on contributions from
both economics and political science, leveraging the analytical tools of both
disciplines and drawing on the respective empirical insights.
The three papers are distinct, stand-alone contributions, each addressing
different – though closely related – empirical puzzles. They employ different
definitions and research methods, produce slightly different results, and speak
to different strands of the political economy literatures. Nonetheless, all three
papers point to similar findings: In many continental European countries, neo-
corporatist structures and their influence both on the political and economic
regime decisively affect structural reform policies and explain diverging reform
trajectories to a significant degree.
The following introduction – together with the conclusion – provides a
contextual framework for the three papers. More specifically, the introduction
broadly reviews economic and political science contributions on the political
economy of structural reforms, providing a sound theoretical and empirical
base on which to build interdisciplinary research.8 Section 2 critically reviews
the groundwork of the contributions, critically discussing differences in the
construction of the empirical puzzle, in the conceptualisation of institutions,
and in the definition of ‘structural reforms’, and drawing lessons for the PhD
project. Section 3 summarises – in very general terms – the theoretical and em-
pirical findings of the literatures. It argues that the conventional determinants
for structural reforms – socio-economic conditions, government partisanship,
electoral pressures and veto powers – do not provide satisfactory explanations
for the reform trajectories observed in Europe. Section 4 discusses the findings
Economists have defined political economy or – in delineation to classic political economy –
‘new political economy’ as ‘the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political
behaviour and institutions’ (Weingast & Wittman 2006, 3), that is, the transfer rational
choice assumptions and game theoretic insights from market agents to political actors. Tak-
ing a broad approach that is impartial to the methodology chosen, political economy is
here defined as the study of society as a complex system of political, economic and social
institutions and conditions. Political economy thus necessarily takes an interdisciplinary ap-
proach and draws upon political science, economics, sociology and law, where appropriate,
to further the understanding of social phenomena.
8 The discussion of the literature in this introduction will take a ‘birds-eye view’, given
that each of the three papers of the research project will include a more targeted literature
review. Also, given the vast number of contributions that are directly or indirectly relevant
to the understanding of the political economy of structural reforms, spanning several social
science literatures, this literature review makes no claim to completeness. Rather it singles
out exemplary, prominent contributions.
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of the literature on institutional change in countries with neo-corporatist inter-
est representation, arguably one of the most distinctive characteristics of many
continental European countries. Section 5 concludes with a short summary of
the main findings of the literature review and an outlook onto the three papers
of the PhD project.
1.2 Questions and definitions
This section discusses research questions and definitions in the literature on the
political economy of structural reforms. There is, however, no one literature
on the political economy of structural reforms. Political economy research on
structural reforms – and more specifically, the question under which economic,
political and social conditions reforms are more or less likely to be implemented
– developed in economics and political science in parallel.
On the one hand, the systematic analysis of determinants of structural re-
form in the economics literature is relatively young, growing in the context
of the implementation of the Washington Consensus in developing and transi-
tion countries (Müller 2003, 11). Accordingly, the majority of early empirical
literature focuses on Latin American and other emerging economies (Haggard
& Webb 1993), with contributions addressing the political economy of reform
in OECD countries following later (Williamson 1994b, Laban & Sturzenegger
1994, Krueger 2000). Theoretical contributions by economists develop for-
mal, rational choice models of strategic interaction drawing on the insights of
game theory to explain socio-economic policy outcomes, including structural
reforms (Drazen 2000, for a summary of the early seminal contributions of this
literature).9
On the other hand, political science is inherently more concerned with the
9 The literature has been termed ‘economic theory of politics’ (Downs 1957) ‘public
choice’ (Buchanan & Tullock 1962, Mueller 2003), ‘political economics’ (Persson & Tabellini
2000), ‘public choice institutionalism’ (Shepsle 2006) or ‘new political economy’ (Besley
2007), each of which may have a slightly different meaning. For example, ‘public choice’
and ‘political economics’ typically have slightly different sets of assumptions (Blankart &
Koester 2006). In contrast to classic economics, this approach ‘focuses less on picking
good policies per se, and more on picking institutions apt to implement and sustain good
policies.’ (Besley 2007, F571, emphasis in original) A much-cited work on structural reforms
includes, for example, the ‘war of attrition’ model by Alesina and Drazen, which shows how
uncertainty over the distribution of costs and benefits of fiscal consolidation can lead to a
delay in welfare-improving policy reform (Alesina & Drazen 1991). Some of these models
have subsequently also been tested empirically. For example, Alesina et al. (2006) develop
testable implications for the ‘war of attrition’ model and attempt to empirically confirm
their theoretic insights.
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description and analysis of political institutions and processes than economics.
However, the discipline has long had ‘much more to say about institutional
effects than about institutional origins and change.’ (Pierson 2000, 476) It
is probably safe to say that the emergence of contemporary political science
research on structural reforms in Europe is closely related to the first wave of
welfare state retrenchment in the aftermath of the first oil crises in the 1980s.
From this starting point, political science has produced a wealth of empirical
research on the political economy of structural reforms, typically taking the
form of case or comparative studies. Today, there are country case studies
more or less explicitly addressing the issue of institutional change for almost
every OECD country.10
In spite of some recent methodological convergence, however, political econ-
omy remains – regrettably – a multidisciplinary field, with few overlaps in the
academic discourse between economics and political science.11 Accordingly,
the literatures differ in terms of the construction of the empirical puzzle on
structural reform trajectories in Europe, in terms of their conceptualisation
of institutions and institutional change as well as in terms of their definition
of a ‘structural reforms’. To provide a sound theoretical basis for the three
papers of the PhD project, the following subsections critically discuss these
differences and – where possible – develop a synthesis approach.
10 There are political economy case studies of Germany (Katzenstein 1987, Kitschelt &
Streeck 2004, Zohlnhöfer 2007, Streeck 2009, Hassel & Schiller 2010, and others), Sweden
(Lindbeck 1997, Lindvall & Sebring 2005, Rojas 2005, and others), Italy (Ginsborg 2003, and
others), France (Hancké 2002, and others), the United Kingdom (Howell 2005, and others)
and the United States (Pierson & Skocpol 2007, and others), to name just a few. The com-
parative politics literature has also contributed to the understanding of structural reforms in
different policy areas by contrasting institutional stability and change across countries and
across time. Comparative research work has been done on labour market reform (Esping-
Andersen & Regini 2000, Wood 2001), pension reforms (Bonoli 2000, Myles & Pierson 2001,
Natali & Rhodes 2004, Häusermann 2010), vocational training reform (Anderson & Hassel
2008), industrial relations reform (Traxler et al. 2001), health care reform (Hacker 1999)
and many other policy fields.
11 It should be noted that the increasing use of the rational choice assumption and so-
phisticated quantitative tools – previously the domain of economists – in political science is
blurring the boundaries of this discipline to economics in terms of methodology (Hall 2007).
In addition, an increasing number of contributions from economics are resorting to analyt-
ical tools such as descriptive ‘narratives’ (Bates et al. 1998, Rodrik 2003), previously used
predominantly by political scientists. For example, Boeri et al. (2006) provide case stud-
ies on reforms of the telecommunication, energy and electricity sectors to derive answers
to the questions on how best to introduce structural reform. Many of the contemporary
contributions are thus attributable to the economics or political science literature more on
the grounds of department affiliation of their authors or the journal titles in which they are
published than on the grounds of the methods used.
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The empirical puzzle on structural reforms in Europe
A striking difference between the economics and political science literatures on
the political economy of structural reforms is the construction of the research
question, namely whether the absence or the presence of structural reforms is
considered to be puzzling.
Economists, in particular, are generally surprised by the political resilience
against reform towards more market-oriented institutional structures in Eu-
rope. From their perspective it is bewildering why structural reform measures
that are thought to improve the welfare of an economy, for example by enhanc-
ing growth and employment prospects, are not implemented or, at least, not
implemented more quickly (Williamson 1994b, Heinemann 2004). Already in
the early 1990s, Fernandez & Rodrik (1991, 1146) identified this puzzle as one
of the fundamental problems of political economy: ‘Why do governments so of-
ten fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency-enhancing?’
This formulation of the puzzle on the political economy of structural re-
forms in Europe has two important problems: First, it requires a strong norma-
tive assumption about the desirability of liberal market reform, which certainly
not all social scientists subscribe to (Crouch & Streeck 1997, Rodrik 2006,
Amable et al. 2009, Armingeon & Baccaro 2012, Hall 2012). With its welfare-
maximising perspective of socio-economic institutions, classic economics seeks
to explain the persistence of welfare inferior institutions in European coun-
tries.12 Second, a negative, blanket assessment of the structural reform efforts
in Europe does not hold up under scrutiny. Particularly the negative overall
assessment of the Lisbon Agenda too easily obscures significant variation in
the reform trajectories among continental EU countries.
Although none of the continental western European countries followed the
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, at least four stylised reform tra-
jectories can be identified: A first group of European countries adapted their
economies relatively early and subsequently carried forward reform policies
through the following decades successfully. Sweden, together with other Scan-
dinavian countries, for example, implemented quite far-reaching labour market
and welfare system reforms already in the mid-1990s, but remained at the top
12 In this context, it should be note that – even taking a non-normative approach – the
absence of reform in continental European economies can be construed also as a puzzle, as
done in the previous introductory section: The observation that all European governments
have a longstanding commitment to liberal market reform raises the question as to why the
continental Western European economies have not followed the Anglo-Saxon economies in
implementing more far-reaching liberal-market reforms.
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of the so-called ‘Lisbon league tables’ for most of the early 2000s.13 A sec-
ond sample of countries implemented structural reforms late, living through
extended periods of low growth and high unemployment without attempting
any significant institutional changes. Germany, for example, was known as
the ‘sick man of Europe’ through much of the 1990s. However, since the early
2000s Germany has been able to paradigmatically reform central elements of its
welfare and labour market institutions. More recently, the German economy
has experienced higher growth rates and decreasing levels of unemployment, re-
ferred to as the second GermanWirtschaftswunder by some.14 A third group of
countries took measures to adapt the institutional structure of their economies
early, but subsequently introduced no further reforms, in spite of low growth
and high unemployment. Italy, for example, implemented fiscal, labour market
and pension reforms in the 1990s. At the turn of the millennium, Paul Pierson
found that, in terms of welfare state reforms, ‘Italy [is] deserving [of] the sec-
ond prize’, runner-up only to the Netherlands (Pierson 2001b, 448). Ten years
later, however, this assessment no longer holds. Through the early 2000s, Italy
is recurrently listed among the worst performers in the Lisbon league tables
and has inherited the title of ‘sick man of Europe’ from Germany.15 The coun-
try had the lowest average growth rate of all EU-27 countries over the past
decade, with just 0.3 percent.16 Fourth and finally, some of the Mediterranean
countries, in particular, did not at all significantly adapted their institutional
structures before the onset of the global financial and economic crisis in 2007.
In the Lisbon league tables, for example, Greece and Portugal have regularly
been singled out as particularly bad performers.
The implementation of significant structural reform policies in a majority
of European countries, in turn, typically presents a puzzle to political scien-
tists. Political science has been defined as the study of the ‘constraints to
the use of social power’ (Goodin 2011, 5). In this Weberian understanding
of political decision-making, policies are determined by the relations between
13 In order to facilitate reforms by peer pressure – one of the mechanisms aimed at en-
couraging reform by means of the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (Zeitlin & Pochet 2005) –
several academics and non-governmental organisation published rankings of reform success
of the EU countries. The Centre for Economic Reform published ten ‘Lisbon Scorecards’
from 2001 to 2010, in which it tracked the reform progress of the EU member states (Ban-
nerman 2001, 2002, Murray 2003, 2004, Murray & Wanlin 2005, Wanlin 2006, Barysch et al.
2007, 2008, Whyte & Tilford 2009, 2010). For other, technically more sophisticated league
tables, see Blanke et al. (2008), Ioannou et al. (2008).
14 Germany’s rebounding economy, The Economist, 4 January 2007.
15 The real sick man of Europe, in The Economist, 19 May 2005.
16 Data Source: Own calculations based on OECD World Economic Outlook 2011
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various groups or actors that share political power. Because the allocation of
power within a political system is a zero-sum game, there is a good chance that
an impulse to change the status quo by a power-yielding political actor will
be constrained by countervailing political powers. Even if structural reforms
are widely thought to enhance social welfare, political scientists would a priori
not expect these to be universally implemented.
This is particularly true for many of the West European countries. When
compared with other industrialised democracies, a relatively large number of
political actors – parliamentary groups in a coalition government, second cham-
bers of parliament, powerful interest groups, sub-national entities (i.e. federal
states), constitutional courts, supranational bodies (i.e. the European Union
institutions) – share power with the government. Countries are left with ‘very
modest capacities for restructuring’ (Pierson 2001a, 448). This conventional
wisdom in political science, however, stands in puzzling contrast to the obser-
vation that continental European countries that were long held to be particu-
larly resilient towards structural reforms – such as Germany, Austria and the
Netherlands – underwent significant institutional change.
The findings on the construction of the empirical puzzle on structural re-
form trajectories in Europe have two important implications for this PhD
project: First, political economy research should avoid a normative approach
to structural reforms in the construction of their research puzzle. Rather, fol-
lowing a more positivist approach, it should pursue questions resulting from
empirical observations that contradict conventional empirical or theoretical
wisdom. Accordingly, the papers of this PhD project – with the exception of
a welfare analysis in Paper Two – remain broadly agnostic on the question
whether deregulatory or (re-)regulatory supply-side reforms are desirable from
a social welfare perspective.
Second, the above analysis of reform trajectories points towards the per-
sistence of episodes of institutional stability and change in most of the con-
tinental European countries. Rather than a theory of institutional stability
or institutional change by itself, political economy research should contribute
to explaining both episodes of inertia and instances of reform to progress the
understanding of structural reform trajectories in Europe.
Institutions and institutional change
The social sciences lack a single definition of institutions (Rhodes et al. 2008,
xiii). Economics, political science and sociology have developed several distinct
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approaches to thinking about institutions, including ‘historical institutional-
ism’, ‘rational choice institutionalism’, ‘organisational’ or ‘sociological insti-
tutionalism’, ‘discursive institutionalism’ and possibly several more. There is
a vast and ongoing debate on the advantages and shortcomings, delineations
and the possible reconciliation of the different strands of institutionalism (Hall
& Taylor 1996, Thelen 1999, Reich 2000, Steinmo 2001, Campbell & Pedersen
2001, Campbell 2004, Peters 2005, Hall 2007, and many more). In the follow-
ing brief discussion of the conceptualisation of institutional change, the focus
will be on historical and rational choice institutionalism, arguably the two
approaches to institutions most prominent in economics and political science.
Historical institutionalism defines institutions as ‘the formal or informal
procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational
structure of the polity or political economy’ (Hall & Taylor 1996, 938).17 Cen-
tral to the paradigm of historical institutionalism is the understanding that
current and future individual or policy choices are determined by historically
established institutions or former choices (Steinmo et al. 1992, Thelen 2004,
Hall 2008, and others); that ‘history is not a chain of independent events’
(Steinmo 2008, 166). Quasi by its nature, historical institutionalists did not
conventionally emphasise institutional change, but gave substantial weight to
the sequence of events and the concept of ‘path dependency’. Existing policy
arrangements are in place particularly because institutions tend to be self-
reinforcing, that is, changing the institution entails switching costs (Pierson
2000). A plausible example – predominantly in common law systems – would
be past court rulings that bind all subsequent court rulings (so-called ‘prece-
dential constraint’).
How then is institutional change understood in historical institutionalism?
What drives institutional change? To account for institutional change, re-
searchers have conventionally resorted to the concept of ‘critical junctures’, at
which point in time institutions are launched or amended.18 On such occa-
sions, political conflict emerges as the appropriate response to the calamity.
Following closely the political science paradigm, institutions are then formed
or re-formed depending on the prevailing power relations (Knight 1992). For
example, in the early 1960s, existing laws and court rulings (path dependent
17 In other words, institutions are sanction-enforced rules and regulations (‘formal insti-
tutions’) as well as non-codified constraints on the behaviour of individuals or groups within
society (‘informal institutions’) (Amable & Palombarini 2008).
18 Critical junctures may be understood as windows of opportunity that open up partic-
ularly due to social, political or economic upheaval, for example a severe economic crisis
(Gourevitch 1986).
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institutions) on race segregation in the United States were challenged by the
campaigns of the African-American civil rights movement and escalating race
riots (the critical juncture). This led to a power struggle between political pro-
ponents and opponents of race segregation in Congress, which was ultimately
decided by the opponents with the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 (insti-
tutional change), setting the US on a different institutional path (Lieberman
2005).
More recently, Streeck & Thelen (2005) provided a much-noted critique
of this conventional approach to explaining institutional change, which al-
lows only for long periods of institutional continuity and isolated instances of
change at critical junctures. Rather than static institutions that sporadically
experience ruptures, as conventional historical institutionalism would hold,
political actors continuously redefine institutions to accommodate changing
requirements. Often these adjustments take place without significant political
conflict or public debate. These mechanisms allow for a process of ‘incremen-
tal change with transformative results’ (Streeck & Thelen 2005, 9, Mahoney
& Thelen 2010).19 The concept of gradual, transformative change within the
framework of historical institutionalism is an important addition to the con-
ventional, overly static critical juncture approach.
Turning to the rational choice approach to institutions: This concept of
institutions builds strongly on the assumptions of microeconomic theory, em-
phasising – to varying degrees – strategic interaction between political actors,
and political choices based on the balancing of costs and benefits with the aim
of maximising personal welfare. In a minimalist interpretation, institutions
are simply understood as pattern behaviours induced by strategic interaction.
These behaviours are self-reinforcing because they induce a particular and re-
curring choice of each actor that maximises his or her payoffs, given his or her
preferences and given the choices of all other actors. This implies, importantly,
that institutions cannot be understood as existing separately from strategies
and actions of individuals or their organisations (Calvert 1995, Aoki 2001).
An obvious empirical example for this type of institution is the ‘mutually
assured destruction’ (MAD) between NATO and the Soviet Union, guarantee-
ing the annihilation of both the attacker and the defender and thus deterring
19Case studies have described institutional change as a gradual process rather than abrupt
political incident. For example, Myles and Pierson show how European pension systems
responded to the challenge of fiscal austerity in the 1990s (Myles & Pierson 2001). Strongly
predetermined by their historically-grown institutional setup, the European pension system
did not fundamentally change – for example by switching from a pay-as-you-go to a funded
system – but rather underwent adjustments within their respective systems.
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any military offensive. This was a stable, self-reinforcing and informal insti-
tutional arrangement. In very abstract terms, practically all institutions can
be conceptualised as ‘equilibrium ways of doing things’ (Shepsle 2006, 23).20
Clearly, however, this approach disallows for any historical considerations.21
Unsurprisingly, the rational choice approach to institutions has been criticised
for being overly functionalist and ‘a-historical’ (Greve 2006, 368).
What does this imply for institutional change and the determinants of in-
stitutional change? Institutional change can be understood in the same way as
a deviation from a Nash equilibrium. For this to happen, the payoffs and/or
the preferences of one or more of the actors have to change. For payoffs and/or
preferences to change it will typically require an exogenous shock. For exam-
ple, mutually assured destruction was abandoned after the economic collapse of
socialism in Eastern Europe and Russia and the end of the (perceived) recipro-
cal threat to each other’s socio-economic system. Similar to ‘critical junctures’
in historical institutionalism, significant upheaval will typically be necessary
to shift payoffs and/or preferences in such a way that there is institutional
change.22
In short, political science and economics have developed two, quasi-antithetic
interpretations of institutions – as exogenously defined norms (historical in-
stitutionalism) and as endogenously defined, equilibrium behaviour (rational
choice institutionalism) – emphasising ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ respectively.
Beyond these two interpretations, there is, however, a spectrum of descrip-
tions of institutions that fall in between the two archetypes, borrowing both
from historical and rational choice institutionalism. One prominent approach
to institutions in the economics literature, commonly associated with Douglass
North (Weingast 2002), interprets institutions as ‘the rules of the game in a
society or, more formally, the humanly-devised constraints that shape human
20 Think of road traffic; traffic law typically dictates either right-hand or left-hand driving.
However, this law could just as well be thought of as a Nash equilibrium, from which no
motorist has a reasonable incentive to deviate. Formally, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
is ‘an action profile with the property that no single player can obtain a higher payoff by
deviating unilaterally from this profile’ (Darity 2008, 540).
21 For example, this approach disallows considering the influence that British and conti-
nental traffic law had on traffic rules in their former colonies.
22 Greif & Laitin (2004) present a model of endogenous institutional change. Using an
infinitely-repeated game structure (see Paper Two for an application of a similar model),
they show in an analytical narrative how gradual changes in the payoffs can lead to the
collapse of an equilibrium and institutional change. More generally, these changes in payoffs
can be thought of as new conditions, which are generated by the institutional structure itself
and which may at some point ‘overwhelm self-enforcing behaviour associated with it’ (Greif
& Laitin 2004, 634).
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interaction.’ (North 1990, 3) This approach has a strong emphasis on rational
choice behaviour, that is, it focuses on how institutions shape human behaviour
by providing incentives. Note, however, that institutions are here exogenous
to the behaviour of actors. Subsequently, power relations are decisive for in-
stitutional change (North 1993). In this, the approach is closer to historical
than to rational choice institutionalism.23
A second prominent hybrid approach is that of institutions as economic re-
sources (Hall & Soskice 2001a). More specifically, this approach suggest that
rather than being costly constraints on their scope of action, institutions are
best seen as ‘capital’ that actors can use to maximise their utility. On the
one hand, institutions here again are, a priori, exogenously given to the ac-
tors. On the other hand, however, given their quasi-functional character, these
institutions will come under pressure to change when they fail to serve the in-
terests of the actors: ‘Where an institution fails to serve [...], it becomes fragile
and susceptible to defection from its rules.’ (Hall & Thelen 2009, 11) In its
understanding of institutional change, the ‘institutions as resources’ approach
is thus closer to archetypical rational choice institutionalism than historical
institutionalism.
Figure 1.1: Institutionalisms and the associated determinants for institutional
change
In summary, the political economy sets out to analyse institutional change
with quite different understandings of the nature of institutions. Historical
institutionalism emphasises the formal and binding character of institutions.
23 Tellingly, North’s concept of institutions as been claimed both by rational choice and
historical institutionalists (Shepsle 2006, Ebbinghaus 2009, for example).
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Rational choice institutionalism emphasises the societal consensus necessarily
underlying a sustainable (set of) institutions. This divergent understanding
of institutions also implies differences in the understanding of institutional
change. Particularly, in the historical institutionalism tradition, institutional
change is commonly associated with changes in power relations. In classic
rational choice institutionalism, institutional change is associated more with
the preferences of politico-economic actors (see Figure 1.1 on page 19).
The subsequent three papers of the PhD project follow different conceptu-
alisations of institutions. While Paper 1 and Paper 3 broadly follow a historical
institutionalist understanding of institutions, the model presented in Paper 2
conceptualises institutions squarely in the rational choice tradition. However,
much care is taken to avoid letting the conceptualisation of institutions guides
the understanding of institutional change. To varying degrees, all three papers
take into account of changes in power relations and changes in institutional
preferences – balancing structure and agency – to explain the absence and
presence of structural reforms. A synthesis of the two conceptualisations of
institutional change is attempted in the conclusion of the PhD project.
The concept of ‘structural reforms’
Structural reforms are the object of analysis of this PhD project. Paper 1
analyses the coming about of the ‘Agenda 2010’ reforms in Germany in the
early 2000s. The focus of the analytical narrative in Paper 2 is the labour
market reform trajectory of Germany and Sweden in the 1990s and 2000s.
Paper 3 focuses on instances of unemployment benefit system reform in the
EU15 from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s.
These observations of structural reform policy share common features, that
broadly fit the following definition:
Structural reforms are enacted government policies intended to fun-
damentally change for the better the institutional structure govern-
ing a policy sector.
More specifically, five characteristics delineate structural reforms from other
government policies: First, structural reforms are geared towards the institu-
tional structure or ‘institutional regime’ (Streeck & Thelen 2005, 9-16) of (a
policy sector in) a political economy. Heyse et al. (2006, 171) define reform
as ‘the fundamental, intended, and enforced change of the policy paradigm
and/or organizational structure.’ Reform, as such, can relate to government
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policy in general, or the organisational or institutional structure in particu-
lar.24 ‘Policy reform’ thus is the broader concept, and refers to more or less
paradigmatic changes in policies that do not necessarily affect the institutional
regime directly. They may, for example, include shifts in government spending
levels and priorities, foreign and development policy etc. ‘Structural reforms’,
however, result from the implementation of policies specifically targeted to
change the institutional structure or regime.25
To further underline this characteristic, it is useful to distinguish ‘struc-
tural reforms’ from ‘structural adjustment’, which is another closely related
concept. Similar to ‘policy reform’, the term ‘structural adjustment’ is often
used synonymously with ‘structural reforms’ in public policy and academic
writing. Structural adjustment in the strict sense, however, is a technical term
for a set of policy recommendations by the International Monetary Fund or
the World Bank, the implementation of which is a condition for the provision
of loans. In consequence, structural adjustment usually has two components,
namely structural reforms and macroeconomic stabilisation.26
It should be noted that, in practice, it might not always be straightfor-
ward to disentangle structural from other socio-economic policies on the basis
of just this one characteristic. For example, the switch from a growth- and
employment-oriented to a price stability-oriented monetary policy clearly con-
stitutes a paradigmatic policy reform. However, changing the mandate and
organisation of a central bank to this end clearly constitutes a structural re-
form. Distinguishing between structural and other policies becomes increas-
ingly difficult, the broader the concept of ‘institution’ is defined.27
Second, ‘structural reforms’ imply the conscious ex ante intent to change
the institutional structure rather than change as the result of other, incidental
exogenous developments or unintended secondary effect of other policy mea-
sures. Structural reforms are thus understood to be the result of active policy
measures targeted towards the institutional framework of the political econ-
omy. This sets the concept apart from the broader, more passive concept of
‘institutional change’. Institutional change may come about by means of the
24 Note that ‘reform’ is a transitive verb that requires one or more objects to form a
meaningful sentence with it.
25 In a much quoted contribution, Visser & Hemerijck (1997) similarly distinguish between
changes to the rules of the game and changes in the goals and principles of policy.
26 The latter are policy reforms to address severe internal and external economic imbal-
ances, such as the inflation rate, balance of payments and public finances.
27 For example, a growth- or inflation-oriented monetary policy may be considered an
institution in itself.
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implementation of structural reforms, but may just as well be the result of
other, incidental socio-economic developments.28 Additionally, policy changes
that are not directly targeted towards the institutional framework of the polit-
ical economy may nonetheless (indirectly) affect the same. These incidental or
unintended institutional changes are, however, not understood to be structural
reforms.
It should be noted, however, that unintended (and typically gradual) insti-
tutional change can have significant repercussions on structural reform policies.
As the three papers of this PhD project demonstrate, non-deliberate change of
the institutional structure of the political economy commonly induces political
initiatives for structural reform. These institutional changes may come about
due to exogenous factors. Paper 1 shows, for example, how the reunification of
West and East Germany, together with progressing international economic in-
tegration, contributed to putting into question the German economic model in
the 1990s. In this way, non-deliberate institutional changes may come about
due to the unintended consequences of other socio-economic policies. In its
analytical narrative of Sweden, for example, Paper 2 shows how wage com-
pression undermined the functioning of the country’s high-quality industrial
regime and subsequently brought about structural reforms.
Third, the term ‘reform’ semantically always implies the ex ante intent of
positive change. Structural reforms are intended to change the institutional
regime towards improving socio-economic conditions, which are felt to be un-
satisfactory in some way or another. That is, they are meant to improve
economic growth, productivity (e.g. through education, and research and de-
velopment), employment or work participation, fiscal sustainability, social or
gender equality, and environmental sustainability etc. Again, this sets apart
‘structural reforms’ from ‘institutional change’. Institutional change is the
broader term, referring to an alteration of the institutional structure in gen-
eral, and is a priori neutral regarding the welfare effects of the alteration to
the institutional regime.
In this context, it should be noted that in the public policy and academic
debate ‘structural reforms’ have long been used synonymously with supply-
28 For example, when the Bismarckian old-age pension for citizens over the age of 65 was
created in the late 19th century, it was only marginally relevant, given that life expectancy
was below 45. With the drastic increase in life expectancy through the 20th century, the
pension system has become one of the pillars of the modern welfare systems, accounting for
12.5 percent of GDP in the EU by the turn of the last century. Data source: EUROSTAT
Main Economic Indicators
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side reforms; market deregulation and welfare state retrenchment.29 Alesina
et al. (2008, 1), for example, defines structural reforms as the ‘deregulation in
the product markets and liberalization and deregulation in the labor markets.’
Much of the political science literature follows similar definitions of structural
reforms and focuses on the political economy of welfare state retrenchment
(Pierson & Castles 2000, Pierson 2001b, Starke 2006, Palier 2010, among many
others). This one-sided approach to structural reforms is easily accounted for
by the long-lasting policy consensus on the liberal market paradigm described
in the previous section.
However, it neglects the fact that structural reforms can in principle be
deregulatory as well as (re-)regulatory. Political preferences for the former or
latter may change over time, even within the same policy sector.30 Structural
reforms of financial market institutions provide a good example: Through the
1980s, 1990s and 2000s structural policies abolished market regulation with the
aim ‘to free up market forces and to promote long-term growth’ (Lall 1995,
2020). Following the financial and economic crisis of the late 2000s, much effort
is being put into re-regulating the same markets. The aim of these structural
reforms is to ‘control the forces that led the system to become absorbed with
itself and ensure [...] that the financial system provides a sustainable contri-
bution to economic growth’.31
Fourth, structural reforms are ‘enacted’ policies; institutional change for
which political agreement was reached and/or for which legislation was passed.
This simply implies that a policy aiming to change the institutional framework
that is not successfully implemented – for example due to the resistance of
opposition groups, due to the veto of a constitutional body in the legislative
process or other macro-political factors – is not considered a structural reform.
29 The IMF has defined ‘structural reforms’ as ‘measures that, broadly speaking, change
the institutional framework and constraints governing market behavior and outcomes.’
(IMF 2004, 104) Similarly, Val Koromzay, Director at the OECD, defined structural re-
forms as ‘changes in structural policy settings directed at improving static or dynamic re-
source allocation in the economy.’ (in his contribution to the conference Economic Reforms
for Europe: Growth Opportunities in an Enlarged European Union, Slovakia, 18 March
2004, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/59/31506532.pdf, retrieved 18.01.2013 16:35, quoted
in OECD (2009, 16)).
30 More recently, political economy research has taken a broader approach to structural
reforms, taking into account that structural change does not necessarily imply the conver-
gence towards a liberal market economy. Häusermann (2010, 8) argues, for example, that
‘the main question is not just whether welfare states can be preserved, or whether they have
to be radically dismantled. Rather, the challenge that social policy makers face today is a
genuine adaptation of social protection to a profoundly altered economic and social context.’
31 The ECB’s response to the crisis, speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the
European Central Bank, Berlin, 26 May 2011
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At the same time, enactment of a structural reforms does not imply the success
of the policy. That is, the definition does not require a structural policy to
achieve its intended goal of improving socio-economic conditions.
Fifth and finally, structural reforms change the institutional structure of
a political economy in a fundamental way. In contrast to marginal adjust-
ments to one or more institutions, structural reforms target the institutional
regime of (a policy sector in) a political economy; the set of institutions that
directs and shapes the behaviour of socio-economic actors. That is, struc-
tural reforms bring about paradigmatic rather than parametric institutional
change. Returning to the example of monetary policy: A reform that pro-
vides a central bank with a price-stability mandate and makes it independent
from political interference is clearly a paradigmatic change of the institutional
regime. Changing the way central bank officials are appointed, while broadly
preserving their independence, would have to be considered as a parametric
adjustment rather than a structural reform of the institutional regime. In
the seminal taxonomy of policy change put forward by Hall (1993), structural
reforms are thus necessarily ‘third order policy changes’:
‘First and second order change can be seen as [...] a process that
adjusts policy without challenging the overall terms of a given pol-
icy paradigm [...]. Third order change, by contrast, is [...] marked
by the radical changes in the overarching terms of policy discourse
associated with a “paradigm shift”.’ (Hall 1993, 279).
The above, five characteristics of structural reforms set clearly the concept
apart from institutional change as ‘the result from an accumulation of gradual
and incremental change’, as described in the seminar contribution by Streeck
& Thelen (2005, 19). More specifically, Streeck & Thelen (2005), Mahoney &
Thelen (2010) and others argue that transformative institutional change may
be the result of the slow rising salience of previously subordinate institutions
vis-à-vis other institutions (‘displacement’), the gradual change of existing
institutions by attaching new elements (‘layering’), the alteration of the scope,
meaning and function of an institutions due to the change of its environment
(‘drift’), the redeployment of an institution for new purposes (‘conversion’) or
the gradual breakdown of institutions over time (‘exhaustion’). Indeed, many
institutional transformations may take place according to these mechanisms.
The process of structural reform is, however, almost antithetic to the pro-
cess of ‘incremental change with transformative results’. While structural re-
forms are fundamental, intended, and formerly enacted, gradual institutional
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change is typically incremental, unintentional (in its socio-economic scope) and
not necessarily subject to conventional legislative processes. Note, first, that
while the cumulative effect of incremental adjustments may indeed paradig-
matically change the institutional regime, a priori each individual incident of
change is marginal in nature. Second, gradual institutional change happens
with a significant degree of determinism.32 This does not match the political
purpose inherent in structural reform policies.
Accordingly, gradual institutional change is likely to follow a different logic
of policy-making than structural reforms. macro-political factors – the elec-
toral system, the legislative process, government centralisation, interest group
representation etc. – are less likely to matter for gradual institutional change
than for structural reforms. In many cases, incidents of incremental institu-
tional change follow ‘political skirmishing’ over ambiguities of a technical or
legal nature. While individual incidents of institutional change may be subject
to political contestation, the transformative effect of the sum of the incidents
of change is hardly appreciable by the political public. In contrast, politi-
cians commonly adopted structural reform policies to demonstrate leadership.
Their fundamental and deliberate nature is more likely to lead to broad public
debate, and render their success or failure subject to macro-political factors.
While the mechanisms of gradual institutional change and structural re-
forms are different, there are – in principle – important links between marginal
and structural institutional change. First, note should be taken of the non-
linear nature of marginal institutional change. Generally, it is assumed that in-
cremental change has transformative impact cumulatively. It should be noted,
however, that small institutional adjustments unwittingly lead to ‘structural
breaks’ and paradigmatic institutional change. For example, marginally ad-
justments may change the level of taxes or transfers beyond a threshold, in-
ducing firms and households in a policy sector to fundamentally change their
behaviour, and thus lead to a change in the institutional structure of the politi-
cal economy. However, according to the above definition, this non-incremental
institutional change is not a structural reform in the absence of political intent
32 Streeck & Thelen (2005, 19) argue that ‘significant change can emanate from inherent
ambiguities and “gaps” that exist by design or emerge over time between formal institutions
and their actual implementation and enforcement’. This implies that ‘structure’ precedes
‘agency’ by predefining institutions that become subject to change as well as the possible
directions this change may take. Theories of gradual institutional change thus broadly con-
tinue to emphasise the importance of path dependency, arguing that ‘institutional structure
poses [...] a significant constraint on the degree and direction of change’. (Bonoli & Palier
2000, 334)
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for fundamental institutional change.
Second, marginal institutional changes are commonly a precursor (rather
than an element) of structural reforms. In this, structural reforms can again
be interpreted as a special case of a ‘third order policy change’. Insights on
policy change and social learning put forward by Hall (1993) apply accord-
ingly: Often policy makers attempt to address socio-economic problems with
marginal adjustments to the institutional framework. Only if these policies
are seen to fail, are more fundamental structural reform policies put forward.
Paper 1 on the reform trajectory in Germany, for example, shows how succes-
sive governments attempted to ‘fix’ the institutional structure with marginal
adjustments before the government of Gerhard Schröder decided to initiate
more paradigmatic institutional changes.
1.3 Determinants of structural reforms
This section explores the determinants of structural reforms in the literature on
the political economy of structural reforms. Given the multidisciplinary nature
of the political economy of structural reforms literature, the following review
of the political economy findings on the determinants of structural reforms
will draw upon contributions from both political science and economics. It
will discuss if and how far broad determinants for institutional stability and
change identified in the literature help to explain the diverse structural reform
trajectories in Europe, closing with an indication of an avenue for further
research.
To begin with, however, the wealth of contributions from economics and
political science raises the question of how to select and organise the literature’s
findings. In a modern democracy, structural reforms are, when implemented,
the result of a policy process that starts with the emergence of a policy issue,
typically followed by the formulation of alternative policy responses, subse-
quently followed by the deliberation of these alternative policies and ending
with the selection of one of a policy for implementation. A priori, a multitude
of factors can influence this policy process in any phase, determining for ex-
ample whether a policy issue emerges in the first place and whether it leads
to the change of the institutional status quo or not. In a somewhat stylised
way, the findings of the literature can be attributing to different stages of the
policy-making process (see Figure 1.2 on page 27).33
33 Adopting a stage model of the policy process may be open to criticism, on the grounds
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Figure 1.2: A reduced-form stages model of the policy process, following Birk-
land (2010)
In a reduced form of the model, four stages can be identified; the emergence
of policy issues, the agenda setting, the selection of policy alternatives, and
the enactment and implementation of the policy. At the first stage, we may
expect that grievances with socio-economic environment would motivate policy
initiatives. At the second stage, these grievances need to be translated into
policy proposals. Among the most important determinants of how grievances
are translated into policy proposals is government partisanship. Third, the
electorate has an important role to play in the selection of policy options. At
the fourth and final stage, the formal and informal political influence of actors
may decide on the successful enactment and implementation of the new policy.
Determinants for the emergence of a policy issue: Socio-
economic conditions
What determines whether or not the reform of an institution of a set of insti-
tutions becomes a policy issue? Broadly, it may be expected that pressures
to reform institutional structures emerge if and when the status quo no longer
seems to fit the requirements in a satisfactory way. Among the most widely
discussed socio-economic developments that are thought to create pressures
for industrialised countries to change their institutional structure are global-
that a stage model necessarily oversimplifies the policy-making process. It may be noted
that the policy process is not a linear one and that certain factors influence the policy process
at different stages. Nonetheless, the stylised stage model is ‘a remarkably helpful way to
structure our thinking about the policy process’ (Birkland 2010, 26) and about the factors
influencing its outcome.
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isation34, technological progress35 and demographic change36. Put in a the
shortest possible way, it is argued that increased international competition
and new automation technologies have led to the displacement in particular
of traditional manufacturing industries in Western European countries37 This
is putting many of the established institutions – in Europe, particularly the
institutions of the welfare state – into question. For example, high and increas-
ing levels of structural unemployment may put at disposition labour market
regulation and unemployment benefits. At the same time, demographic devel-
opments towards an ageing population may increase pressures to change the
health and pension elements of the welfare state.
However, on closer inspection, these macro-factors as such are of little
explanatory value, particularly for the diverse reform trajectories in Europe.
Technological progress, globalisation and demographic change broadly affect
all European countries in the same way. For example, European Single Mar-
ket and euro area membership – both movements towards closer international
economic integration in Europe – are found to be significantly positively corre-
lated to the propensity of European countries towards structural reform (Høj
et al. 2006, Leiner-Killinger et al. 2007, Duval 2008). At the same, however,
all continental European economies are part of the Single Market and most of
them are also part of the euro area.
It could be argued that the macro-factors matter for the emergence of po-
34 Globalisation, the term commonly used for the process of ‘international economic inte-
gration’ (Rodrik 2000), is exposing many economies to a new level of international compe-
tition, by adding more and more items to the list of internationally exchanged commodities
(Sapir 2006) and allows for an ‘easier flow of knowledge and information across borders.’
(Heinemann 2006) Services, which were formerly not thought of as exposed to international
competition, are also increasingly confronted with competition from other countries (Herman
2010).
35 It has been argued that technical progress is changing the political economy into a ‘post-
industrial society’ (Ritzer 2007). Added value was not primarily gained from the production
of goods, but more and more through the service industry. Productivity gains resulted more
from better academic or creative abilities than through more productive manual labour.
Blue-collar jobs were being lost and replaced by job-openings for white-collar staff.
36 Many industrialised economies are facing huge demographic changes on several ac-
counts. Higher income and the invention of birth control have left many European societies
with a skewed population age structure, with disproportionately few young and working
people and relatively many elderly and retired people. Additionally, the formerly relatively
homogeneous societies have found it difficult to integrate a substantial influx of immigrants
into their societies and economies. These demographic changes are said not only put sub-
stantial strain on social security systems (Feldstein 2005), but also create shortages of skilled
labour for Europe’s economies that specialised on technologically sophisticated products and
services.
37 For an account of the effect of globalisation, for example, on institutional change, see
Schwartz (2001), Djelic & Quack (2003), Campbell (2004).
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litical pressures to change the institutional status quo only in as far as they
lead to socio-economic crisis, negative economic growth and fast growing un-
employment, for example. Indeed, one the most robust findings of the political
economy literature is evidence for the ‘crisis hypothesis’. The hypothesis states
that severe economic downturns encourage reform. Already in 1995, Tommasi
& Velasco (1996, 13) establish ‘that economic crisis seems either to facilitate
or outright cause economic reforms is part of the new conventional wisdom on
reform’. Targeted quantitative empirical studies show that the crisis hypoth-
esis holds across countries and time (Drazen & Easterly 2001, Pitlik & Wirth
2003). With different emphasis and restrictions, broader quantitative empiri-
cal studies also seem to confirm this finding (IMF 2004, Høj et al. 2006, Duval
2008, Alesina et al. 2006), making the crisis hypothesis the strongest finding
of quantitative investigations into the determinants of structural reform.38
However, the crisis hypothesis – at least by itself – also falls short of ex-
plaining the reform trajectories in continental Europe. While paradigmatic
structural reform may indeed be commonly preceded by economic crisis – also
in European countries – many of the same countries remain complacent even
in the face of periods of low economic performance or even severe economic
crises. Italy is a particularly striking example. While the country had a higher
real per capital income than both France and the United Kingdom in the early
1990s, by 2007 it had fallen behind both of these countries.39
In summary, economic or social problems (‘crises’) – or the perception
thereof – may indeed be an important – if not necessary – condition for reform.
It can easily be shown, however, that an adverse macroeconomic environment
is not a sufficient condition for reform.
Determinants for agenda setting: Government partisan-
ship
Following the emergence of a salient political issue, pressures to change the
institutional status quo need to be translated into policy proposals. With
respect to socio-economic institutions, the policy alternative is commonly more
38 Political economics models even show how crisis can be welfare improving if the subse-
quent reforms elevate the economy onto a higher growth path (Drazen & Grilli 1993, Hsieh
2000).
39 Data Source: Own calculations based on OECD World Economic Outlook 2011. The
2008 Lisbon Scoreboard published by the Centre for European Reform finds that ‘Italy is
going to have to raise its game to avoid a further decline in its relative prosperity within the
EU. It scores poorly on just about every [reform] indicator.’ (Barysch et al. 2008, 11)
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or less government involvement; more or less government expenditure, or more
or less regulation of markets.
Conventionally, we expect left-leaning governments to hold on to more
regulation and conservative governments to be more likely to implement lib-
eralising reform. One interpretation of this anticipated behaviour is simply
the expectation that world-view matters for socio-economic policy choice: the
political left has a strong inherent preference for distributive justice, which
requires government intervention and regulation. The conservative political
camp’s ideology emphasises property rights and individual freedom, and thus
advocates government restraint and deregulation.40
Political partisanship can, however, also be understood as a distributional,
social conflict. Building on the Marxist concept of social class, ‘power re-
source theory’ investigates the impact of relative power position on the interest
representation of capital and labour (Stephens 1986). Policy outcomes, and
particularly the level of redistribution in the welfare state – and arguably in
reverse the level of welfare retrenchment – depend much on the relative power
of the political left and organised labour (Bradley et al. 2003). According to
this argument, on the one hand, conservative governments would generally be
expected to cater to the interests of capital owners and pursue liberal market
reforms, retrenching redistributive institutions. Labour governments, on the
other hand, would be expected to pursue policies of market ‘decommodifica-
tion’ and redistribution.
The results of quantitative empirical investigations into the effect of govern-
ment partisanship on structural reforms are, however, inconclusive. Amable
et al. (2006) finds that left-wing governments strengthen welfare institutions
in the light of shocks, while conservative governments use economic down-
turns for welfare retrenchment. Other quantitative studies also support the
conventional understanding that conservative governments are more inclined
to liberal market reforms than left-wing governments (Allan & Scruggs 2004,
IMF 2004, Alesina 2006, Duval 2008, for example). A second group of studies,
however, finds no correlation between government ideology and welfare expen-
diture (Castles 1998, Belloc & Nicita 2011, for example). And a third group of
studies even finds evidence of an inverse effect of ideology on welfare spending,
by which conservative governments engage in less welfare retrenchment than
40 In a slightly different line of argument, Prasad (2006) shows that the credibility prob-
lems of a particularly militant left in the United Kingdom and the United States created
opportunities for conservative politicians to mobilise dissatisfaction with the status quo and
introduce far-reaching liberal-market reforms.
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left-leaning governments (Ross 2000, Høj et al. 2006, Green-Pedersen 2007, for
example).41
This mixed evidence on the effect of government partisanship carries over
also to the continental European reform trajectories of the past decades. Re-
forms have been implemented both by conservative governments in the United
Kingdom and Sweden as well as by social-democratic governments in Ger-
many and the Netherlands. All in all, the explanatory power of government
partisanship on the reform propensity in Europe seems limited.
Determinants for policy selection: Electoral pressures and
public opinion
In the selection of a policy alternative for implementation, a government ulti-
mately relies on public support, not least because the reform may otherwise
be reversed after its departure from power. However, one of the oldest asser-
tions about the implementation of reform is that public opinion is generally
opposed to change. Already in the 16th century, Niccolò Machiavelli found
that reforming the institutional structure of a polity seldom finds majority
support, introducing a status-quo bias into political systems.42
More specifically, Machiavelli posits that structural reforms are unpopular;
first, because gathering support for reforms is difficult due to uncertainty re-
garding their effects, and because, second, those benefiting from the status quo
will oppose reforms in any case. These claims have broadly been supported
by contemporary research. With respect to the first claim, political economics
contributions have shown how uncertainty over reform payoffs at individual
level and the resulting popular opposition can lead to a status-quo bias or
reform delay. In their seminal contribution, Fernandez & Rodrik (1991) show
that – if no ex post transfers are possible between winners and losers of a reform
41 Political economics has been able to capture the logic of this last finding in a formal
model. Left-leaning governments may find it easier to introduce liberal reforms than con-
servative governments due to a ‘Nixon-Goes-to-China’ credibility problem (Cukierman &
Tommasi 1998b,a). Another possible explanation for the inconsistent empirical results is
the blur of the classic right-left dichotomy. In particular, the social-democratic ‘marching
to market’ in the 1990s begs the question of how far the conventional understanding of
partisanship remains an relevant policy determinant (Schelkle et al. 2010).
42 ‘It ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more
perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction
of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done
well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the
new. This coolness arises [...] partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe
in new things until they have had a long experience of them.’ (Niccolò Machiavelli, The
Prince, Chapter 6, 1513)
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– welfare-increasing reforms may not be introduced as much as expected, even
if a majority of the population would gain from the reforms ex post (Laban &
Sturzenegger 1994, for similar arguments).
With respect to the second claim, Pierson (2001a, 411) finds in his impor-
tant contributions on welfare state reform that one of the sources of European
welfare state stability is ‘the electoral incentives associated with [welfare] pro-
grammes which retain broad and deep popular support’ (Pierson 1994, for a
similar argument). In other words, many of the welfare institutions of the
‘European economic model’ remain highly popular, while initiatives to cut
back these institutions typically are not. This is not very surprising, taking
into account that practically all reform proposals involve cutbacks in the so-
cial security systems or government transfers, from which – as Pierson (2001a)
describes – an absolute majority of the population benefits. Given this opposi-
tion to reform, governments are thought to be disinclined to introduce reforms.
Indeed, Jean-Claude Juncker, then Prime Minister of Luxembourg and Presi-
dent of the Eurogroup, famously said, ‘We all know what to do, but we don’t
know how to get re-elected once we have done it.’43
However, empirical studies find no evidence for the so-called ‘Juncker Curse’,
namely that voters punish governments for structural change by voting them
out of office (Buti et al. 2009). To the contrary, recent empirical studies show,
for example, that unsustainable fiscal policies generally reduce the probabil-
ity of re-election (Brender & Drazen 2008, Drazen & Eslava 2010).44 All in
all, there is little coherent empirical evidence to corroborate the conventional
wisdom held on popular discontent with reforms.
Determinants for policy enactment and implementation:
Formal and informal veto power
Not all Policy initiatives by a government will be enacted and implemented.
The reason for this is that governments in modern Western democracies typi-
cally do not hold absolute power over legislation and regulation. Rather, polit-
ical power is shared with other actors in the political arena, who can more or
less effectively prevent a departure from the institutional status quo. This veto
power can generally have a formal or informal nature. That is, the veto-yielding
43 Quoted in Bonfiglioli & Gancia (2011).
44 In a recent theoretical contribution, Bonfiglioli & Gancia (2011) show that, under
the realistic assumptions of asymmetric information between voters and the government,
reformist governments are not necessarily punished by voters and uncertainty about the
effects of reform can in fact foster reform policies.
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political actors may have constitutionally or quasi-constitutionally enshrined
powers in the policy-making process. Alternatively, the political actors may
hold sway over the policy-making process in some other, informal way.
A first strand of literature – both in political science and economics – fo-
cuses on the impact of the formal constitutional order on policy outcomes.45
The study of the impact of constitutional order on policy outcomes goes very
much to the heart of the political science discipline. Classic contributions to
this strand of literature are Lijphart’s model of the majoritarian and consen-
sual state, which describes the more inclusive nature of continental European
states vis-à-vis Anglo-Saxon countries (Lijphart 1984), and Scharpf’s ‘joint
decision trap’ model, which describes how federally-organised states (or con-
federations such as the EU) are biased towards lowest common denominator
policy decisions because of the sanctioning power of federal entities (Scharpf
1988). Similarly, the economics literature has contributed a large number of
models on the effects of constitutional rules on socio-economic policy-making
and performance, a significant number of which are presented and subsequently
tested in the seminal contributions by (Persson & Tabellini 2000, 2001), for
example.
An evident conjecture is that more diffused formal political power will re-
duce the ability of the government to change the regulatory status quo and
will bias the polity towards the status quo. Indeed, IMF (2004) and Alesina
et al. (2006) find that more powerful governments (majoritarian or presidential
systems or unified governments with a large parliamentary majority) are more
likely to implement reforms. However, the overall evidence from the quanti-
tative research on the relevance of constitutional rules – such as the nature
of the political system or the electoral system – for the reform propensity of
industrialised countries is not as strong as expected. Høj et al. (2006), for
example, find that the formal system of policy-making has no significant effect
on structural reform policies.
A second strand of literature investigates the influence of informal interest
groups on the policy-making process. Much of the rational choice literature
on interest groups goes back to Olson’s seminal contribution on the ‘Rise and
Decline of Nations’, which describes how well-organised special interest groups
can damage the broader economy (Olson 1982). This literature has developed
45 It investigates, for example, the impact of regime-type (presidential or parliamentary),
party system-type (one-, two- or more-party), parliament-type (unicameral or multi-cameral)
and electoral system-type (proportional or majoritarian) on governments’ policy-making
ability.
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sophisticated models on the impact of interest groups on political outcomes
(Grossman & Helpman 2001).46
One of the most widely noted rational choice contributions on policy im-
plementation is Tsebelis’ Veto Player Model (Tsebelis 1995, 2002). The model
abstracts from description and analysis of individual veto-yielding constitu-
tional actors and interests groups and breaks down the complex research in
the economic and political science literature to a simple question: which agents
can potentially stop a departure from a political status quo? Its intuitive sim-
plicity makes the veto player framework an attractive framework in which to
explain policy continuity and change. Unsurprisingly, the model has been
widely used to investigate reform inertia (Hellman 1998, Bawn 1999, Bonoli
2000, 2001, Merkel 2003, Gehlbach & Malesky 2008, Däubler 2008, and others).
In general, however the model seems to be more suited to explain institutional
stability than institutional change.47
Quasi in response to the status quo bias in veto player theory, recent con-
tributions have combined the veto play model with coalitional analysis. More
specifically, researchers emphasise the importance of political coalitions be-
tween veto-yielding political actors to establish and change institutional ar-
rangements (Dur & Swank 1998). Häusermann (2010), for example, presents
a study of pension reforms in France, Germany and Switzerland between 1970
and 2005.48 There are, however, both theoretical as well as empirical lim-
itations to this approach. First, coalitional models risk rationalising policy
outcomes with coalitional shifts. Particularly if a large number of explanatory
factors are included in the analysis – such as ‘structure, institutions and actors’
preferences and strategies’ (Häusermann 2010, 9) – coalitional analysis risks
46 To name an example, Faure-Grimaud & Martimort (2003) presents a model how asym-
metric information between a representative government and the governmental bureaucracy
can lead to policies that favour the bureaucracy and institutional stability rather than the
electorate and institutional change.
47 The ingenious simplicity of the Veto Player Model, however, also has its drawbacks. It
takes the interests of veto players as given and fixed. Policy change is thus only possible
within the joint ‘winset’ of all veto players. Assuming rational actors implies, however,
that this winset will be exploited within a relatively short period of time. What happens
thereafter when no further Pareto improvement is possible? In this case, policy change is
only possible following a shift of the relative position of veto players within the spatial policy
plane, that is, change of their preferences. However, the veto player model cannot address
the question of what shapes, and thus what changes, the preferences of the veto players. see
Paper 1 of the PhD project for a more detailed discussion of the Veto Player Model
48 The comparative study shows how shifting coalitions due to changes in the socio-
economic environment and a form of legislative logrolling allow for structural reform even in
political systems with a large number of veto players (Häusermann 2010, 115). Modelling
institutional change as ‘coalitional engineering’ provides a compelling argument and is an
important contribution to the political economy of structural reform literature.
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being over-determined. Second, in many empirical cases of structural reforms
there is no evidence of the ‘coalitional engineering’. For example, the 2003
Agenda 2010 reforms in Germany cannot be explained by the development of
new cross-class coalitions (see Paper One of this PhD project).
Besides the rational choice approach on interest group and veto power,
there is also a historical institutionalist tradition on interest group research,
particularly on Europe. The research on the influence of interest groups in Eu-
ropean political economies is commonly linked to the study of ‘corporatism’
(McFarland 2010). The field of research has developed a rich literature, its
origins reaching back to the 1960s (Shonfield 1965, Schmitter 1974, Schmit-
ter & Lehmbruch 1979, Katzenstein 1985, Schmitter 1989, and many others).
Corporatism captures a form of interest representation – ‘networks linking gov-
ernment with [centrally-organised] interest organizations, many of which have
quasi-public status as key actors in policy making’ (Molina & Rhodes 2002,
305) – that is of particular importance to many countries in Europe. This
warrants a closer look at what the literature has to say about its influence on
institutional stability and change in the following section.
1.4 Structural reforms and neo-corporatism
The following section discusses the relationship between structural reforms
and neo-corporatism in the literature on the political economy of structural re-
forms. Corporatism – or, more precisely, ‘neo-corporatism’ – is one of the most
thoroughly studied concepts in the research of Western Europe.49 Nonetheless
(or maybe for this very reason), the concept remains very broad. Depend-
ing on the field of research, it carries different connotations (Almond 1983,
Molina & Rhodes 2002). With some stylisation, two strands of literature can
be distinguished; one democracy theory school and a second school on political
economy, both of which have produced a large number of contributions. On
the one hand, the democracy theory literature analyses corporatism as a sys-
tem of interest representation and a process of democratic policy making. On
the other hand, the political economy literature on corporatism focuses on the
organisation of economic interests, their interplay with government institutions
49 ‘Corporatism’ is today commonly used synonymously with the more accurate term ‘neo-
corporatism’. The term ‘corporatism’ or ‘corporativism’ is linked to the fascist economic
ideology of Benito Mussolini. Further, ‘neo-corporatism’ has to be distinguished from ‘state
corporatism’, in which cooperation is state-enforced, while neo-corporatism is based on
interaction between government and interests groups on more equal terms.
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and their impact on macro-economic outcomes such as inflation, growth and
employment. The two strands vary more in the focus of their study than in
their principle understanding of corporatism. Somewhat surprisingly, however,
they come to almost contrary conclusions on the predicted effect of corporatism
on structural reform.
Within the democracy theory school, corporatism is commonly seen as in-
tegral part of a form of government with defused political power. In his famous
conceptualisation of different types of democracy, Lijphart (1984, 1999) ranks
the political rules and practices on a scale from ‘majoritarian democracy’ at
the one end and ‘consensus democracy’ at the other end. To varying degrees,
many European democracies share features of a consensus democracy: ‘execu-
tive power sharing in broad multiparty coalitions, executive-legislative balance
of power, multi-party systems, proportional representation, and coordinated
and “corporatist” interest group systems aimed at compromise and concerta-
tion.’ (Lijphart 2008, 7)
Based on the concept of ‘consensus democracy’, authors attribute consid-
erable political power to the corporatist interest groups. Accordingly, so the
argument goes, corporatist interest groups can effectively prevent a change to
the status quo (Bonoli & Palier 2000).
[T]he character of the interest group system, especially the degree
to which the system is social corporatist, should facilitate the ex-
tent to which affected actors can press their claims against adverse
policy changes in the face of fiscal stress and internationalization.
[In consequence,] social policy change in such an environment will
typically involve slow, marginal, negotiated changes in which all
interests are accounted; relatively quick and non-trivial retrench-
ments of the welfare state in response to domestic pressures and
internationalization are unlikely. (Swank 2001, 208-209)
In line with this argument, much of the quantitative empirical literature
accepts corporatism as an institutional arrangement, by which veto points are
added to the policy-making process. Authors thus anticipate that countries
with stronger corporatist features are more resistant to welfare retrenchment:
Allan & Scruggs (2004, 504), for example, ‘expect more integrated/corporatist
democracies to be more resistant to welfare state retrenchment’. To their own
surprise, most authors – investigating the more direct effect of corporatism
on the propensity to reform – do not obtain robust evidence for an effect of
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corporatism on reform propensity. Høj et al. (2006, 23) writes: ‘Somewhat
surprisingly, no robust evidence was found concerning the effects of bargaining
systems and industrial relations [...] on the propensity to implement structural
reforms.’ (Helbling et al. 2004, Allan & Scruggs 2004, for similar findings)
The failure of empirical studies to produce significant results on the rela-
tionship between corporatism and structural reforms is likely related to the
oversimplifying assumption that corporatist actors – as veto players – gener-
ally block reform. While it may generally be assumed that a system with more
veto players increases the likelihood of a status quo bias, it is not a priori clear
that corporatist actors have an inhibiting effect on structural reforms.
In fact, the political economy literature on corporatism broadly comes to
the opposite conclusion of the political theorists. Here, corporatism is un-
derstood primarily as an arrangement by which originally antagonist interest
groups – such as employer organisations and trade unions – cooperate to pur-
sue common interests. In this way, concertation among governments, trade
unions and employer organisations in tripartite fora can facilitate competitive
wage setting, but also labour market and welfare reforms (Hassel 2003, Natali
& Rhodes 2004, Hancké & Rhodes 2004, Simoni 2010). Ebbinghaus & Hassel
(2000, 45) find that ‘concerted reform built on a consensus of governments, em-
ployers and unions can be crucial [...] in overcoming potential blocks against
reforms’. In her study of pension reform in Europe, Häusermann (2010, 268)
goes even further when arguing that ‘countries with a tradition of consensus
politics and negotiation may have a comparative advantage. Thereby, a high
number of veto points (i.e. a high number of power-sharing institutions) may
turn from an obstacle to an asset for a country’s reform capacity.’
While they reach different conclusions on the impact of corporatism on
structural reform policies, most of the political theory and the political econ-
omy literature on corporatism describe corporatist actors as political potent,
with the power to obstruct institutional change.50 Veto player theorists them-
selves, however, rejects this presumption outright. Tsebelis (1999, 603) alto-
gether denies corporatist agents a veto-yielding role. ‘[L]egislation is produced
whether the social partners agree or not. If they agree, then the parliament
or the government issues legislation or decrees that confirm the agreement.
50 Somewhat differently, Culpepper (2002, 774) argues that ‘policy-makers lack the combi-
nation of technical, relational, and local information necessary to design successful blueprints
for reform, and so they are dependent on the social partners to acquire this information’.
While the social partners remain important partners in the reform process, their influence
does not originate from veto power, but rather from an informational advantage.
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If they disagree, then the legislative institutions of the country decide on the
issue.’ Gourevitch & Hawes (2002, 253) similarly argue: ‘Corporatism is cre-
ated by political process. Political systems decide who gets voice and in what
way. The system of interest representation towards the government is an act
of delegation by authorities to groups – an action which can be revoked. [...]
The degree of corporatism is thus an expression of politics.’ It is difficult to
reject this critique of the corporatism literature outright. Corporatist actors
typically have no constitutional powers, meaning that they are no veto players
according to the Veto Player Model. Theoretically, a government with a leg-
islative majority in parliament should indeed be able to dismiss the opposition
of trade unions or employer organisations.
However, understanding corporatism as a purely optional policy-making
forum – that may, in the best case, help governments muster a broader con-
sensus for potentially controversial policy measures and, in other cases, may
simply be swept aside – is also a misconception.51 It is a decisive feature of
corporatism that, while it does not add formal veto players to the political
arena, it does provide selected societal interests with significant political in-
fluence. This political influence results from the close interlocking of formal
and informal institutions, which provides corporatist agents with subtle, yet
important political power. Even a weakening of formal corporatist structures,
such as the reduced use of tripartite committees in policy formulation in many
Scandinavian countries does not necessarily have to lead to a weakening of
corporatism as such (Christiansen & Rommetvedt 1999).
In summary, corporatism is maybe best understood as ‘institutional ar-
rangements whereby important political-economic decisions are reached via
negotiation between or in consultation with peak-level representatives of em-
ployees and employers (or other interest groups) and the state’. (Kenworthy
2003, 11) These ‘institutional arrangements’ can be described as the ‘institu-
tionalized and privileged integration of organized interests in the preparation
and/or implementation of public policies’. (Christiansen et al. 2009, 26) How-
ever, how exactly these institutional arrangements – arguably one of the most
51 In many ways, this account of corporatism is closer to the pluralist system of informal,
ad hoc interest representation or lobbyism. ‘Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest
representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of
ordered multiple, voluntary, competitive, non hierarchically and self-determined (as to type
or scope of interest) categories which are not created or specially licensed, recognized, sub-
sidized, otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and
which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective cate-
gories.’ (Schmitter 1974, 95) However, a characteristic of corporatism is that constitutional
policy-making bodies cannot easily ignore corporatist agents.
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distinguishing characteristics of many continental European countries – im-
pact structural reform policies, whether they obstruct or facilitate institutional
change, remains contested.
This calls for more research on the political economy of structural reform
in neo-corporatist countries, to which this PhD project will contribute three
academic papers.
1.5 Summary and outlook
In the previous sections, this introduction to the PhD project provided a broad
review of the literature on the political economy of structural reforms, devel-
oping insights for interdisciplinary research on structural reform trajectories in
Europe. First, the discussion on the nature of the multidisciplinary literature
revealed that previous contributions focused too narrowly on explaining either
institutional stability or institutional change. An explanation of the diverse
reform trajectories in Europe, however, requires understanding of both institu-
tional stability in the presence of significant socio-economic pressure to adjust
and institutional change in the presence of highly diffused political power in
the European political systems.
Second, the discussion of the literature revealed that different conceptual-
isations of institutions in the stands of the literature have important reper-
cussions for the findings on institutional change. More specifically, a historical
institutionalist approach tends to emphasise the significance of power relations,
while a rational choice institutionalist approach tends to accentuate the im-
portance of preferences. To avoid a inadvertent bias towards the one or other
determinant of structural reform, this implies that research on institutional
stability and change has to take a conscious approach to assumptions made on
the nature of institutions.
Third, the above provided a definition of structural reforms, namely as en-
acted government policies intended to fundamentally change for the better the
institutional structure governing a policy sector. It argued that – while there
may be important interlinkages – structural reforms are distinctly different
from other forms of policy change, from other forms of (unintentional) insti-
tutional change, and from gradual institutional change with transformative
results.
Fourth, the discussion of the central findings of previous contributions re-
vealed that none of the conventional explanations – or at least none of the
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conventional explanations on their own – account for the reform trajectories
observed in Europe. Reform trajectories of European countries demonstrate
that socio-economic conditions and particularly economic crisis are not a suf-
ficient condition for structural reform, although they may be a necessary one.
Theoretical and empirical findings on government partisanship, electoral pres-
sure and public option, and interest group and veto power on structural reforms
remain inconclusive.
Fifth, the review of findings on the effects of corporatism – a form of interest
representation of particular importance for many European countries in par-
ticular – on structural reforms revealed similarly inconclusive findings. While
a democracy theory strand of the corporatism literature finds that this form of
interest representation is likely to obstruct reform, a political economy strand
of the literature argues that a tradition of consensual policy-making may in
fact facilitate the implementation of structural reform policies. It was argued
that the reason for this may be an incomplete understanding of corporatist
interest representation in the political economy.
Building on these insights, this PhD project puts forward three political
economy papers with the aim of contributing to the understanding of the
determinants of structural reforms in European countries. the first paper is a
case study, analysing the reform trajectory of one particular European political
economy. More specifically, the Paper One – entitledThe Political Economy
of the Agenda 2010 Reforms: How Gerhard Schröder Overcame the
“Blocked Republic” – explores the trajectory of welfare and labour market
reforms in Germany from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s. It addresses the
puzzle as to why the so-called ‘Agenda 2010’ – arguably the only noteworthy
overhaul of the German socio-economic model since the Second World War
– was undertaken in in the early 2000s and by the left-leaning government
of Gerhard Schröder, not by the conservative governments that preceded it.
Through the 1980s and 1990s Germany suffered from repeated growth crises,
high and rising unemployment, and growing fiscal imbalances. In spite of two
decades of persistent reform rhetoric of the conservative government of Helmut
Kohl, however, no significant measures were taken.
The paper critically discusses the dominant analytical framework to anal-
ysis policy stability and change – namely the Veto Player Model – and puts
forward an augmented veto player framework for the analysis of the German
political economy. The paper subsequently compares four distinct episodes
of the German political economy, namely the pre-reunification period of the
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1980s, the post-reunification period of the 1990s, the first social-democratic
government under Chancellor Schröder from 1998 to 2002, and the second
social-democratic government of Chancellor Schröder from 2002 to 2005. It
finds corporatist institutions, the multilevel governance structure and the lack
of cohesion within the federal government alternately blocked reform in Ger-
many between 1983 and 2002. Only in 2003, when the blocking power of all
these constraints waned, was it possible for the federal government to imple-
ment far-reaching socio-economic reforms, the ‘Agenda 2010’.
Although the paper is written broadly in a historical institutionalist tradi-
tion, the first paper is that institutional stability and change – among other
things – depends also on the interests of employer organisations and trade
unions. The paper finds that structural reforms were possible after social part-
ners started questioning the consensus on the economic model in which they
operate. Based on this insight and the concept of institutional complementar-
ity found in the Varieties of Capitalism literature (Hall & Soskice 2001b), the
second paper – entitled Corporatist cartels: Explaining reform inertia
in continental European economies – develops a model of a European
‘coordinated market economy’. More specifically, the paper shows how coor-
dination between firms, trade unions and the government is used to shape a
country’s comparative advantage in the global economy.
In contrast to the first paper, Paper 2 taking a distinctly rational choice
approach to institutions. Institutional stability and change in this model de-
pend on the change of the payoffs for corporatist actors. More specifically, an
institutional structure will remain stable until the costs of coordination exceed
its benefits for one or more of the coordinating actors. At this point, one or
more actors will start defecting from the coordinating equilibrium and pres-
sures to eliminate the coordinating institutions, that is, pressures to reform
the political economy will arise. The second paper concludes with an ana-
lytical narrative of labour market reforms in Sweden in the early 1990s and
in Germany in the early 2000s to illustrate the functioning of the model. It
shows how rising costs and/or falling benefits from institutional status quo can
account for the different reform paths.
The third paper, entitledCorporatism, the game-changer: The inter-
mediating effect of privileged interest representation on the determi-
nants of labour market reform in Europe investigates the impact of eco-
nomic and political factors across a larger sample of corporatist and pluralist
countries. First, it argues that changes institutional preferences of privileged
41
corporatist interest groups should be reflected in changes in the probability of
structural reforms in corporatist countries. Focussing on reforms to unemploy-
ment benefit system, both trade unions and employer organisations are more
likely to pursue benefit retrenchment in ‘bad times’ than in ‘good times’. In the
absence of privileged interest representation, institutional preferences should
not matter in pluralist countries. Second, the paper argues that conventional
determinants for structural reforms – for example, government partisanship
and economic crises – should be found to matter in pluralist countries, but not
in corporatist countries.
Using a data on structural reforms, the paper sets out to test four hy-
potheses on structural reform determinants. Using an ordinal logistic regres-
sion model, the paper shows that probabilities for structural reforms indeed
diverge across corporatist and pluralist countries. It concludes that the in-
termediating effect of corporatism has to necessarily be taken into account to
understand reform trajectories in Western Europe.
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Paper 1
The political economy of the Agenda
2010 reforms: How Gerhard Schröder
overcame the ‘Blocked Republic’
Abstract
This paper addresses the puzzle as to why the so-called ‘Agenda 2010’ reforms
– arguably the only noteworthy overhaul of the German welfare system since
the Second World War – was undertaken only in the early 2000s by the social
democratic government of Gerhard Schröder and not by any of the conser-
vative governments that preceded it. It employs an augmented veto player
framework, which allows for the separate analysis of three distinct ‘veto clus-
ters’ within Germany’s political economy. Drawing on primary research as well
as secondary sources, the paper compares four distinct episodes of the German
political economy, namely the pre-reunification period of the 1980s, the post-
reunification period of the 1990s, the first social democratic government under
Chancellor Schröder from 1998 to 2002, and the second government of Chan-
cellor Schröder from 2002 to 2005. It finds corporatist institutions, the federal
legislative system and the lack of cohesion within the federal government al-
ternately blocked reform in Germany between 1983 and 2002. Only in 2003,
when the blocking power of all these constraints waned, was it possible for the
federal government to implement far-reaching socio-economic reforms.1
1 Revised version of a paper published 2008 in ACES Cases, No. 2008.3, American
Consortium on European Union Studies, EU Center of Excellence Washington, D.C.
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2.1 Introduction
In his first government declaration after coming into office in October 1982,
Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced a ‘policy of change’ with the objective of
‘reducing the state to its core competences’.2 This raised expectations that the
conservative liberal coalition of the Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU),
its Bavarian sister party the Christich Soziale Union (CSU) and the Freie
Demokratische Partei (FDP) would embark on a radical reform path similar
to the policies initiated in several Anglo-Saxon countries at the time. How-
ever, no radical reform of the German socio-economic institutions – the wel-
fare system and regulated labour market, for example – followed. Instead,
the country’s resilience to structural reforms became proverbial. With policy
changes apparently impossible even in times of low economic growth and high
unemployment, Germany became known as the ‘the blocked republic’.3
Notable political science scholars have argued that Germany’s complex
politico-economic structures obstruct economic reform policy (Kitschelt &
Streeck 2004, Welsh 2005), rendering Germany a de facto ‘semi-sovereign state’
(Katzenstein 1987). That is, a very large number of socio-economic actors
exert their authority in the process of policy formulation and legislation, ef-
fectively preventing a majority-backed government to put into practice any
paradigmatic policy change, particularly reform pertaining to the institutional
structure of the political economy. Katzenstein (1987, 351) finds that, ‘within
the constraints and opportunities that characterise the Federal Republic, in-
cremental policy change [...] is a politically logical choice’.
The ‘Agenda 2010’ reforms, however, stands in contrast to this conven-
tional wisdom about Germany. Announced by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
in 2003, this policy initiative intended to reform the institutional structure of
the German labour market, the social security system, the tax system, and the
research and education system to address ‘the challenges [...] of the 21st cen-
tury.’ (SPD 2003, 6, original in German). The legislative changes subsequently
implemented are commonly held to be ‘the most ambitious seen in post-war
Germany’, resulting in a significant overhaul of the German socio-economic
system.4 And Schröder’s successor, Chancellor Angela Merkel, lauded the re-
form policies as ‘historical’.5
2 Government Declaration of the Federal Chancellor to the German Bundestag, 4 May
1983, Bonn, translation.
3 Die blockierte Republik, Der Spiegel, 21 September 2002.
4 The Economist, 18 December 2003.
5 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 August 2006. Other regular critics of the social
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This assessment is broadly confirmed by academic analyses (Egle & Henkes
2003, Trampusch 2005, Schmid 2006).6 Structural reforms can be defined as
enacted government policies intended to fundamentally change for the bet-
ter the institutional structure governing a policy sector.7 While there were
of course some instances of change to welfare and labour market regulation
that broadly fall into this definition of structural reforms also in the 1980s
and 1990s, these remained isolated and limited in scope. The Agenda 2010
reforms constitute the only successful, wider overhaul of the German socio-
economic system since the Second World War. Brenke & Zimmermann (2008,
117) identify a ‘renunciation of a welfare-biased economic and labour market
policy [...] in Germany’. In Esping-Andersen’s taxonomy of welfare systems
(Esping-Andersen 1990), the policies have clearly moved Germany’s ‘conserva-
tive’ welfare state model towards greater individual responsibility – the ‘liberal
model’ – and more tax-financed social security – the ‘social democratic model’
(Hassel & Williamson 2004, Egle 2006).
Given that this type of structural reforms has been on the policy agenda of
the Federal Republic since the early 1980s, the Agenda 2010 reforms present an
empirical puzzle. Why was it possible for Germany to deviate from ‘the logic
of incremental change’ and introduce more radical structural reforms? Why
was the first major reform of the German socio-economic model undertaken
by the second Schröder government coalition, comprising the social democratic
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
(Greens), and not by any of the conservative governments under Helmut Kohl
or the first social democratic government under Gerhard Schröder that pre-
ceded it?
This paper will show that the Schröder-led government managed to break
the political gridlock and introduce structural reforms because the binding
constraints of Germany’s political economy had lost their powers. To under-
stand how a ‘window of opportunity’ (Kingdon 1984) for structural reform
in Germany opened, it will, in the following Section 2, present an analytical
framework, in which to analyse institutional stability and change in Germany.
More specifically, it will critically discuss the popular use of the ‘Veto Player
Model’ for the analysis of the German political economy and suggest an alter-
democratic government conceded that the reforms were ‘more than just a first step in the
right direction’(German Council of Economic Advisors 2003, 2, original in German).
6 Some have disputed the political and economic significance of the reform agenda, calling
it a ‘moderate reform’ or an ‘emergency fix’ (Zohlnhöfer 2004, Merkel & Petring 2007).
7 Please refer to the introduction of the PhD project for a detailed discussion of the
concept of ‘structural reforms’.
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native, augmented veto player framework. In Section 3 this framework is used
to analyse the causes for reform inertia between 1982 and 2002, despite vary-
ing political constellations and changes in the country’s economic structure,
while Section 4 will show how the framework helps to understand the passing
of the Agenda 2010 reforms. The two empirical sections of the paper make
use of a broad spectrum of sources, including semi-structured and narrative
interviews (conducted between 2006 and 2008 with German policy-makers,
government officials and journalists), newspaper articles, official documents,
macroeconomic data as well as a large secondary literature. Finally, the con-
cluding section summarises and discusses the findings of the empirical sections
of the paper and carries them forward to understand the economic policies of
the grand coalition government of the CDU/CSU and the SPD government
under Chancellor Angela Merkel that came into office in 2005.
2.2 The analytical framework
Germany’s post-war political system was designed to avoid instability and
abuse of power by dispersing political power among many political and eco-
nomic actors (Saalfeld 2005). Indeed, the list of policy-constraining actors is
long. Within the government, the coalition parties, as well as the relatively
independent government bureaucracy (Ressortprinzip) have been identified as
influential. Outside the government, the German federal system limits the
policy-making capacity of the federal government vis-à-vis the Länder, the fed-
eral states. When the opposition parties win elections in a majority of the Län-
der, the government loses control of the Bundesrat, the veto-yielding second,
federal chamber of parliament. Finally, other outside actors, such as the fed-
eral supreme court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), the European Union (EU) as
well as a multitude of well-organised ‘special interest groups’ – many of which
have privileged access to the policy-making process – also exert constraining
political influence. This has raised the question, ‘how political decisions in
such an interlocking governmental system are at all possible’ (Holtmann &
Voelzkow 2000, 15, original in German).
Arguably, the dominant analytical framework to analyse German policy
continuity and change over the past decade has been the veto player framework,
following the ‘Veto Player Model’ presented in Tsebelis (1995, 2002). In spite
of criticism from both historical and rational choice institutionalists (Wagschal
1999, Schmidt 2003b), the intuitive simplicity of the framework has preserved
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its popularity among researchers studying Germany (Bawn 1999, König &
Bäuninger 2000, Siegel 2002, Merkel 2003, Strohmeier 2003, Zohlnhöfer 2003a,
Busemeyer 2005, Strohmeier 2006, Saalfeld 2006, Blank 2012, and others).
The following section provides a critical appraisal Tsebelis’ Veto Player
Model and its application to Germany, arguing that the model is quickly over-
burdened if it attempts to factor in the important structural components of the
German political economy, vital to understanding the country’s policy-making
process. Rather, it is suggested to break down the complex system of veto
players into a number of sub-systems, which allows taking account for these
components. It subsequently identifies three pivotal veto clusters in Germany,
namely the veto points within the federal government, in the federal legislative
system and in the system of corporatist interest representation.
The Veto Player Model and veto clusters
At first glance, the Veto Player Model seems to offer an appealing framework to
analyse the highly complex German political system. The model translates the
classic analysis of institutional structures in political science into a relatively
simple agent-based model, focussing on ‘individual or collective actor[s] whose
agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change in
policy’ (Tsebelis 1995, 301). It thus breaks down complex political structures
to one simple question: which agents are able and willing to prevent a departure
from a policy status quo? More specifically, the veto player framework assesses
whether a policy proposal put forward by the agenda setter – typically the
incumbent head of government – will meet with the approval or rejection of
the so-called ‘veto players’.8 With their veto power, veto players can prevent a
departure from a policy status quo if this policy change does meet their policy
preferences. Thus the viable policy alternatives are delimited by a ‘winset’,
defined by the individual policy preferences or policy positions of the veto
players. The smaller the winset for policy change, the lower the probability
that the status quo will change.9
8 Broadly, veto players are either ‘institutional veto players’, whose political powers are
enshrined in the constitution, or ‘partisan veto players’, whose political power emerges from
the constitutional reality.
9 A corollary of this Model is the Veto Player Theorem, stating that three factors de-
termine the constraints on a government’s policy choices: First, given that a larger number
of veto players is likely to reduce the size of the viable policy space (the winset). Second,
Tsebelis shows that a larger dispersion of policy positions similarly reduces the size of the
viable policy space. And third, most veto players themselves are ‘collective veto players’
– rather than individual veto players, such as the head of state in presidential government
systems – and consist of veto-yielding, disparate interests. A more cohesive policy position
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At closer inspection, however, the model has some significant drawbacks,
particularly when employed as an analytical framework for Germany. First,
the model is less apt at explaining policy reform (and structural reform) than
it is at explaining policy continuity or incremental policy change. The Veto
Player Theorem predicts that ‘countries with many veto players will engage in
only incremental policy changes.’ (Tsebelis 2000, 464) Given the large number
of veto players in Germany, it is appropriate to assume a relatively small winset
ex ante.
Thus, relatively large changes in the political system – for example, large
shifts in policy preferences or the falling away of important veto players –
are necessary to explain significant reform. To explain radical policy change
(and structural reforms) in Germany with the Veto Player Model, Saalfeld
(2006, 254) needs to argue, for example, that ‘the policy preferences of all
veto players had moved towards more market-oriented economic policies in the
1990s [...] facilitat[ing] changes to the status quo in economic, labour market
and welfare policies despite unfavourable institutional conditions of “divided
government” ’. This leaves unexplained, however, what changes in the structure
of the political economy precipitated the preference shifts. The Veto Player
Model is ‘not about how institutions shape policy preferences, but about how
institutions influence policy output given actors’ policy preferences.’ (Ganghof
2003, 3) Understanding how institutions shape policy preferences is, however,
indispensable to understand structural reform trajectories of countries over
time.
Second, as a macro-political model, the Veto Player Model downplays
micro-political factors; the formal and informal influence of individual and
group interests within collective veto players. The analysis of collective veto
players (such as parliaments, coalition governments, committees etc.) retains a
distinct macro-flavour by focusing on formal decision making procedures within
these organisations, for example simple versus qualified majority voting. In the
Veto Player Model, these formal procedures determine how interests are aggre-
gated and, subsequently, ‘collective veto players [are thought to] approximate
the behavior of individual ones.’ (Tsebelis 2002, 63)
This approach, however, is too limited to sufficiently understand the decision-
making process in Germany at federal level. The country’s political economy
system is characterised by a particularly tight interlock of societal and political
actors, both vertically across different levels of government as well as horizon-
of these veto players increases their veto power against a change in the status quo.
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tally across different entities at federal level. The vertical interlock stems, for
example, from overlaps of powerful partisan interests across state, federal and
EU decision-making bodies. At the same time, partisan and other societal
interests – such labour, employer, environmental, religious etc. interests –
are represented horizontally across the decision-making bodies at federal level.
This makes the identification of veto points in Germany – as Merkel (2003)
points out – very difficult.10
Note that, in addition, this interlock implies that policy position of col-
lective veto players can exhibit significant dynamism. Changes in the policy
position may, for example, result from elections not only at national but also
at sub-national level, changing the composition in the Bundesrat for example.
They may also result from changes in relative power or policy position of other
societal interest groups within in the important collective veto players. These
dynamics add a further degree of complexity also to instances of ‘coalitional
engineering’ (Häusermann 2010) and package deals, which often cut across
collective veto players and make the analysis on the basis of conventional in-
stitutional and partisan veto players all but impossible.
Third, the Veto Player Model fails to capture different forms of interaction
between (groups of) agents. The model draws heavily on general equilibrium
analysis in economics, which shows how bargaining and exchange between
agents leads to Pareto improvements of resource allocation. The decision-
making process in the veto player framework is understood as a similar bar-
gaining process among the veto-yielding agents. The policy options – equiva-
lent to exchange options in the market setting – are delimited by the winset,
in which Pareto improvements for veto players are possible. By its very na-
ture, the form of political interaction of the veto players is consensual; actors
are willing to constructively interact with other actors. A key underlying as-
sumption of this approach is that actors genuinely care about the implemented
policy and about changing the policy status quo towards their policy position.
The motivation to veto a policy reform initiative may, however, be driven
10 Addressing the puzzle of institutional stability in Germany of the 1980s and 1990s
Zohlnhöfer (2003a, 137) emphasises the importance of veto player ‘cohesion’, for example.
He argues that ‘Christian democrats lacked consensus on what ought to be done in economic
policy and how far-reaching reforms should be. While the business factions of the CDU/CSU
as well as the FDP demanded comprehensive market oriented reforms, the Social Committees
defended the status quo and were only willing to accept marginal changes.’ Note that
this finding contradicts the Veto Player Theorem. Also, given that business and welfare
factions within Germany’s parties interlock with employer organisations and trade unions
respectively, it may be more appropriate to include the social partners as distinct veto points
in the analysis.
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by other considerations than policy substance. Partisan veto players are, for
example, commonly driven by vote or office seeking motives. A veto may thus
be used to hurt the reputation of the government rather than to exert influence
on policy substance. These veto players have been referred to as ‘competitive
veto players’ in distinction to the conventional ‘cooperative veto players’ in the
Veto Player Model (Wagschal 1999, Crepaz 2001, Wagschal 2005).11 Also, the
policy position of some institutional veto players – such as constitutional courts
or central banks – will not typically reflect the aggregate policy preference of
the collective actor, but be driven by the legal or statutory mandate of the
actor.
In summary, the Veto Player Model was developed as a contribution par-
ticularly to comparative political science, aiming to ‘unify the comparative
analysis of political systems’ (Ganghof 2011, 2707). While it deserves much
merit for allowing the joint assessment of seemingly incomparable political
systems, it does less well in understanding policy dynamism over time, par-
ticularly in countries with a highly complex, interlocking politico-economic
system. Accounting for the dynamics in policy preferences, all micro-political
factors and the different forms of political interaction takes the compelling
simplicity of the analytical framework ad absurdum. Thus, the original Veto
Player Model loses much of its appeal for an analysis of Germany’s structural
reform trajectory over the past decades.
To address the problems of the original veto player framework for the
analysis of countries such as Germany, this paper suggests breaking down
the decision-making system into a number of sub-systems. The original Veto
Player Model captures the entire political system in one single political bar-
gaining game. Alternatively, this paper suggests analysing the policy proposal
of an agenda setter in a number of sub-games, each of which captures an impor-
tant aspect of political interaction in the economic policy-making process (see
Figure 2.1 on page 64). More specifically, this adapted analytical veto player
framework suggests the separate analysis of ‘veto clusters’ rather than all veto
points at once. Following the original Veto Player Model, policy change in
the augmented veto player model can come about if the policy proposal is not
blocked by one or more veto clusters.
11 Note that the logic of the Veto Player Theorem does not necessarily apply to the
interaction of competitive veto players. For example, Tsebelis (2002) contends that the
number of veto players is reduced if the policy position of two veto players overlap. This
‘absorption rule’, however, does not hold for competitive veto players, which may yield their
veto for non-policy related reasons.
63
Figure 2.1: The political system consists of five veto players A, B, C, D and E.
There are three veto clusters consisting of players A and C (Cluster 1), players
A, B and E (Cluster 2) and players C, D and E (Cluster 3), which interact
among each other. Note that veto players can be part of more than one cluster,
allowing to account for political interlock. In this example, agreement on a
change of the policy status quo from SQ1 to SQ2 would only emerge in Cluster
2, given that SQ2 is inside its winset. Cluster 1 and 3 would not agree on SQ2
and there would be no policy change. Note that the result is equivalent to
a simply Veto Player Model. However, the cluster approach allows a more
differentiated analysis of the relevant political interactions.
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As the following study will show, the advantage of analysing the German
polity in decision-making sub-systems allows a more differentiated understand-
ing of the economic policy-making process. First, it is easy to see that this
approach allows for different – cooperative, competitive and possibly other –
forms of interaction among actors. For example, interaction among coalition
partners in a government – a first cluster – may be ruled by genuine con-
cerns about policy content, while interaction between the governing and the
opposition parties – a second cluster – may be ruled more by office-seeking
motives.12
Second, a clustering of veto players also allows a better grasp of the in-
terlocking nature of the German political economy, particularly if important
collective veto players are modelled as veto clusters. More specifically, veto
clusters overlap where a particular veto point features in more than one veto
cluster. For example, a political party could feature as a veto point both as
a coalition partner in the federal government as well as in one or more gov-
ernments at Länder -level. Similarly, trade union interests could feature as a
veto point both within a government (if it has strong influence on the policy
position of the welfare policy of a social democratic government, for example)
and as a veto point in tripartite negotiations.
Third, veto clustering allows taking into account the dynamics of Ger-
many’s political economy more easily. By focussing on veto clusters with
a manageable number of veto points, the impact of shifts of socio-economic
structures on policy preferences – which are too easily dismissed in the agent-
based Veto Player Model – can be assessed at a reasonable expense. Put
differently, the veto clusters allow the reintroduction of structural factors into
the framework overly determined by agency.
The disadvantage of the veto cluster approach is clearly that it disallows
comparative studies. Veto clusters are likely to be highly idiosyncratic. While
enhancing the analytical leverage of a country case study, breaking down the
system implies that the model will no longer travel to other countries. Addi-
tionally, the approach requires the correct identification of the relevant clusters
in the political system. Note that relevant veto clusters may differ across policy
issues. This requires a detailed description of the respective political system,
which is provided in the following for Germany.
12 Note that in the latter case the analysis of policy preferences and winsets of the original
Veto Player Model is thus superceded by other factors and largely obsolete.
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Veto clusters in the German political system
Three veto clusters determine economic policy in Germany: (1) the relevant
veto points within the federal government, particularly the coalition parties in
the German Bundestag, (2) the relevant veto points in the federal legislative
system, particularly also the political parties represented in the Bundesrat by
means of their governing majority in the Länder, and (3) the relevant veto
points within the German system of corporatist interest representation, par-
ticularly the trade unions and employer organisations.
The first veto cluster in the German political system comprises the actors
within the federal government (Cluster I). Both the electoral as well as the
party system in Germany result in a relatively large diversity of parties in the
Bundestag, which requires careful coalitional engineering to form stable govern-
ments. Two parties – the CDU/CSU and the SPD – conventionally dominate
the political agenda in Germany. However, as neither the CDU/CSU nor the
SPD have ever been able to gain an absolute majority in an election at the
federal level, German federal governments have always been coalition govern-
ments. The FDP, the only other party represented in parliament until the early
1980s, was joined by the Greens in 1983 and the Partei des Demokratischen
Sozialismus (PDS, renamed Die Linke.PDS in 2005 and Die Linke in 2007) in
1990. Until 2005, economic policy changes have required the consent of either
the FDP, which has been sternly pro-market since 1982, or the Green Party,
which has settled for a moderately social democratic economic policy platform.
Another complicating factor in Germany’s government system is the role
played by the two large parties as ‘catch-all parties’, which adds additional
veto points to coalition governments. Their members have traditionally en-
compassed a broad range of different political viewpoints and ideologies on
economic policy. The CDU/CSU is generally said to be more sympathetic
to business, while the SPD tends to be more sympathetic to the interests of
workers. However, close links to organised labour, employer interests and other
associations are important in both parties. In the CDU/CSU, the ‘Social Com-
mittees’ (Sozialausschüsse or Christlich-Demokratische Arbeiterschaft, CDA)
represent the labour wing, while the Mittelstands- und Wirtschaftsvereinigung
(merged to form MIT in 1995) represents business interests inside the party.
Within the SPD, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Arbeitnehmerfragen (AfA) has
traditionally been close to the trade unions, while the Seeheimer Kreis repre-
sents the modernisers in the party.
The second veto cluster captures the federal constitution of Germany, tak-
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ing account of the fact that much of the federal-state interaction is hosted in
the Bundesrat (Cluster II), which has evolved into the functional equivalent
to an upper house of parliament. Germany’s Grundgesetz prescribes a strict
vertical separation of power between the federal and state level. Over the
decades, however, the federal level has gained direct legislative authority in
more and more policy fields, mostly by recourse to the constitutional provi-
sion of having to ‘ensure equal living standards’ across the country (Art. 72,
Para. 2 Basic Law). This provision has severe implications for policy-making
at the federal level. Typically, the Bundestag should be able to overturn a
veto by the Bundesrat (einfache Gesetzgebung). In practice, however, 55-60
percent (Schindler 1999, 967) of legislation needs the approval of the Bundesrat
(zustimmungsbedürftige Gesetzgebung) because it touches the competences or
finances of the Länder. The Länder have thus gained considerable influence at
the federal level via the Bundesrat.
This point is crucial because the governing coalition usually does not have
the support of the Bundesrat, i.e. the state governments represented in the
federal chamber are backed by parties that are part of the opposition in the
Bundestag (two out of three years since 1949). Burkhart & Manow (2004)
show that, while the number of legislative proposals actually vetoed by the
Bundesrat is not significantly higher in divided government than in cases when
the same parties have a majority in both the Bundesrat and the Bundestag,
the ‘anticipated veto’ by the Bundesrat will effectively stop the government
from initiating far-reaching policy reform and structural reforms.
Note that this veto cluster diverges from the ‘Joint Decision Trap’, put
forward by Scharpf (1988). The joint decision trap describes how a federally-
organised entity such as Germany (or the EU) is biased towards lowest common
denominator policy decisions due to the veto power of Länder governments.
Scharpf assumes autonomous policy decisions by Länder governments. For
the purpose of this paper, it is argued that party discipline compels Länder
governments to adhere to the federal party policy line. This assumption is
reasonable for policies pertaining to federal legislation on wage bargaining,
unemployment protection, unemployment benefits, health insurance etc.
The third veto cluster captures the system of corporatist interest repre-
sentation in the German political system (Cluster III). This system includes
arrangements by which interest groups are included in the political decision-
making process. These interests groups comprise first and foremost the trade
unions represented by the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) – including IG
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Metall, ÖTV and DAG (now Ver.di), IG Bergbau, Chemie und Energie among
others –, employer organisations – including the Bundesverband der deutschen
Industrie (BDI), the Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgebervertretungen
(BDA), the Zentralverband des deutschen Handwerks (ZDH) and the Deutsche
Industrie- und Handelskammertag (DIHK) amon others – as well as welfare
associations. These social groups are represented in the governing bodies of
important para-statal institutions, such as the federal labour office, the social
security institutions, universities and the public broadcasters.
Beyond the tripartite-governed para-statal institutions, however, they also
exert informal political influence, particularly by means of close linkage to po-
litical parties. For example, there are traditionally leadership overlaps between
the political parties, trade unions and employer organisations (Hassel 2006).
The closely interlocking network ensures strong political influence of interest
groups – particularly of trade unions and employer organisations – on economic
policy. In fact, social partnership between government, trade unions and em-
ployer organisations that allows resolution of conflict through institutionalised
cooperation has long thought to be a hallmark of German corporatism (Streeck
2005b). In consequence, the social order and economic governance in Germany
depends, ‘not on the strength of the state, but on a balance of power between
social groups as well as on a corporatist pattern of social organization’ (Streeck
& Hassel 2004, 103).
These three veto clusters – the federal government, the federal legislative
system and corporatist interest representation – bear notable resemblance to
the conceptualisation of the German polity in the wider political science litera-
ture. Most prominently, Katzenstein identifies three similar, albeit not entirely
congruent interfaces, or ‘institutional nodes’.
First, the transformation of West German parties to catch-all par-
ties with mass appeal and the system of coalition governments
act as brake for any major initiatives. Second, West Germany’s
‘cooperative federalism’ has the effect of creating political links
among the territorial interests in the Federal Republic which are
sufficiently tight to stall all serious attempts at large-scale policy
change. Finally, parapublic institutions provide effective mecha-
nisms for representing ‘functional interests’. (Katzenstein 1987,
81-82).
Similarly, the concept of the ‘negotiated democracy’ (Verhandlungsdemokratie),
another description of Germany’s complex policy-making structure that builds
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on Lehmbruch (1976) and Lijphart (1984), also exhibit some congruence with
the veto clusters identified above. Czada (2000, 45) describes the three compo-
nents of a Germany’s negotiated democracy as ‘party-political concordance’,
‘constitutional veto structures’ and ‘neocorporatist intermediation’, which cap-
ture very similar elements of Germany’s political system as the three veto
clusters described above.
It should be noted that this political science literature has highlighted the
importance of other institutions in the German political system, such as the
Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Bundesbank. These are not included in the
analysis of this paper. The potential veto power of the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht on structural reform policies is significant, for example. However, the
court has had very little impact on structural reform policies (Merkel & Petring
2007) and, as Helms (2003) points out, has also lost some of its powers to the
EU. The general loss of authority of German institutions to the EU would
suggest that the EU needs to be added to the list of veto-yielding institutions.
But although the EU itself gained wide competences in the past two decades
and also deals with structural policy inside the member states, its real impact
on reform policies in member states has proven to be limited.13
2.3 Economic policy continuity
To analyse the period of broad institutional stability between 1982 and 2002,
the era is divided into three periods. The analysis sets off with a first period
that begins with the announcement of the ‘policy of change’ by Helmut Kohl
in 1982 and runs through the 1980s. A second period covers the time from
reunification in 1990 until the change of federal government in 1998. A third
period, which has come to be known as ‘Schröder I’, spans the first term of
the Schröder government; before the Agenda 2010 reforms were introduced
in the second term of the Schröder government (‘Schröder II’). The analysis
shows how the three veto clusters identified above blocked the implementation
13 Although the Treaties give the European Union no direct competence in the member
states’ social and economic policy, the 2000 Lisbon Agenda for Jobs and Growth made
structural reforms a key policy area of the Union. The Lisbon Agenda, aimed to make
Europe, ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010’,
intended to use soft policy tools, such as peer review and benchmarking to nudge member
states towards more reform efforts. Although speeches and documents on the Agenda 2010
make frequent reference to the Lisbon Agenda and its targets, interviews indicate that
the peer pressure effect of EU’s Open Method of Coordination in the development of the
Agenda 2010 policies was marginal. Rather, reference was made to the Lisbon targets after
the policies had been agreed on (see also Hatzopoulos (2007)).
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of structural reforms through the 1980s and 1990s.
Economic policy in Modell Deutschland
The central obstacle to reform in Germany in the 1980s was not the first or the
second veto cluster – the federal government or the federal legislative system
– but Germany’s corporatist structure (Cluster III). The German economic
model – the so-calledModell Deutschland – worked well for the dominant inter-
est groups: trade unions and employer organisations representing Germany’s
manufacturing sectors. Fundamental change of the institutional structure of
the German economic model did not find their approval. Beyond some lim-
ited budget consolidation and ‘public adjuration of market forces’ (Schmid
1991, 25, original in German), the Kohl government implemented none of its
announced structural reforms.14
While Germany had enjoyed two decades of high growth and close to full
employment following World War II, the oil crises of 1973 and 1979/1980 signif-
icantly dampened Germany’s economic outlook. The crises led to a significant
rise in unemployment. The social liberal government under Helmut Schmidt
responded with a large expansion of welfare spending – around 10 percent per
annum – during the 1970s.15 When the CDU and the FDP assumed govern-
ment control under Helmut Kohl in 1982, they shifted the policy debate away
from demand-side and towards more supply-side economic policy. The rela-
tively high unemployment and slow growth were described as a domestically
rooted problem that needed to be addressed by structural reforms. In his 1983
government declaration, Kohl summarized his economic policy plans with the
formula ‘away from more state, towards more market; away from collective
burdens, towards more individual effort; away from encrusted structures, to-
wards more flexibility, initiative and competitiveness’ (Kohl 1983, original in
German).
Despite this Thatcherite rhetoric, however, no radical changes in the Ger-
man political economy followed. The value-added tax was increased and spend-
ing for selected welfare programs was moderately reduced. For example, a 1983
act accompanying the budget moderately linked unemployment benefit dura-
tion to the record of social security contributions. However, the bulk of the
budget deficit reduction was financed through the rebounding German econ-
14 For a detailed description of the economic policy of the Kohl governments, please refer
to Zohlnhöfer (2001), for example.
15 Data source: Own calculations based on DESTATIS data
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omy of the mid-1980s. A vocally advertised income tax reform only marginally
reduced the average tax burden in the second half of the 1980s. The ‘reform’
of the legal shopping hours symbolises the overall hesitant reform policy of
the time: shops were allowed to remain open two more hours a week (Webber
1992, Katzenstein 1989).
[In summary,] the government has done little or nothing to im-
prove the working of the market [...]. [P]reservation of inherited
structures rather than fundamental reform has been and still is the
dominant principle of economic policy in Germany. (Hellwig et al.
1987, 140)
In spite of the economic recovery after the 1982 recession, with growth
at around two percent for most of the later 1980s, unemployment remained
stubbornly high at around eight percent.16 This continued to be a pressing
problem for the government. Consequently, more radical reforms of the labour
market and the welfare institutions should have been easy to rationalise.
If only the two political veto clusters – ‘federal government’ and ‘federal
legislative system’ – are taken into account, the lack of more radical policy
change remains surprising. In fact, the conditions for fundamental economic
reform seem highly favourable. First, the CDU/CSU enjoyed very good ratings
in the polls, marshalling considerable ‘electoral slack’ throughout the 1980s.
The Christian democratic liberal government had already won a majority of
seats in the Bundesrat in 1972. Also the CDU/CSU’s coalition partner, the
FDP, had left the coalition with the SPD hoping to achieve its market-oriented
economic policy goals with the help of the Christian democrats.17 That is,
coalition politics and majorities in the Bundesrat were conducive to a more
radical reform policy. This leaves the corporatist structures of the German
economic model as the decisive determinant for institutional stability.
Note, first, that in spite of growth and employment crises, the German
political economy of the 1980s firmly maintained the characteristics of the
Modell Deutschland, the post-war German economic model. While there is no
consistent definition of this economic model, it commonly captures Germany’s
specialisation in high-quality manufacturing niches, a close coordination of
16 Data source: Own calculations, IMF World Economic Outlook 2008
17 In 1982 the liberal German Minister for Economic Affairs, Otto Graf Lambsdorff,
published a ‘Concept to Overcome Low Growth and to Fight Unemployment’, renouncing
the Keynesian economic policy of the SPD and FDP coalition government. This change in
economic policy of the FDP triggered the end of the SPD/FDP coalition.
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business interests, particularly in the Mittelstand, co-determination in corpo-
rate management, and a sophisticated system of vocational training, among
other elements.18 The Varieties of Capitalism literature (Hall & Soskice 2001)
develops a model of ‘coordinated market economies’, showing how firms may
use institutional elements found in the Modell Deutschland to their advantage.
Maintaining that Germany had (and still has) a ‘comparative institutional ad-
vantage’ in ‘diversified quality production’, the model provides a compelling
argument for why Germany’s socio-economic institutions facilitated its ascent
to world-leadership in the export of high-quality manufacturing products such
as luxury cars and machine tools.
It is easy to understand that neither trade unions nor employer organisa-
tions were interested in changing this institutional regime so long as it ensured
good annual accounts for manufacturing firms and secure, well-paid jobs for
their employees. Growth, both of corporate profits and household income,
in the German manufacturing sector in real terms were negative in the early
1980s. After 1983, however, real corporate profits grew by an average of over
4 percent, while real household income in the manufacturing sector grew by
over 3 percent on average. At the same time, growth of profits and income in
the non-manufacturing and particularly in the service sectors was significantly
lower.19 In short, the Germany’s specialisation in a skill-intensive, high-quality
production regime paid off for the trade union and employer organisation mem-
bers.
Note, second, that trade union and employer interests were effectively trans-
mitted into the political decision-making process particularly through their
influence in the party system. On the one hand, labour-friendly social com-
mittees inside the CDU/CSU exerted substantial influence on the economic
agenda of the CDU/CSU. Here, it is worth pointing to the strong political
position in the CDU of the committee chairmen Norbert Blüm (who was si-
multaneously a member of the CDU’s executive board and Minister of Labour
from 1982 to 1998) and Heiner Geissler (who was Secretary General of the
CDU). On the other hand, the interests of large- and medium-sized firms were
effectively represented in the CDU/CSU by the influential Mittelstands- und
Wirtschaftsvereinigung (Zohlnhöfer 2001, 42). Regarding the CDU/CSU’s ju-
nior coalition partner, the FDP always had close tied to corporate interests,
the party’s core constituents being ‘entrepreneurs, middle-class intellectuals as
18 For two discussions of the term Modell Deutschland – from a German and an Anglo-
Saxon perspective – see Offe (2002) and The Economist, 14 April 2012
19 Data source: Own calculations from OECD STAN database
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well as business and industry executives’ (Kortmann 2010, original in German).
The analysis of the corporatist veto cluster – the policy preferences of actors
and their interaction – helps understand why policy impulses of the Kohl gov-
ernment did not translate into structural reform and institutional change. The
government’s plan to liberalise the labour market in the mid-1980s – a stated
priority of the government coalition – failed due to the resistance mounted
by both the unions and the employer organisations (Wood 1997, Thelen 2000,
Wood 2001a). Both the unions and the employer associations, for example,
rejected a coalition initiative to break the monopoly of DGB representatives in
the work councils. More specifically, these two groups used their government
influence to water down the legislative proposal. This manoeuvre, ‘can only
be understood in the light of the characteristic patterns of organisation and
incentives in German industrial production’ (Wood 1997, 24).
Instead of dismantling integral elements of Germany’s coordinated market
economy, the government returned to demand-side policies. This kept ex-
cess labour supply off the market by increasing the social budget. First, the
government stepped up its active labour market policies and wage subsidies.
Expenditures for these measures rose by 10-20 percent annually until the end
of the 1980s (from EUR 14.5 billion in 1985 to EUR 25.1 billion in 1990).20
Second, the government began encouraging early retirement. These schemes
helped firms adjust their labour demand despite highly regulated labour mar-
kets. Because companies massively applied these early retirement schemes to
lay off workers (Trampusch 2005), the cost of these schemes rose from EUR 95
million in 1985 to EUR 546 million in 1989. By the late 1980s, labour market
participation of men between the ages of 60-64 reached only 30 percent, while
it stood at 55 percent in the United Kingdom and 65 percent in Sweden (Wood
2001b, 387). The government’s tacit support to the German manufacturing
sector has been referred to as ‘welfare corporatism’ (Streeck 2005a, 141).
Economic policy after reunification
Following German reunification, the anchor for institutional stability shifted
from corporatism to the federal legislative process, from Cluster III to Cluster
II. After a short a post-reunification consensus between the major political
parties, business and labour – helped by the domestic demand boom from
1990 to 1992 – the government embarked on new structural reform initiatives.
At the same time, the financial burden of reunification on the German wel-
20 Data: Own calculations, IMF World Economic Outlook 2008
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fare system was putting into question core pillars of the Modell Deutschland.
This weakened the reform-decelerating powers of the corporatist veto cluster.
However, the loss of a majority in the Bundesrat hindered the Christian demo-
cratic/liberal government from enacting more far-reaching structural reforms.
The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the subsequent, surprisingly fast
reunification of Germany in 1990 were bound to preoccupy German political
economy. While the political reunification turned out to be less onerous than
anticipated, the economic unification of the strong West German economy with
the derelict economy of Eastern Germany proved to be very difficult. Kohl’s
stated primary post-reunification goal was to create equal living standards in
the eastern and western regions of the country (Art. 34, Treaty on the Estab-
lishment of German Unity). This entailed huge investments to overhaul the
decayed eastern infrastructure. Since 1990 about 4 percent of GDP have been
paid in transfers from the west to the east regions each year, amounting to
roughly EUR 1.4 trillion in 2005.21 Because East Germany de facto acceded
to the West German constitution, socio-economic regulations and welfare in-
stitutions were automatically applied to former East Germany. With huge
increases in unemployment following closure of large sections of the planned
economy’s industries in the East, active labour market policy and early retire-
ment – which had worked well to stabilise unemployment rates in the 1980s in
the former West Germany – became the preferred policy measure to maintain
social peace (Wood 2001b, 388). The cost peaked at EUR 52.2 billion in 1992
for active labour market measures and at EUR 18.6 billion in 1993 for early
retirement measures.22 Between 1990 and 1995, 57 percent of the former East
German work force took part in active labour market programs (Zohlnhöfer
2003a, 141).
The loose fiscal policy and the one-to-one exchange of the East Mark to
the German Mark led to a post-reunification boom, with growth rates of 5.7
percent and 5 percent in 1990 and 1991, respectively. The ensuing high in-
flationary pressure prompted the Bundesbank to drastically increase interest
rates, pushing the German economy into recession in 1993. The subsequent
rise in unemployment increased the budgetary problem of the government still
further, leading to substantial reform pressure by the mid-1990s. The pressure
to lower the deficit was further amplified by the need to fulfil the Maastricht
criteria of the European Monetary Union (EMU), a second political priority of
21 Der Spiegel, 22 August 2005, see also Ritter & Deveson (2011)
22 Data source: Own calculations, IMF World Economic Outlook 2008
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the Kohl government. Attempts to consolidate the budget by introducing spe-
cial taxes, such as the ‘solidarity surcharge’ (Solidaritätszuschlag), cut-backs
in welfare spending and a reduction of subsidies, produced only short-term
effects; the deficit reached a new all-time high in 1996.
In 1995/1996 the number of unemployed reached the 4-million threshold for
the first time. In an attempt to reduce unemployment, the government enter
into a tripartite agreement, the ‘Alliance for Jobs’ (Bündnis für Arbeit), with
trade unions and employer organisations in 1996. This move was patterned
on the ‘concerted action’ (Konzertierte Aktion) approach of the 1960s and
1970s. In a joint declaration, the government, employer organisations and
unions agreed on the target to cut unemployment by 50 percent by the end of
the decade by. After several informal consultations, however, the ‘Alliance for
Jobs’ ended in April 1996 without an accord, mainly because no agreement on
labour market liberalisation could be reached. The ‘attempt to use the social
capital accumulated in the associations for fundamental reforms’ (Streeck 2000,
56, original in German) had failed.
After the ‘Alliance for Jobs’ came to an end, the Kohl government uni-
laterally put forward far-reaching economic policy reform proposals, aimed at
drastically cutting back expensive demand-side labour market policies. With
its majority in the Bundestag, the coalition amended the ‘Protection against
Dismissals Act’ as well as other labour market regulation.23 However, central
elements of the labour market reform, pertaining particularly to the benefit
system and requiring approval from the Bundesrat, did not pass the legisla-
tive process.24 At the same time, a major overhaul of the German income
tax system – one of the core policy objectives of the FDP, aimed at reduc-
ing non-wage labour costs and increasing work incentives – failed outright in
the legislative process after long negotiations.25 Against this background, it is
unsurprising that the Association for the German Language chose Reformstau
(‘reform blockade’) as the ‘word of the year’ in 1997.26
How can this economic policy turnaround be explained? Growth and un-
employment rates were not significantly worse after the early-1990s recession
23 More specifically, the government raised the threshold above which employment protec-
tion is applicable from five to ten employees, liberalised the use of fixed-term work contracts,
cut sick pay to reduce non-wage labour costs (the issue over which the ‘Alliance for Jobs’
had fallen apart), tightened the criteria under which benefit recipients could refuse a job,
and reduced the content of active labour market policy. Associated Press, 7 November 1996.
24 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 November 1996
25 Die Welt, 27 March 1997, Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 July 1997, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 July 1997
26 Die Zeit, 18 December 1997
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than they had been following the early-1980s recession. However, in a reac-
tion very dissimilar to that of the mid-1980s, the Kohl government turned
away from the ‘social partnership’ and with its reform policy ‘threw down the
gauntlet to social peace’ in Germany.27 Social scientists are puzzled that the
social committees within the CDU/CSU could not or did not want to prevent
reform initiatives from entering the legislative process the way they had in the
1980s (Zohlnhöfer 2004, 313).
To understand the 1990s economic policy of the Kohl government, the effect
of reunification on the Modell Deutschland as well as the effect of other struc-
tural changes that took place in the shadow of reunification have to be taken
into account. These developments challenged the consensus among the social
partners on the viability of the German economic model. Interview partners
both from some of Germany’s leading employers as well as from IG Metall –
arguably Germany’s most influential trade union – indicated that cooperation
among themselves and with the government was ‘different’ after reunification,
and that their counterparts had become ‘less reasonable’. This points towards
a less comfortable, more competitive relationship between business, labour and
the government.
From the perspective of employers, the convenient system of ‘welfare cor-
poratism’ and collective wage agreements was increasingly becoming a liability
for international competitiveness, particularly for medium-sized employers in
the Mittelstand.28 The post-reunification unemployment shock led to a steep
rise in non-wage labour costs from around 70 percent of direct compensation
in the 1980s to almost 85 percent in the mid-1990s.29 Large firms were able
to relocate labour-intensive production abroad or pass on the costs to their
suppliers, but small- and medium-sized firms were forced to bear the cost. Ac-
cordingly, with the exception of the post-reunification boom years, profits of
German manufacturing firms developed negatively in real terms through most
of the 1990s.30 Small firms increasingly viewed the labour market institutions
of the Modell Deutschland as a burden rather than an asset for their business
operations. With this, key components of the ‘coordinated market economy’
were being put into question.
At the same time, German firms faced an increasing need to restructure
27 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 April 1996, original in German
28 ‘Non-wage labour costs in Germany reach new record high’, European Industrial Rela-
tions Observatory, 28 May 1997
29 Data source: DESTATIS labour market database
30 Data source: Own calculations from OECD STAN database
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their operations and to adapt their business model to a changing interna-
tional environment. European economic integration and market liberalisation
introduced concepts such as outsourcing, market capitalisation, lean produc-
tion, service economy, and mergers and acquisitions into the German eco-
nomic landscape, thereby slowly changing established ownership and produc-
tion structures (Schroeder & Silvia 2003, Kinderman 2003, Beyer & Hoppner
2003). Höpner & Krempel (2003), for example, find that a slow erosion of the
cross-shareholder system, the Deutschland AG, took place in the second half
of the 1990s.
As a result of these developments, a conflict emerged particularly between
more and less exposed firms inside the employer organisations regarding the
direction of economic policy in Germany. The conflict surfaced, for example,
in the attacks of the reform-minded chairman of the BDI, Hans-Olaf Henkel,
against the BDA.31 While the BDI pressed for far-reaching structural reforms,
the BDA defended core elements of the German economic model (Streeck &
Hassel 2004). Many small- and medium-sized firms started leaving employer
organisations (Thelen & van Wijnbergen 2003, Silvia & Schroeder 2007). Dis-
cord among different types of employers in the German economy led to a
weakening of the political influence of the employer organisations (Lehmbruch
2000).
From the perspective of trade unions, reunification also had severe repercus-
sions. Real income of manufacturing workers had reliably increased through
the 1980s and early 1990s, at about twice the rate as in the general econ-
omy. In the mid-1990s, however, income growth slowed to below 2 percent,
also on account of the increase in social security contributions.32 At the same
time, increasing decentralisation of wage bargaining – particularly in Eastern
Germany – combined with high unemployment and changing work environ-
ments (Schroeder 2003) also contributed to a significant decrease of unioni-
sation (Hassel 1999). Union membership of the working population fell from
around 36 percent in 1991 to about 24 percent in 2000.33 Lower levels of
unionisation not only put substantial financial strain on the trade unions, but
– as interview parters confirm – also started undermined their legitimacy in
the eyes of policy-makers.
As a result of these developments, interests between traditionalist and more
reform-minded trade unions emerged. This conflict is demonstrated, for exam-
31 Der Spiegel, 23 September 1996, Der Tagesspiegel, 7 July 1998
32 Data source: Own calculations from OECD STAN database
33 Data source: Armingeon et al. (2010)
77
ple, by the policy struggle between the traditionalist head of IG Metall, Klaus
Zwickel, and his reform-minded deputy, Walter Riester (who later became com-
missioned with pension reform in the Schröder government).34 Internal conflict
over policy severely weakened the political influence of the labour movement.
It also accounts for the declining influence of the trade unions the CDA, the
labour wing in the in the CDU (Zohlnhöfer 2003a). By the late 1990s, not
one of the board members of German trade unions was simultaneously a party
executive.35 With their internal cohesion, the ability of the labour movement
to uphold the status quo was faded.36
The resulting weakness in the corporatist veto cluster, which had prevented
liberal market reform in the 1980s, did not, however, open a window of oppor-
tunity for more decisive structural reform. Note that the ‘federal government’
veto cluster (Cluster I) remained accommodative to more far-reaching struc-
tural reforms: It was the FDP, for example, that pushed its CDU/CSU coali-
tion partner to bring forward the tax reform initiative, which was originally
foreseen for after the 1998 elections.37
Rather, through the mid-1990s, the ‘federal legislative system’ veto cluster
(Cluster II) created a strong anchor for the institutional status quo. The coali-
tion parties in the federal government – CDU/CSU and FDP – had lost their
majority in the Bundesrat in 1991. In the early 1990s, the government had
been able to cooperate with the opposition by appealing to a ‘post-reunification
consensus’. Following the economic crisis, however, the opposition adopted
a confrontational strategy. From 1995, the new chairman of the SPD, Os-
kar Lafontaine started to use the Bundesrat as a veto tool to undermine the
federal government’s legislative programme and boost the public profile the
SPD. After 16 years in opposition and in view of the electoral success of so-
cial democratic parties in other large European countries at the time, office
seeking motives strongly dominated policy considerations in the SPD. Major
legislative initiatives to reform labour market institutions and the tax system
were thus rejected or watered down by the Bundesrat.38 The FDP chairman,
34 Der Spiegel, 13 October 1997, Focus, 17 November 1997
35 While during the 1980s 97 percent and 20 percent of SPD and CDU/CSU members
of parliament, respectively, were trade union members, these numbers had shrunk to 80
percent and 20 percent by the mid-1990s (Hassel 2006).
36 An early indicator of the union weakness in the 1990s was the quick, EU-induced
privatisation of several state-owned companies in the transport, postal service and telecom-
munication sector, which the unions were unable to stop. cf. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 June
1994
37 Die Welt, 20 August 1996, Die Zeit, 29 November 1996
38 Associated Press, 25 September 1997, see also (Lees 2000).
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Wolfgang Gerhard, famously complained ‘We are in government, but we are
not in power!’39
Economic policy under Schröder I
The first years of the government of Gerhard Schröder were characterised by
severe intra-party conflict. This shifted the determinant for institutional sta-
bility from the ‘federal legislative system’ to the ‘federal government’ veto
cluster, from Cluster II to Cluster I. Following a demand-side economic policy
in the months after taking office from the Kohl government, the government’s
attempts at supply-side institutional reforms were largely foiled by resistance
from within the governing coalition.40
When SPD and the Greens gained a majority in the 1998 elections, this
marked the first time all governing parties were completely replaced by oppo-
sition parties in the history of the Federal Republic. Given soaring unemploy-
ment and budget deficits, a break with unions and subsequent market-oriented
reform attempts, the Christian democratic liberal government had lost the
trust of the electorate. A growing perception of a ‘justice gap’ (Gerechtigkeit-
slücke) emerged (and was actively kindled by the opposition parties), especially
in Eastern Germany, where more than 60 percent of the voters moved to the
left of the political spectrum, namely the SPD or the PDS.41 With the slo-
gan ‘Social Justice and Innovation’, the double act of Gerhard Schröder and
Oskar Lafontaine, and a professionally organised election campaign, the SPD
managed to draw votes also from reform-oriented conservative voters (Stöss &
Niedermayer 2000).
In terms of economic policy, the Schröder government’s first months were
dominated by a demand-side approach. The 1996 labour market reforms of
the Kohl government were revoked, a move that the SPD had promised to
carry out in its election campaign.42 In consequence, public expenditures for
welfare measures rose by 6.8 percent. Included in this demand-side economic
policy was an income-tax reform that decreased the lower tax bracket and
increased the tax allowance. As a concession to the Green Party coalition
39 Die Zeit, 10 July 1997, original in German.
40 For a detailed description of the economic policy of the Schröder I government, please
refer to Egle et al. (2003), for example.
41 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 October 1998
42 The reintroduction of social security contributions for low income jobs (so-called 630-
DM-Jobs) and rules against pseudo self-employment were especially heavily criticised by
employers (Egle 2006, Rose 2003), who warned that the low-wage sector would be pushed
back into illegality.
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partner, an ecological tax (Ökosteuer) on energy consumption was introduced
and used to support pension funds. By bringing back to life the ‘Alliance for
Jobs’ (renamed ‘Alliance for Jobs, Training and Competitiveness’), the SPD
hoped to revive the corporatist institutions that had been challenged during
the last years of the Kohl government (Schroeder 2003, 12). In particular, the
government tried to have trade unions agree to an employment-friendly policy.
However, no compromise could be reached. Apart from the very limited so-
called ‘Job-AQTIV’ labour market law on activation and training measures,
concrete results of the “Alliance for Jobs” are difficult to identify (Heinze 2003,
Reutter 2004).
The economic policy approach of the Schröder I government changed sig-
nificantly, following the departure of Lafontaine as finance minister and chair-
man of the SPD. On finances, Schröder replaced Lafontaine with Hans Eichel,
a fiscal conservative. The new finance minister started implemented some
limited spending cuts in the welfare and pension system.43 However, after
losing elections in several Länder (and subsequently the majority in the Bun-
desrat) and with disastrous results in European Parliament elections, further
economic imposition were shelved (Schröder: ‘I’ve understood’).44 At this
time, the pressure to reform was reduced considerably as unemployment de-
clined and growth rates picked up in the course of the global internet-economy
boom. What followed until 2002 came to be known as the ‘policy of the steady
hand’45, although the government did introduce some incremental pension and
corporate income tax reforms in 2000/2001.46 Overall, however, and despite
the incoherent policy profile in social, fiscal and employment matters, tradi-
tional social democracy dominated the SPD economic policy agenda until the
end of Schröder I.
This economic policy is explained by substantial intra-party conflict within
the SPD, which can be understood in terms of the ‘catch-all party problem’ in
Cluster I of the analytical framework. In 1998, the SPD rode a wave of ‘new
social democracy’ that was sweeping through Europe at the time, namely the
United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Portugal and Italy. But the vague concept
43 Spending cuts which amounted to about 1.5 percent of the budget in 2000 (Zohlnhöfer
2003b, 198).
44 Der Spiegel, 13 June 1999, Berliner Zeitung, 6 September 1999
45 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 July 2001
46 The rise of pensions was decoupled from the rise in living standards, and linked to
the rise in prices. With the Riester-Rente, a second, private pillar in addition to the public
pension fund was introduced (Schmidt 2003a, 247-251). The corporate income tax reform
lowered the corporate tax rate, but also provided tax breaks on profits from the sale of
cross-shareholdings.
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Neue Mitte (or ‘Third Way’, Giddens 1998) and the slogan, ‘Social Justice and
Innovation’, which had worked well in the election campaign, turned out to
be ‘programmatically empty’ (Egle & Henkes 2003, 73). The SPD programme
lacked a ‘concretion of social democracy’s basic values liberty, equality and
solidarity’ (Meyer 2001, 13, original in German, Egle 2006), resulting in conflict
between modernisers and the traditionalists over the economic policy direction
of the government.
This conflict emerged most visibly in the rivalry between Finance Minis-
ter Lafontaine and Chancellor Schröder. The balancing act between the two,
which had carried the SPD into government in 1998, quickly broke down af-
ter the election.47 Lafontaine is a self-proclaimed left-Keynesian. Schröder’s
approach to economic policy is characterised by pragmatism and reformism.
A close advisor describes his role – then as minister president of Lower Sax-
ony – in committees as follows. ‘Schröder never – in contrast to his eternal
adversary Edmund Stoiber – prepared for meetings particularly thoroughly.
He would listed to technical discussions passively. However, he would typi-
cally be the one to make the winning, compromise proposal.’48 At the same
time, Schröder surrounded himself with reformist social democrats, such as
Bodo Hombach (Federal Minister for Special Tasks), Frank-Walter Steinmeier
(Chief of Staff in the German Chancellery), Alfred Tacke (State Secretary at
the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology) and Uwe-Karsten Heye
(Government Spokesperson). He maintained close ties with German industry,
which he had established during his time as minister president.49
Although the modernisers in the SPD gained the upper hand over tradi-
tionalists, Schröder’s subsequent attempts to introduce supply-side structural
reforms failed due to the resistance of his own party, which – as interview
partners close to the government explained – was not ‘ready’ for more inno-
vative policy changes. In June 1999, Schröder and Britain’s Prime Minister
Tony Blair published a paper titled, ‘The Way Forward for Europe’s Social
Democrats’ (Blair & Schröder 1999), which can be understood as an attempt
to reaffirm the chancellor’s commitment to the ‘Third Way’ concepts and as
a rejection of Keynesian policies. Both the paper and the fiscal consolida-
tion policy evoked strong resistance from the SPD labour committee AfA and
the parliamentary fraction. Labour representatives called the Blair-Schröder
47 Der Spiegel, 4 October 1999
48 original in German, see also Murswieck (2003), Egle (2006)
49 Die Zeit, 14 March 2002
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paper a ‘historically blind defamation of the welfare state.’ 50
At the same time, as coalition partners, the Greens experienced a similar
programmatic debate. As a relatively young party, grown out of the envi-
ronmentalist movement, the Greens had not agreed on a consistent economic
programme when they assumed government responsibility, apart from the eco-
tax, which formed their ‘key project of an ecological-social modernisation’
(Egle 2003, 104) of the German economy; environmental – such as the nuclear
power phase out – and societal issues dominated their political agenda. How-
ever, it is probably true that Bündnis 90/Die Grünen pushed the SPD in the
direction of more rather than less structural reform.
The analysis of policy preferences in the federal government veto cluster
suggests that intra-party conflict (Cluster I) was the decisive anchor for in-
stitutional stability in the Schröder I government. The ‘federal system’ and
‘corporatism’ veto clusters only had a secondary role. With regards to the role
of the federal legislative system, the SPD lost its majority in the Länder just
a year after coming to power. With the majority in the Bundesrat, conserva-
tive parties were able to block structural reform initiatives of the government.
Indeed, the Bundesrat blocked a more significant reduction of subsidies in the
context of its 2000 tax reform.51 Overall, however, there were few supply-side
reform projects were introduced into the legislative process.
With regards to the role of corporatism, Heinze (2003) argues that the
stronger integration of trade unions into the decision-making process through
the ‘Alliance for Jobs’ increased the immobility of the government. Instead of
more innovative reforms, the ‘Alliance for Jobs’ delivered a deadlock in labour-
market policy. By 2000, however, the negotiations had practically come to an
end, after which time members did not reconvene. Incremental reforms, such
as the corporate tax reform of 2000 – which was expected to further disentangle
the ‘Deutschland AG’, the strong cross-householdership between large German
banks, insurance companies and industrial enterprises in Germany – and the
pension reform of 2001 were not successfully resisted by the social partners.
This suggests that rather than acting as a binding constraint on government
policy, the constraining powers of the corporatist veto cluster remained weak.
50 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 July 1999, original in German
51 Handelsblatt, 14 June 2000
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2.4 Economic policy under Schröder II: The Agenda
2010
The following section provides a short description and analysis of the Schröder
II government and its central economic policy programme; the Agenda 2010.52
It argues that the government was able to implement these Agenda 2010 re-
forms because all three veto clusters of the German political economy had lost
their constraining power.
In 2001/2002, the economic situation in Germany deteriorated drastically,
in step with the global economic downturn following the 9-11 terror attacks.
Growth rates plummeted (from 3.2 percent in 2000 to zero in 2002), and un-
employment rose quickly (from 7.8 percent in 2001 to 8.7 percent in 2002),
putting pressure on the government to end its ‘steady hand’ policy. A scandal
in the Federal Labour Agency in spring 2002 served as an opportunity to re-
open the structural reform debate.53 Schröder not only replaced the head of
the agency and modernised the corporate governance structure. More impor-
tantly, he set up a ‘Commission for Modern Provision of Services in the Labour
Market’ (Kommission für Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt), tasked
with developing a reform concept to make the German labour market and the
job placement system more efficient. It became known as the ‘Hartz Commis-
sion’ after its chairman Peter Hartz, a former board member of the Volkswagen
AG.
In August 2002, the Hartz Commission presented 13 reform proposals.
These included a more far-reaching reform of the Federal Labour Agency. But
the Commission also proposed measures to increase pressure on the unem-
ployed, encourage the integration of the labour and social assistance admin-
istration, introduce a low-wage sector (Mini-Jobs), promote entrepreneurship
(Ich-AG) and intensify the use of temporary employment agencies (Personal-
Service-Agenturen). The national wage bargaining system was not touched by
the proposals.54
52 For a detailed description of the economic policy of the Schröder II government, please
refer to Egle et al. (2006), for example.
53 In the so-called ‘placement scandal’ (Vermittlungsskandal) the Federal Court of Auditors
had uncovered that the BA had grossly overstated its job-placement success rates.
54 Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt: Vorschläge der Kommission
zum Abbau der Arbeitslosigkeit und zur Umstrukturierung der Bundesanstalt
für Arbeit, report of the commission under the chairmanship of Dr. Peter
Hartz, available online at http://www.bmas.de/DE/Service/Publikationen/
moderne-dienstleistungen-am-arbeitsmarkt.html, retrieved 23.06.2013 21:02, see
also Schmid (2003), Jann & Schmid (2004)
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These proposals notwithstanding, the SPD was in danger of loosing the
September 2002 federal elections on the grounds of the country’s poor eco-
nomic performance. The CDU/CSU candidate, Bavarian minister president
Edmund Stoiber, boasted better credentials on economic issues.55 In the 2002
election campaign, Schröder promised to implement the reform proposals of
the Hartz Commission ‘one-to-one’.56 The SPD’s narrow victory was, however,
not attributed to its economic reform agenda, but to the government’s oppo-
sition to the US-led military intervention in Iraq and Schröder’s shirt-sleeved
handling of the Elbe-floods in the same year.57
This ‘blood and flood effect’ – as one interview partner put it – did not
last long, and the SPD lost dramatically in the polls in the first months of
its second term in office. Instead of returning to a ‘steady hand’ policy, how-
ever, Schröder moved forward on the reform agenda. On 3 March 2003, he
announced the breakdown of the ‘Alliance for Jobs’ – on which there had been
no active negotiations for more than three years – and added that he intended
to go ahead with a reform programme, without the participation of the social
partners.58 On 14 March, Schröder addressed the Bundestag and released de-
tails of a new, broad reform package, the Agenda 2010. The reform agenda
addressed labour-market policy, taxes, higher education and job training, as
well as the pension and health insurance system. The Chancellor justified
his structural reform policies with the need to make Germany’s social market
economy sustainable: ‘The alternative is obvious: Either we modernise our
social market economy or we will be modernised by the untamed powers of the
markets.’ (Schröder 2003, original in German)
The central element of the structural reform package was the change to
labour legislation, which adopted most of the Hartz Commission’s proposals.
These proposals resulted in four new, separate labour market laws, known as
Hartz I, II, III and IV. Employment protection was liberalised by the provi-
sion that dismissal protection applied only to firms with more than ten, instead
of five, employees. The legislation also merged secondary unemployment as-
sistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) with social welfare (Sozialhilfe) by creating Arbeit-
slosengeld II from January 2005 (known as ‘Hartz IV’). Legislation additionally
reduced the period of primary unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosengeld I)
from 18 to 12 months (with an exemption for persons above the age of 55),
55 Handelsblatt, 8 April 2002, Financial Times Deutschland, 22 September 2002
56 Handelsblatt, 18 July 2002
57 Der Spiegel, 23 September 2002, Die Welt, 14 August 2012
58 Der Tagesspiegel, 4 March 2003
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thereby increasing the pressure on long-term unemployed people. The provi-
sion that unemployed people are compelled to take up any legal occupation
was first removed due to pressure from inside the SPD, but later reintroduced
on account of the opposition in the parliamentary arbitration committee. Fi-
nally, craft legislation was simplified by reducing the requirement of ‘master
craftsmanship’ (Meisterzwang) from 94 to 41 crafts.59
Many SPD supporters were highly dissatisfied with the proposals and harsh
critique came from the trade unions and welfare associations.60 For the tra-
ditionalist camp inside the SPD and for the PDS, in particular, the Agenda
2010 heralded the end of the German welfare state and aroused fierce protest.61
Employer associations reacted positive at first.62 However, as more details
about the reform plans emerged, employer organisations became more critical,
lamenting the persistent ‘reform deadlock’.63 While the general feedback from
the press and academia was cautiously positive, a substantial number of ana-
lysts questioned the economic viability of the supply-side reforms (Offe 2003,
Hickel 2003).
In the following 18 months, the SPD saw an unprecedented loss of voter
confidence and the party reached historic lows in the opinion polls. Dissatis-
faction was strongest in Eastern Germany, where trade unions organised sev-
eral mass demonstrations.64 Undoubtedly, the Hartz IV legislation helped the
PDS (and the right-wing Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD)
win electoral gains in Saxony and Thuringia. In Western Germany, a number
of frustrated SPD politicians and union officials established the Wahlalterna-
tive Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit (WASG). The new party saw itself as a
representation of those disadvantaged by Agenda 2010 and wanted to create a
political alternative ‘left of the SPD’.65
When statistics showed more than five million unemployed in January 2005
because social-assistance benefactors were now included in the unemployment
statistic, the government could not convincingly prove the feasibility of its
59 This brief summary of Agenda 2010 illustrates that parts of the Hartz-reforms were
modelled on the 1996-1998 reforms of the Christian democratic liberal government, ‘which
following the change of Government in 1998 were deemed anti-social and repealed’ (Ubber
2004, 136). However, the reforms then go well beyond the 1996-98 measures.
60 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 July 2003, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 August 2003,
Handelsblatt 23 October 2003
61 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 December 2003
62 Die Welt, 15 June 2004, see also (Weßels 2006)
63 Der Spiegel, 28 May 2003, Bildzeitung, 6 October 2004
64 Der Spiegel, 3 April 2004
65 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 March 2004
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supply-side reforms. The SPD lost state elections in its former stronghold
North Rhine-Westphalia in March 2005, at which point Schröder announced
that he intended to dissolve the Bundestag and call new federal elections.66 In
October 2005, the red-green government was voted out of office and replaced
by a grand coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD parties under the chancellorship
of Angela Merkel. Gerhard Schröder stepped down from all political offices.
The Agenda 2010 seems to fundamentally contradict established knowledge
that institutional change in Germany is incremental by nature. The red-green
coalition made a remarkable shift in its policy from its demand-side policies
of 1998-1999 to the far-reaching supply-side reforms of 2003-2005. To see how
the political economy such facilitate drastic policy change, we again examine
the three veto clusters, ‘federal government’, ‘federal legislative system’ and
‘corporatist interest representation’.
First, by the time of his second term in office, Schröder succeeded in estab-
lished a cohesive federal government. After the departure of Oskar Lafontaine,
SPD modernisers had gradually gained an upper hand on economic policy
matters. Incremental reforms, such as the corporate tax reform of 2000 and
the pension reform of 2001, stand in sharp contrast to the attempts of Con-
certed Action in form of the ‘Alliance for Jobs’ and indicate that the Schröder
government was gaining more political room for manoeuvre.67 In many ways,
the these reforms can be understood as a pioneer of the Agenda 2010.
After the 2002 elections, Schröder further consolidated the hold of the mod-
ernisers on government. Interview partners particularly stressed the impor-
tance of the merger of the the Federal Ministry for Labour (Bundesministerium
für Arbeit und Soziales) and the Ministry for Economic Affairs (Bundesmin-
isterium für Wirtschaft und Technologie) under the leadership of the former
minister president of North-Rhine Westphalia, Wolfgang Clement. The merger
of the traditionalist ministry for labour with the business-friendly ministry for
economic affairs into a ‘super ministry’ for economic affairs and labour is seen
as an important factor supporting labour-market reforms.
Interviewees close to the decision-making process in Berlin also maintain
that Gerhard Schröder gradually adopted a ‘presidential’ style of government.68
This further contributed to the weakening of the SPD’s labour wing, by making
the policy-decisions more independent from opposition within his own party.
Schröder’s exceptional media skills were helpful in this context, earning him
66 Die Zeit, 22 May 2005, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 December 2005
67 The Economist, 20 July 2000, Handelsblatt, 17 December 2000
68 see also Berliner Republik, June 2004 and Murswieck (2003)
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the title of ‘media chancellor’ (Medienkanzler).69 They permitted Schröder
to communicate directly with the electorate. For example, well-known for his
excellent sense of drama, Schröder proclaimed in the German Bundestag – in
the manner of another famous German reformer, namely Martin Luther – ‘I
stand here because there has to be change, because that is the appropriate
reaction to the changed situation of our society.’70 (Schröder 2003)
Second, the CDU/CSU-led Länder, which held a majority in the federal
chamber, did not block Agenda 2010. Although the CDU/CSU could have fol-
lowed a vote-seeking, confrontational veto strategy similar to that of the SPD
in the mid-1990s, it broadly decided on a policy-seeking strategy. Interview
partners confirm that the conservative parties decided to cooperate politically,
while voicing ‘rhetorical critique’ in public. The opposition called for restric-
tions on the independent wage-bargaining system, a demand that clearly was
not going to be met by the government, for example. Nonetheless, opposition
parties pushed the government towards more far-reaching reforms in the ar-
bitration committee of Bundestag and Bundesrat.71 Accordingly, Zohlnhöfer
(2004) credits the CDU/CSU and FDP with exerting important influence on
Agenda 2010, for example in the context of the liberalisation of mini-jobs and
self-employment. Egle (2006) even refers to an ‘informal grand coalition’ be-
tween the red-green government and the CDU/CSU opposition majority in the
Bundesrat.
Third, social partners were either unable or unwilling to prevent the Agenda
2010 structural reforms. Indeed, the turning point in the economic policy of
the Schröder government was marked by the proclaimed end of the ‘Alliance
for Jobs’. The ability of the Schröder government to publicly renounce tripar-
titism stresses the persistent weakness of the corporatist veto cluster. Note
that Schröder could simply have maintained the ‘Alliance for Jobs’; an infor-
mal institution that simply no longer held meetings. Accordingly, the SPD’s
backing away from the the social partners – especially from its close allies, IG
Metall and ver.di – is identifies as a ‘break in the system’ by many interviewees.
A former senior German executive pointed out ‘The commitment from all
partners to the industrial location Germany no longer existed.’ This points to
the fact that attempts to harness corporatist structures to build a agreement
on institutional change failed because a basic consensus on the the aspired
economic model had gone missing. Schröder himself describes Agenda 2010
69 die tageszeitung, 6 September 2002
70 ‘Here I stand; I can do no other’, Der Spiegel, 8 October 2004, original in German
71 Der Spiegel, 17 October 2003, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 December 2003
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as a direct consequence of the failed Bündnis für Arbeit.72 On the one hand,
employer organisations had increasingly taken a hostile position towards Ger-
many’s ‘old’ economic order and pushed for more far-reaching liberalisation.
On the other hand, trade unions remained in a state of disorder. The creep-
ing decentralisation of wage bargaining and the loss of members were forcing
the trade unions to restructure and consolidate (Silvia 2008), making them an
increasingly unreliable parter for the German industry.73 This is maybe best
illustrated with the example of the 2003 IG Metall strike, calling for a 35-hour
week for eastern German plants. The stoppages in eastern Germany led to
production standstills in western German plants and to protests from work
councils; IG Metall had to end its strike unconditionally.74
Against this background, in the mid-2000s social scientists find that ‘[t]he
organised, corporatist society is in a state of growing disorganisation. Not only
does the normal working relationship break apart, the social-inclusive power
of the association-state is failing. Big associations are today perceived as a
part of the problem by the public.’ (Heinze 2003, 142, original in German)
Some went as far as to claim that the, ‘twilight of the Gods of the post-
war corporatism’ had come (Weßels 2006, original in German) and that the
‘century of corporatism’ had ended (Streeck 2005b). Clearly, the relatively
unobstructed implementation of Agenda 2010 is a strong indication that –
for the time being – corporatism had lost its constraining power on German
political decision-making.
However, the weakness of the Modell Deutschland in the 1990s and early
2000s does not necessarily imply its complete erosion and the end of corpo-
ratist policy-making. Indeed, the Varieties of Capitalism literature questions
whether the decline of Germany’s coordinated market economy is inevitable
(Deeg 2005, Busch 2005, Hancké et al. 2008). Indeed, Germany’s economy out-
look greatly improved in the second half of the 2000s, arguably also as a result
of Agenda 2010 reforms (Zimmermann & Eichhorst 2008).75 The rebounding
German economy was even referred to as a second German Wirtschaftswun-
72 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 September 2004
73 Handelsblatt, 17 June 2003
74 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 June 2003
75 The OECD country report in Germany argues that the Hartz reforms, in particular,
led to ‘greater work incentives and a better matching between labour supply and labour
demand.’ (OECD 2012, 49, original in German) GDP growth reached 2.9 percent and 2.5
percent in 2006 and 2007 respectively, the German federal budget was balanced for the first
time since 1969 in 2007 and, maybe most importantly, unemployment fell from 10.7 percent
in 2005 to 9.8 percent and 8.4 percent in the following two years. Data source: EUROSTAT
Main Economic Indicators database
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der, indicating that the Modell Deutschland is more resilient than previously
thought.76 At the same time, more successful German trade union action af-
ter 2003 suggests that the process of restructuring and consolidation moved
forward and that ‘there’s life in the old dinosaurs yet’.77 It is not unreason-
able to conjecture that the Agenda 2010 reforms may have been historical
exception, required to correct fundamental mismatches in the economy’s insti-
tutional framework, and that Germany will return to a series of incremental
policy changes.
2.5 Summary, conclusion and outlook
The paper set out to answer the question why, after decades of institutional
stability, it was possible for a social democratic German government to deviate
from the country’s ‘the logic of incremental change’ and, with the Agenda 2010
structural reforms, bring about significant institutional change.
The theoretical section of the paper provides a critical review of the dom-
inant analytical framework for institutional stability and change, namely the
Veto Player Model. It argued that the Model quickly becomes overburdened
if it attempts to factor in structural and dynamic elements of a complex po-
litical economy. The theoretical section presents an augmented veto player
framework, which breaking down the politico-economic systems into a num-
ber of ‘veto clusters’. This allows for a partial analysis of sub-systems that
each follow a different political or political economy logic. It identifies three
pivotal veto clusters within the German political economy, namely the veto
points within the federal government, in the federal legislative system and in
the system of corporatist interest representation.
An analysis of economic policy under Kohl and Schröder until 2002 shows
that all three veto clusters of the German politico-economic system contributed
to the lack of far-reaching structural reforms. Somewhat stylised, it could be
argued that strong corporatist structures account for policy continuity in the
1980s, confrontation with federal entities blocked more far-reaching reform
projects of the Kohl government in the 1990s, and low intra-party cohesion
prevented innovative policy change under the Schröder I government (see Ta-
ble 2.1 on page 90). The analysis of the German political economy under
Schröder II demonstrates that the three veto clusters traditionally cohering
76 The Economist, 4 January 2007 and 14 April 2012
77 The Economist, 16 February 2006
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the political economy in Germany were fading: the SPD modernisers had as-
sumed control of the economic policy agenda setting; the opposition, which
dominated the Bundesrat, accommodated supply-side policy changes; and the
corporatist structures had been weakened too far to deter innovative policy
change. In other words, the formerly ‘blocked republic regained its economic
policy-making capability to a considerable extent.
Cluster I Cluster II Cluster III
Kohl in the 1980s cohesive accommodating strong
Kohl after reunification cohesive confrontational weakening
Schröder I non-cohesive accommodating weakening
Schröder II cohesive accommodating weakening
Table 2.1: Veto clusters and structural reforms in the German political econ-
omy 1982-2005
In terms of its theoretical contribution, the analysis shows how a partial
analysis of veto clusters allows for a meaningful analysis of complex political
economies over time. First, it allows for cooperative and competitive forms
of interaction among actors. For example, interaction among veto players
in the federal system were highly confrontational in the late years of the Kohl
government, but cooperative among veto players in the federal government. By
contrast, in the first years of the Schröder government conflict emerged among
the veto players in the federal government, while veto players in the federal
system behaved relatively cooperatively. Second, the veto cluster approach
allows reflecting the interlocking nature of the German political economy well.
The same actors – for example, the parties with a majority in the Bundestag
– can feature as veto players in more than one veto cluster – for example,
in the federal government as well as in the corporatist system. Third, the
partial analysis of veto clusters makes the incorporation of dynamics more
manageable. This allows, in particular, the analysis of the impact of shifts
of socio-economic structures on policy preferences and veto points. Thus the
augmented veto player framework also provides a bridge between the agent-
based and structural political economy analyses.
In terms of its empirical contribution, the most significant finding of the
analysis is the link between the gradual decline of Modell Deutschland and the
ability to carry out non-incremental policy change.78 The catalytic effect of
78 Incremental change in socio-economic institutions can lead to non-incremental, that
is to say structural institutional change. In this context, structural institutional change
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German reunification and global and European economic integration, among
others, led to a change in the preferences of firms, trade unions and the govern-
ment that, together, sustained the German economic model. Declining support
for the German economic model and its cooperative institutions substantially
weakened the stability of its corresponding corporatist structures.79 The fol-
lowing Paper Two of this PhD project provides a more in-depth, theoretical
exposition of this phenomenon.
In closing, it is worth noting that the grand coalition government of the
CDU/CSU and the SPD under Chancellor Angela Merkel that followed the
Schröder government avoided far-reaching structural reforms. This outcome
may seem surprising given that both coalition partners entered into the 2005
electoral race with a commitment to institutional change. The leadership of
the SPD included Franz Müntefering, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Peer Stein-
brück – all modernisers and close allies of Gerhard Schröder – and was com-
mitted to the Agenda 2010 reforms. The CDU/CSU pushed the debate on
structural reforms beyond Agenda 2010, for example with the appointment
of Paul Kirchhoff, a tax lawyer, former federal constitutional court judge and
outspoken reformer, to Angela Merkel’s team of advisers. The grand coalition
government, however, reversed some components of the Agenda 2010 reforms
(Zimmermann 2008), rather than pushing for further change.
In terms of the analytical framework employed for this paper, this course
in economic policy is easily explained by means of the federal government
veto cluster. Cohesion in the grand coalition was very low. The CDU/CSU’s
coalition partner, the SPD, underwent significant change after the departure of
is not to be misunderstood as the sum of numerous incremental institutional changes, i.e.
‘incremental change with transformative results’, as Streeck & Thelen (2005, 9) suggest.
The analysis presented here shows how incremental change within a system of apparent
institutional stability can reconfigure preferences and political constellations that, in turn,
facilitate radical institutional change. Similarly, Dyson (2005) suggests that incrementalism
could ‘disguise’ fundamental structural change by generating ‘tipping points’ of innovative
policy change.
79 This finding is confirmed by recent research findings on institutional stability and
change in Germany. In a book-length study of the ‘Hartz IV’ reforms – the unemployment
assistance component of the Agenda 2010 – Hassel & Schiller (2010) argue that several long-
run destabilising factors in the German political economy opened a window of opportunity
for reform. More specifically, Hassel & Schiller (2010, 20, original in German) argue that,
among other things, ‘the cartell of elites in social policy, that was broadly dominated by
the social partners until the middle of the 1990s, was dissolved due to the high costs of
reunification and became open for new ideas.’ In more general terms, (Streeck 2008, 3) finds
in his study on institutional change in the German political economy that the ‘[c]ontinuous,
systemic, endemic, dialectical change, gradual disorganization of institutional structures,
slowly decaying institutional complementarity, the emergence of tipping points in historical
processes where images of stability and stasis no longer serve constructive purposes.
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Gerhard Schröder. The emergence of the left-wing party Die Linke – a merger
of the predominantly eastern German PDS and the WASG – was eroding the
traditional party base of the social democrats. A quick succession of party
leaders, from modernisers such as Franz Müntefering and Matthias Platzeck,
to the more traditionalist Kurt Beck in 2006, left the party in an ongoing
dispute over its political direction. Traditionalists regained influence in the
party, shifting its policy stance away from modernist towards more traditional
social democracy. Reforms such as the Agenda 2010 were almost impossible
in view of the low coherence of the grand coalition government.
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Paper 2
Corporatist cartels: Explaining reform
trajectories in coordinated market
economies
Abstract
This paper addresses the puzzle as to why some European countries live
through extended periods of economic underperformance before reforming their
institutional structure. First, building on the comparative capitalism litera-
ture on ‘coordinated market economies’, the paper argues that Europe’s socio-
economic institutions can provide institutional complementarities, beneficial
to particular sectors of the economy. Because corporatism allows stakeholders
from these sectors privileged access to the political decision-making process,
institutional stability and change depends on their institutional preferences;
rather than on considerations for aggregate social welfare. Second, the paper
presents a formal, game-theoretic model of a coordinated market economy.
From this model it derives a set of socio-economic variables that determine
institutional stability and change in this type of economy. Third, the paper
explores the mechanisms described by the model by examining the reform
trajectories of Germany and Sweden.1
1 Revised version of a paper first presented at the 5th ECPR General Conference, Pots-
dam, Germany, 10-12 September 2009
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3.1 Introduction
Over the past decades, persistently low growth rates and high unemployment
put pressure on many continental European countries to reform their socio-
economic institutions. There is significant variation, however, in the policy
response to this pressure, both in terms of scope and timing. Some countries
enacted structural reforms – intended to fundamentally change for the better
the institutional structure governing their economy – relatively quickly. Other
countries experienced extended episodes of repeated growth and employment
crises without noteworthy structural reforms. This is surprising, particularly
because this policy divergence can be observed also in European countries
that are held to be quite similar in terms of their political, economic and
social constitution. Sweden and Germany, for example, both faced a period
of low growth and rising unemployment following the 1970s oil crises. On the
one hand, however, Sweden already introduced far-reaching structural reforms
in the early 1990s. The first comprehensive structural reforms of Germany’s
socio-economic institutions, on the other hand, were carried through only ten
years later in the early 2000s.
Why do countries not promptly adopt structural reforms that raise – or are,
at least, generally expected to raise – aggregate social welfare? This empirical
puzzle has been identified as one of the fundamental questions of rational choice
political economy (Fernandez & Rodrik 1991). If change to the institutional
structure of the economy is expected to raise aggregate welfare, winners of
the institutional change should be able to compensate losers; institutional
change should be possible. The 1990s saw the emergence of a formal political
economics literature on reform inertia. In general, models in this literature
rely on uncertainty and asymmetric information to explain the persistence of
a welfare-inferior status quo. Fernandez & Rodrik (1991) show, for example,
that if the distribution of costs and benefits of a reform is uncertain, a majority
of risk-averse individuals may block a reform ex ante, which would be approved
ex post (Laban & Sturzenegger 1994, for a similar model). Alesina & Drazen
(1991) demonstrate how welfare improving reforms may be delayed in a war-
of-attrition model if there is asymmetric information over the cost and benefits
of the policy measures.
Unfortunately, the prevalent rational choice models on reform inertia are
limited in their ability to explain the reform trajectories in Europe. First,
these models typically set out from a strong normative assumption about the
desirability of a particular, typically supply-side reform policy. They take no
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account of the particular political, economic and social institutional arrange-
ments in European countries. These institutional arrangements, however, have
important repercussions both for the welfare effects of reforms as well as for
the political economy of the reforms. Second, the models typically seek to
explain biases towards an institutional status quo. They have little to say
about institutional change in the absence of severe exogenous shocks. Reform
trajectories in Europe are, however, characterised by episodes of both puzzling
inertia and reform.
This paper develops a rational choice model to contribute to the under-
standing of both episodes of institutional stability and change in continental
European countries, taking into account their distinctive politico-economic in-
stitutions. Building on the comparative capitalism literature, the paper begins
with the supposition that, within Europe’s ‘coordinated market economies’, el-
ements of the European socio-economic model complement each other in a way
that supports a particular type of – potentially highly productive – industrial
regime. It argues, however, that these institutional complementarities tend to
benefit some ‘inside’ sectors in the economy more than others. At the same
time, corporatism typically grants stakeholders from the inside sectors strong
political influence, biasing the policy-making process towards their interests.
Policy continuity and change in this model is thus driven by an interest group
logic (Olson 1982), rather than by uncertainty or asymmetric information.
To the best knowledge of the author, the model in this paper presents the
first attempt to capture institutional complementarities, the central mechanism
underlying a coordinated market economy, in a purely rational choice frame-
work. It thus provides a ‘equilibrium-functionalist’ rather than a ‘historical-
political’ rationale for the existence of complementary institutions (Deeg 2007).
More specifically, most of the relevant comparative capitalism literature – while
assuming rational socio-economic actors – broadly takes institutional comple-
mentarities as exogenously given; as ‘constraints that shape human interac-
tion’ (North 1990, 3). By contrast, institutions in this paper are conceived
at a higher level of abstraction and as ‘collective constructs’ (Hall & Thelen
2009), which are sustained by equilibrium behaviour of socio-economic actors.2
2 Note that institutions conceive as ‘equilibrium ways of doing things’ (Shepsle 2006) em-
phasises the societal consensus necessary to sustain a (set of) institutions, while downplaying
their formal and binding character. The introduction and conclusion to this PhD project
provides a more detailed discussion of different approaches to conceptualising institutions.
As a consequence, institutions and coordination become synonymous in this paper’s model,
while the prevalent comparative capitalism literature distinguishes between coordinating
institutions and the coordination process itself.
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This rational choice approach to modelling institutional complementari-
ties advances the understanding of reform trajectories in Europe’s coordinated
market economies in several ways. First, it provides an argument for why coun-
tries may retain socio-economic institutions that do not or no longer maximise
aggregate welfare, even if these institutions are assumed to be fully under the
control of rational actors with perfect information. Second, modelling coordi-
nating institutions as a ‘fragile’ equilibrium allows institutional change even
in the absence of large exogenous shocks. While the institutions of a coordi-
nated market economy are self-enforcing in that complementarities mutually
increase their value to actors, the model shows that relatively modest shifts
in socio-economic variables may destabilise this type of economic model and
induce structural reforms. Third, the model also gives some indication on the
role of government in procuring complementary institutions and its motivation
for enabling economic coordination. Fourth, the model points to a number of
socio-economic variables that may be expected to significantly determine in-
stitutional stability and change in a coordinated market economy.
The paper is organised as follows: For the benefit of readers unacquainted
with the relevant comparative capitalism literature, Section 2 briefly sum-
marising the literature on institutional complementarities in coordinated mar-
ket economies. It then develops this approach by taking into account corpo-
ratist arrangements and the role of socio-economic actors – particularly trade
unions, employer organisations – as well as the government in shaping these
socio-economic institutions. It further extends the original concept of coor-
dinated market economies by a insider-outsider dimension. Section 3 then
proposes a formal model, which attempts to capture some of the core elements
of these political economies. The section also provides some comparative stat-
ics of the model as well as a short discussion on how focal points may lead
to adjustments rather than the abandonment of institutional complementari-
ties. Section 4 provides some descriptive indication of the model at work by
analysing the reform trajectories of Germany and Sweden. In this way, the
paper broadly takes the form of an ‘analytical narrative’ (Bates et al. 1998).
Section 5 concludes and identifies ways forward for possible extensions to the
model.
104
3.2 The argument
Continental European economies have been found to differ significantly from
the textbook description of a market economy. In a recent newspaper article,
Edmund Phelps describes their differences to the Anglo-Saxon market economy
as follows:
The other system – in Western Continental Europe – though also
based on private ownership, has been modified by the introduction
of institutions aimed at protecting the interests of “stakeholders”
and “social partners.” The system’s institutions include big em-
ployer confederations, big unions and monopolistic banks. [...] Co-
determination (cogestion, or Mitbestimmung) has brought worker
councils (Betriebsrat); and in Germany, a union representative sits
on the investment committee of corporations. [...] What it lacks in
flexibility it tries to compensate for with technological sophistica-
tion.3
In the following section, the paper will discuss the implications of this ‘other
market economy’ with strong stakeholder involvement in the political economy
for socio-economic outcomes and institutional change. First, it provides a
brief describe the concept of ‘institutional complementarity’, the institutional
foundation of Europe’s ‘coordinated market economy’. Second, it adds two
elements to the conventional description of the coordinated market economy,
addressing some common criticism of the original framework. More specifically,
the paper argues that corporatist actors can – through their privileged access
to the political decision-making process – shape the institutional environment
in which they operate. It also argues that institutional complementarities are
likely to be shaped for the benefit of these same actors rather than the economy
as a whole.
Institutional complementarities
Many continental European economies allow the free operation of market
mechanisms to a lesser degree than Anglo-Saxon economies. Instead, govern-
ment regulation and intervention, and negotiated agreements between socio-
economic interest groups replace the market allocation of resources. In the
labour market, for example, wages are not primarily set through a supply and
3 The Wall Street Journal, 10 October 2006
105
demand mechanism, but are negotiate centrally by firms, trade unions and
(in some cases) the government. Blanket wage agreements then cover whole
industries. Clearly the ‘invisible hand’ that is supposed to guarantee the opti-
mal allocation of resources in markets operates to a lesser degree than in most
Anglo-Saxon economies. From a neo-classical economic perspective these ar-
rangements are bound to distort resource allocation and lead to welfare-inferior
economic outcomes.
Other literatures, however, take a more favourable view of the institutions
in continental European economies. Much of the neo-corporatist literature has
argued, for example, that economies with corporatist institutions may be more
successful in practising real wage restraint than economies with decentralised
labour markets (Calmfors & Driffill 1988, Soskice 1990b, Hall & Franzese 1998,
Scharpf 1997). Beyond this, both the economic and political economy litera-
ture have developed the concept of complementarities between different socio-
economic institutions. Generally, institutional complementarities capture the
idea that the effectiveness of one institution may be augmented by the pres-
ence of another institution and vice versa (Aoki 1994, Amable 2004). This
approach allows for the possibility that a set of institutions – while possibly
being highly distortional individually – complement each other in such a way
that the overall performance of the economy is increased rather than reduced.
In their seminal comparative capitalism contribution, Hall & Soskice (2001)
use the concept of institutional complementarities to develop two ideal-type
economic models. Different institutional arrangements provide different com-
parative institutional advantages in strongly regulated ‘coordinated market
economies’ and market-driven ‘liberal market economies’.
The basic idea is that the institutional structure of a particular
political economy provides firms with advantages for engaging in
specific types of activity there. Firms can perform some types
of activities, which allow them to produce some kinds of goods
more efficiently than others because of the institutional support
they receive from those activities in the political economy, and the
institutions relevant to these activities are not distributed evenly
across nations. (Hall & Soskice 2001, 37)
The Varieties of Capitalism literature further suggests that the institutional
framework in coordinated market economies does not systematically perform
more poorly than the market-based arrangements in Anglo-Saxon economies.
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Rather, a comparative institutional advantage facilitates the specialisation of
these economies in lucrative segments of the global economy. More specifically,
several complementarity institutional clusters – the corporate governance and
financial system, industrial relations and labour market regulation, vocational
training and inter-company relations – in coordinated market economies sug-
gest a specialisation in high-quality production: Rigid labour markets, for
example, cause low worker mobility and facilitate the growth of firm-specific
skills. Similarly, work representation on plant and company level promotes the
flow of information between the management and the shop-floor. Vocational
training schemes enable school-leavers to gain experience in their future work
environment at a very early age.
The coordination of interests between economic actors is of integral impor-
tance to sustain – as the name suggests – the coordinated market economy’s
institutional complementarities and its comparative institutional advantage.
For example, the German vocational training system can only be sustained
if trade unions are willing to accept that apprentices are paid well below the
coordinated wage agreement, if firms are willing to continue investing in the
firm-specific skills, and if the government maintains generous unemployment
benefits and employment protection legislation that protects these skills within
firms (Esping-Andersen 1990, Hassel 2008).
High returns from institutional complementarities may even reverse the
interests of economic actors. It is conventionally assumed, for example, that
the business community will oppose welfare institutions because these increase
labour costs (wage and/or non-wage) or taxes (Huber & Stephens 2001). Mares
(2003, 261) finds, however, that in certain circumstances ‘a cross-class alliance
comprising large manufacturing producers and the most important sectors of
the labor movement’ supports the development of welfare institutions, partic-
ularly to protect skill formation within firms or sectors.
Based on this argument, the comparative capitalism literature argues that
continental European countries, such as Germany, Austria, Sweden and Den-
mark, have exhibited high growth rates and among the highest per-capita
income levels in the world. Institutional complementarities go a long way to
explain the less than dismal performance of many highly regulated and coor-
dinated European economies from the early 1950s.
107
Shaping institutional complementarities
Much of the early comparative capitalism literature takes the socio-economic
institutional framework as a given. Hall & Soskice (2001) maintain that firms
operate within a historically grown set of institutions, ‘whose character is not
fully under their control’. That is, socio-economic actors cannot create or
change ‘the overarching institutional structures of the political economy’ and
as a result ‘institutional structure conditions [...] strategy’ (Hall & Soskice
2001, 15). For example, one particular set of institutions may favour a high-
quality production strategy, while mass production may be optimal when fac-
ing another set of institutions. In other words, the institutional structure
largely predetermines the strategy of actors, and the institutional structure
will thus prescribe whether the economy emerges as a liberal or coordinated
market economy.
First, however, Hall & Soskice (2001) have been criticised for being overly
static in their approach to institutions (Howell 2003, Goodin 2003, Morgan
et al. 2006, among others). Crouch (2005, 2) writes, for example, that while
the Varieties of Capitalism literature introduces ‘an extremely valuable cor-
rective to assumptions made in economic theory [...], neo-institutionalism has
become rather deterministic.’ Recent contributions have attempted to address
this problem (Hancké et al. 2008, Trampusch 2010, Howell & Givan 2011,
among others). Hall & Thelen (2009) argue that political economy actors do
not merely adjust their strategies to given coordinating institutions, but take
an active role in shaping and maintaining them. Not only does institutional
structure condition strategy, in other words, but strategy also conditions in-
stitutional structure.
Indeed, the interest representatives of private, economic stakeholders in
coordinated market economies – particularly trade unions and employer or-
ganisations – play an integral part in shaping and maintaining the country’s
institutional structure. For example, they supplement the regulatory role
of the state by performing ‘independent self-regulation’ and ‘delegated self-
regulation’ (Streeck 1999). Self-regulation includes, for example, the wage
coordination process between trade unions and employer organisations. Del-
egated self-regulation most often includes the setting of industry-wide rules,
guidelines and codes of conduct. The chamber of commerce and industry,
for example, oversees the regulation of the content of the vocational training
schemes in some countries.
Second, the original Varieties of Capitalism canon has also been criticised
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for overemphasising the role of private actors and disregarding the role of
the state, particularly also in the context of institutional change (Levy 2006,
Schmidt 2008, among others). As legislator and regulator, the state clearly
takes a central role in defining and changing the formal institutional structures.
Schmidt (2009, 517) notes that the ‘state is not just the political economy
setting that structures the activities of private political economic actors, [but
it] also constructs the politics for reform, constitutes the political institutional
setting that shapes the reform process, and can also be the political driver
for reform.’ Accordingly, recent research – particularly research relating to
policy change and structural reforms – has shifted attention back to the role of
government politics and takes greater account of ‘the central and indispensable
role of the state in the process of institutional change’ (Howell 2005, 251, Hall
2009, Hemerijck 2012).
When ‘bringing the state back in’, it should not be overlooked, however,
that the political decision-making process in coordinated market economies
takes a distinctive shape. More specifically, the typical pattern of decision-
making in this type of economy – quite independent of the partisan composition
of the government in office (Traxler et al. 2001, 302) – is corporatism (Soskice
1990a). Corporatism can be defined as ‘institutional arrangements whereby
important political-economic decisions are reached via negotiation between or
in consultation with peak-level representatives of employees and employers (or
other interest groups) and the state.’ (Kenworthy 2003, 11)
The influence of private stakeholders on the legislative and regulatory pro-
cess extends their influence on the shape and persistence of institutions. In
practical terms, corporatism implies that peak-level trade unions and employer
organisations – but potentially also welfare associations, consumer groups and
even the churches – are continuously and involuntarily included into the polit-
ical decision-making process both through formal and informal channels. For-
mal routes of influence are, for example, the tripartite governance of parastatal
organisations such as public television stations, labour offices etc. Notably, in
the Ghent System the main responsibility for the administration of the wel-
fare funds lies with trade unions rather than the government. More informal
arrangements additionally ensure a close interlock between the social partners
and the political decision-making process. This traditionally manifests itself in
leadership overlaps of parties, trade unions and employer organisations (Hassel
2006).
Overall, it is easy to see that corporatism constrains the scope of action
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of the government in coordinated market economies.4 Policies in these ‘com-
pounded polities’ are devised ‘in consultation and coordination with business
and labor rather than by state fiat (as [for example] in the U.K.’s simple liberal
market economy)’ (Schmidt 2009, 527f., emphasis in original). Note that this
does not a priori create a status quo bias into the political economy. Rather,
policies are less likely to follow government interests – for example policies that
maximise the governments chances of re-election – and are more likely to take
account of the requirements of corporatist interest groups. At least to some
degree, corporatist interests are likely to guide the hand of the government. Ac-
cordingly, Schmidt (2002, 107) refers to the ‘enabling state’, which contributes
to complementarity across formal institutions of a coordinated market econ-
omy and facilitates ‘economic actors to operate cooperatively and to coordinate
the direction of their activities with one another and the state’.
In summary, the institutional structure of coordinated market economies is
not, or not entirely, predetermined historically, but is subject to the politico-
economic stakeholders; not only peak level trade unions and employer organ-
isations, but also the government. It can thus be expected that institutional
complementarities – and with them the comparative institutional advantage of
this type of economy – are consciously shaped and sustained by these coordi-
nating actors. Institutional complementarities can be interpreted as ‘collective
constructs’. This, in turn, implies that ‘active support for coordination must
be mobilized on a relatively continuous basis from actors who are conscious of
[their] limitations as well as the advantages. [In consequence,] the durability
of an institution can rest substantially, if rarely wholly, on how well it serves
the interests of the relevant actors.’ (Hall & Thelen 2009, 12-13)
4 It should not be left unmentioned that policy-making in coordinated market economies
is often further constrained by additional compounding factors, such as coalition govern-
ments (as a result of a system of proportional representation), the vertical separation of
power (as a result of a federal constitutions) or judicial review by a constitutional court.
Among other factors, Germany’s federal system and the composition of its federal govern-
ment resulted in decades of ‘reform blockade’ (see Paper One of this PhD project). In the
‘equilibrium-functionalist’ approach to institutional complementarities of this paper these
‘veto clusters’ do not play an accentuated role, given that complementarities depend more
on the willingness of certain actors to coordinate their interests rather than on the abil-
ity of veto players to prevent institutional change. Accordingly, additional compounding
factors in coordinated market economies are disregarded in the following model for sim-
plicity. Note that they potentially play an important role, however, for example if they
prevent the government from implementing adjustments necessary to sustain institutional
complementarities.
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Insider and outsiders in coordinated market economies
The comparative capitalism literature on institutional complementarity has
paid little attention to divisions, and the problem of insiders and outsiders in
coordinated market economies. Clearly, a particular set of institutions, while
being beneficial to certain sectors of the economy, may be disadvantageous to
other sectors. Some sectors may be able to harness institutional advantages
to their benefit, optimising their production strategy in a certain production
regime, as Vitols (2002) has shown for the pharmaceutical industry in Ger-
many. However, other sectors of the economy will not find this as easy. Small
and medium size enterprises, firms active in the non-exporting and in the ser-
vice sectors, and businesses relying particularly on low and medium-skilled
workers may find the institutional framework in a coordinated market econ-
omy less appealing. Rather than providing any advantage, the institutional
framework may simply add costs to the operation. From the perspective of
firms active in non-high-quality sectors of the economy, regulation, coordina-
tion of interests and generous welfare institutions may look very much like red
tape, overly high wages and high taxes.
In short, established institutional complementarities in Europe’s coordi-
nated market economies typically favour high-quality manufacturing firms that
employ medium- to high-skilled workers on a long-term basis. Unsurprisingly,
this has significant implications for the macro-economy. Because firms in the
service or low-skilled sectors are disadvantaged, the corresponding segments
of the workforce have found it difficult to gain employment. This may well
account for the strong segmentation of the labour market in the coordinated
market model.
The downside of the model is its relative incapacity to generate well
paid jobs for all who are willing to work, thus producing problems
of long-term unemployment and labor-market exclusion, especially
among women and older workers. It is therefore no coincidence
that much of the political economy literature [...] is replete with
references to insider-outsider divisions. (Iversen & Wren 1998, 516)
It should be noted that this insider-outsider dilemma is not problematic
per se from an aggregate social welfare perspective. In fact, as long as the
benefits of the institutional arrangements to the insiders outweigh the costs to
the outsiders, these arrangements can be desirable. Winners can compensate
losers. Generous welfare systems in continental European economies could be
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interpreted as serving this purpose, particularly given that they were geared
towards preserving the insider-outsider divide rather then encouraging the rein-
tegration of the unemployed into the labour market (Esping-Andersen 1990).
If the costs to the outsiders outweigh the benefits of the institutional arrange-
ments to the insiders, however, then these arrangements are more problematic.
In a democratic policy-making system, we would expect structural reforms –
adjusting or abandoning the institutional framework of the coordinated market
economy – if losers cannot or can no longer be compensated by winners.
In decision-making systems with strong corporatist arrangements, how-
ever, this is no foregone conclusion. Rueda (2008, 30) finds that ‘before in-
sider–outsider divisions [had] become significant, a central feature of corpo-
ratism was its nonexclusive and egalitarian nature [...]. As outsiders become
more numerous, however, corporatist arrangements serve to protect insiders,
rather than facilitate the integration of outsiders.’5 Indeed, the political econ-
omy literature widely acknowledges that corporatist stakeholders serve the
economic insiders more than the economic outsiders: Trade unions represent
the interests of the skilled, employed workers more than they do those of the
labour market outsiders (Lindbeck & Snower 1989, Saint-Paul 2000). And em-
ployer organisations often represent large, exporting corporations more than
they do small or service-oriented enterprises (Thelen & van Wijnbergen 2003).
This leaves the question why democratically elected governments act as
all-facilitating enabler for the interests of insider groups in coordinated market
economies, even if these stand in the way of the overall welfare of the economy.
It is generally assumed that political parties typically pursue the interests of
their constituents. Left-wing parties in governments are thought to represent
labour interests; conservative parties in power are thought to represent business
and finance interests. However, the political economy literature has shown that
parties are likely to pursue the interests – if and when these interests conflict
– of the ‘inside’ fraction of their constituents rather than the interests of the
outside fraction (Häusermann 2008, Rueda 2008, Marx & Schumacher 2013).
This is explained, among other factors, by the privileged integration of insider
interests in the political sphere through corporatist arrangements.6
5 Welfare losses are less likely if the corporatist stakeholders are all-encompassing in their
representation of constituent groups. That is, a loss in aggregate welfare is less likely if trade
unions represent all workers, employed and unemployed, if employer organisations take into
account the costs and benefits of particular institutions for all firms, and if the government
caters for all voters equally.
6 A closely related finding shows that outside interests – for example the vote of the
precariously employed or the unemployed – are more difficult to mobilise (Pontusson &
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Thus, left-wing parties in governments are likely to be biased towards the
interests of ‘inside’ workers and conservative parties in power are likely to be
biased towards the interests of ‘inside’ business and finance. Rueda (2008,
12) writes, ‘In the presence of insider–outsider conflict, social democratic gov-
ernments will promote insider policies regardless of the consequences for out-
siders.’ The same is likely to hold true also for conservative governments. For
example, it has been argued that government-funded early retirement schemes
introduced by the conservative government of Helmut Kohl helped the German
industry shed excess labour in economically difficult times without undermin-
ing other important institutional elements of Germany’s coordinated market
economy (Streeck 2005).
In summary, insiders in the economic sphere – those who benefit from
the institutional complementarities of the coordinated market economy – are
also ‘insiders’ in the political decision-making process. It is easily understood
how the divided economy in a coordinated market economy in conjunction
with strong corporatist arrangements can lead to a welfare-inferior institu-
tional status quo. Economic insiders, who have a strong voice at political
level and profit from the cooperative arrangements, will uphold complemen-
tary institutions with little or no consideration for the potential costs to the
outsiders. If these costs to the economic outsiders, who have no direct influence
on the policy-making process and do not directly profit from the institutional
arrangements, outweigh the benefits to the economic insiders, the aggregate
welfare in the economy is not maximised.7
3.3 The model
In the following, this paper will translate the above argument into a game-
theoretic model. The main purpose of this exercise to extract a set of socio-
economic variables that can help predict the emergence of pressure towards
structural reforms and institutional change in Europe’s ‘coordinated economies’.8
More specifically, the section begins with a short theoretical examination of
institutional complementarities, modelled as equilibrium behaviour in a game
of strategic interaction. It applies this insights to a rudimentary model of a
Rueda 2010).
7 The Annex shows that the ‘coordinated economy’ may indeed be welfare inferior to the
liberal market alternative in the formal model.
8 Given that the market mechanism is replaced by a coordination mechanism and in
conscious delineation from the sophisticated Varieties of Capitalism literature, this model is
referred to as a ‘coordinated economy’ rather than a ‘coordinated market economy’.
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coordinated market economy. It then derives a set of determinants for insti-
tutional stability and change. Finally, it provides some intuition on how the
process of institutional adjustment may be conceptualised in the model.
Coordinated economies as a cooperation game
The term ‘coordinated economy’ implies that agents coordinate their actions
to attain a better outcome. That is, economic agents coordinate their interests
and shape institutional arrangements as discussed in the previous section. To
understand the nature of this coordination in game-theoretic terms, consider
the following simple normal form game in Table 3.1.
left right
top 1,1 x,0
bottom 0,x 2,2
Table 3.1: A game between player 1 (horizontal) and player 2 (vertical)
Note, first, that for any value of x < 1 this game is a simple, so-called
‘coordination game’. The game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies,
namely [top;left] and [bottom;right], where no player has anything to gain
from changing his strategy unilaterally.9 Note, however, that if the players
can coordinate on playing [bottom;right] their payoffs will be higher than if
they play [top;left]. The actions of player one and player two are thus ‘strategic
complements’ (Bulow et al. 1985).10
Second, consider a case, in which 1 < x < 2. While the two Nash equilibria
remain, [bottom;right] becomes a risk-dominated strategy. That is, it is easy
to see that if player 1 plays top, he will always be awarded with a payoff of
at least 1. If he plays bottom, however, there is a risk that the other player
decides to play left – maybe due to a misunderstanding. To reach the welfare-
maximising equilibrium [bottom;right], players have to be confident about the
choice of the other agent. ‘In coordination games, the key element is confidence
rather than conflict.’ (Cooper 1999, 17)
Third, consider a situation in which x > 2. This game is a simple, so-called
‘Prisoners’ Dilemma Game’, with only one Nash equilibrium, namely [top;left].
9 Mixed strategy Nash equilibria are ignored for simplicity.
10Definition: A symmetric game with two players that each have payoff function Π(xi, xj).
The choice of xi and xj are strategic complements if an increase in each player’s own decision
xi raises the marginal payoff dΠdxj of the other player. In other words, the decisions are
strategic complements if the second derivative d
2Π
dxidxj
is positive for i 6= j. The function Π
is ‘supermodular’ (Topkis 1998).
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In a single shot game, the welfare-maximising equilibrium is unattainable, as
agents each have an incentive to defect. Prisoners’ dilemma games are among
the most popular in the social sciences because they can capture many real-
world situations, in which higher levels of player welfare cannot be attained
because of conflicting interests. For example, firms would find it beneficial to
fix prices above market level. However, in perfect markets each firm has an
incentive to undercut the collusive price, thus taking a bigger market-share for
itself (‘Bertrand competition’).
However, industrial organisation has developed game-theoretic frameworks
in which tacit collusion between market participants allows them to overcome
this competitive market equilibrium (Friedman 1971, Green & Porter 1984,
Rotemberg & Saloner 1986). In a non-competitive equilibrium the firms co-
ordinate their market policy and set the product prices/quantities so as to
maximise total profits; they collude to escape competition. The market mech-
anism is abandoned in favour of a cartel that increases the profits of the firms.
Using the ‘Folk theorem’, it can be shown that this non-market equilibrium
is sustainable in an infinitely repeated game; the prisoners’ dilemma can be
overcome if agents are reasonably patient. The approach to these ‘cooperation
games’ is simple: actors are assumed to aggregate their future payoffs from the
different strategic alternatives. It can thus be shown that a higher level equi-
librium is sustainable if the sum of expected future payoffs from cooperating
is higher than the sum of expected future payoffs from defecting (Rubinstein
1979).
In short, we can distinguish between coordination and cooperation games.
Coordination games have multiple, single-shot Nash equilibria and players have
to coordinate on the same or corresponding strategies. Cooperation games, on
the other hand, describe ‘the strategic situation where collectively all gain from
cooperation, but unilaterally a deviation by a player is beneficial to that one
individual and costly to the other players’ (McCannon 2008). Cooperation is
sustainable when individuals forsake short-term welfare to increase their aggre-
gate long-term welfare. Note that the infinite repetition moves the prisoner’s
dilemma game back closer to the logic governing the coordination game. Here,
actions of the agents are again strategic complements and there exist multiple
(subgame perfect) Nash equilibria.
Thus, and in spite of its name, coordination in a coordinated market econ-
omy is better described as a cooperation game with an infinite horizon than
a single-shot coordination game. Interests of the agents are, ex ante, antago-
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nistically opposed. For example, firms want to pay workers lower wages, while
workers want to increase wages. Governments want to tax workers or firms to
pay off their interest groups. Consequently, this paper will model a corporatist,
coordinated economy – strategic interaction between trade unions, employers
and the government, providing institutional complementarities – along simi-
lar lines as collusion games. In fact, political economy literature has used a
cartel as a metaphor to describe corporatist arrangements: ‘Corporatism can
be defined as a cartel of elites that permanently cooperate in spite of different
interests.’ (Streeck 2005, original in German)
A model of a coordinated economy
Consider first a very simple liberal market economy. In this ‘standard economy’
(indexed ‘s’), firms produce goods with a single input, labour, such that the
output of the economy Ys = F (L).11 Individual, identical firms maximise
f(l)−wl by choosing optimal labour input levels (l), given market wages (w).
Additionally, firms pay a tax. This tax finances a proportion (γ) of the cost
(τ) of a publicly provided private good (T ), supplied by the government.12
This tax can be interpreted as the employer’s share to social security, for
example. In the liberal market economy, firms thus face a profit function that
is dependent on their individual output/revenues (y), paid salaries (wsl) and
the social security tax (γτ):
pis = y − wsl − γτ
The labour supply is assumed to be fixed (or completely wage inelastic)
so that employment levels remain constant. Changes in labour demand are
absorbed by wage adjustments. Thus, equilibrium wage in the liberal market
economy is given as ws = f ′(l). Workers in the liberal economy are the only
beneficiaries of the publicly provided private good, i.e. the social security
system (T ). Workers themselves pay for the remaining share (1 − γ) of the
cost of the social security system (τ). In the liberal economy, workers thus
11 Capital as a production factor is ignored in this model for the sake of parsimony. Capital
letters denote aggregate variables, lower case letters denote individual agents.
12 Note first the difference between public goods, which are both non-excludable and non-
rivalrous (e.g. public safety), and publicly provided private goods, which are state-provided
goods that could potentially be provided through the market (e.g. education, social security,
day care). Note further that firms, for simplicity and without loss of generality, are assumed
to pay a lump-sum tax. A proportional tax on revenue or wages, for example, would not
change the results of the analysis.
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face an income function that is dependent on market wages (ws), their share
of the social security tax ((1− γ)τ) as well as a positive return from the social
security system (T )13:
s = ws − (1− γ)τ + T (τ)
Finally, government decides, first, on whether it wants to provide T to
the workers and, second, how it wants to divide the contributions to the so-
cial security system across firms and workers. We assume that conservative
governments favour firms and left-leaning governments favour workers. And
we assume that the full cost of the social security system cannot be borne
by either firms or workers alone, that is 0 < γ < 1. It is easy to see how a
partisan government decides: A conservative government will not provide T
and will not levy taxes on firms or workers. A left-wing government, however,
will provide T and will shift the financial burden to firms as much as possible,
such that γ → 1. Under a left-wing government, γτ) thus effectively presents
a transfer from firms to workers.
In short, the liberal market economy has only one type of firm and worker
with a nonexclusive labour market, in which wages are market determined.
The government decides whether to to provide a redistributive social security
system or not, based on its partisan preferences.
Now consider a coordinated economy. Coordinated economies consist of a
coordinated (‘inside’) and an uncoordinated (‘outside’) sector (indexed ‘c’ and
‘u’ respectively). Firms in the inside sector are represented by a peak-level
employer organisations, workers in the inside sector are represented by a peak-
level trade union. Firms and workers in the outside sector are not represented
by employer organisations and trade unions.14
Three agents – employer organisations, trade unions and the government
– cooperate on maintaining institutional complementarities. First, employer
organisations and trade unions are collective agents that represent the inter-
ests of inside firms and workers respectively, for example firms and workers in
the manufacturing, export-oriented sector of the economy. Employer organ-
13 T can, for example, be thought of a function the the size of contributions τ as well as
the probability of falling back on social security, which is not modelled explicitly here.
14 Note that firms and workers are assumed to be identical within the inside and outside
sectors. The proportion of firms in the inside sector of the economy is assumed to be equal
to the proportion of workers in the inside sector. Also, the size of the inside and outside
sectors are assumed to be fixed. These assumptions are not very realistic of course, but are
made here to avoid unnecessary complexity.
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isations and trade unions determine the contributions of individual firms (q)
and the contributions of individual workers (s) towards the complementarities.
The contributions of firms may be interpreted as investments into particular
production technology to be able to produce high-quality goods. Similarly,
worker contributions can be interpreted as investments into firm-specific skills
– attained, for example, through a universal vocational training system – to
be able to operate this technology. Aggregate contributions from firms and
workers are given as Q = Σq and S = Σs.
Second, governments also contribute to uphold the complementarities. It is
assumed here that the government contribution is a function the social security
system (T ), which the government can provide for workers.15 Generous levels
of social security have, for example, been identified as pivotal to maintain high
levels of firm-specific skills in an economy (Mares 2001, Estevez-Abe et al.
2001).
The institutional complementarities allow the coordinated, inside fraction
of the economy (denoted θ) to upgrade its production, such that their output
at time t is larger by some coefficient α:
Yc,t = (1 + αt)θF (·) where αt = g(Qt−1, St−1, Tt−1) ≥ 0.
Conversely, we assume that the institutional arrangements are costly for
the remaining uncoordinated, outside share of the economy (denoted 1 − θ),
so that their production at time t is reduced by a coefficient β:
Yu,t = (1− βt)(1− θ)F (·) where βt = h(Qt−1, St−1, Tt−1) ≥ 0.
Several additional assumptions are made: First, the production coefficients
α and β are ‘supermodular’ functions of the contributions to institutional
complementarities of inside firms Q, of inside workers S and the government T ;
this is, contributions are strategic complements. Strategic complements imply
that a change in one actor’s strategic choice gives the other actors an incentive
to move in the same direction. For example, g(·) could be some Cobb-Douglas
function, such that g(·) = aQbScT 1−b−c. Second, individual contributions of
firms (q) and of workers (s) to the institutional complementarities are costly
to these agents. Third, contributions made in the previous period t − 1 take
effect in the present period t.
15 T (τ) is a function such that if τt = 0 then T (τt) = 0.
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In summary, institutional complementarities in the coordinated economy
are modelled as equilibrium behaviour of employer organisations, trade unions
and the government. Their respective contributions create complementarities,
which ‘upgrade’ the coordinated part of the economy. However, the ensuing
structure is a costly ‘downgrade’ for the uncoordinated part of the economy.
Profit and income functions for inside and outside firms and workers in the
coordinated economy are derived next. It is assumed that inside firms pay
wages to inside workers; outside firms pay wages to outside workers. Wages
paid in the inside, coordinated sector are negotiated between the peak-level
employer organisation and trade unions and are assumed to be higher than
wages in the liberal market model (wc > ws). Wages in the outside, uncoor-
dinated fraction of the economy are market-determined. Note that – taking
into account the negative effect of institutional complementarities on the un-
coordinated fraction of the economy – the wages in this part of the economy
will be wu = (1−β)f ′(l) and thus lower than the wages in the liberal economy
(wu ≤ ws).
From the above discussion, the profit functions (pi) for individual, identical
inside and outside firms, and the take-home income () for individual, identical
inside and outside workers at time t are given as follows:
pic,t = (1 + αt)y − wcl − γτt − qt
piu,t = (1− βt)y − wul − γτt
c,t = wc − (1− γ)τt + T (τt−1)− st
u,t = wu − (1− γ)τt + T (τt−1)
In words, profits are determined for inside and outside firms by their income
(y), marked up or down by the production coefficients (αt and βt respectively),
by the wages they pay to inside and outside workers (wc and wu respectively)
as well as by the share of the social security system they are required to
finance (γτt). Also, inside firms need to pay their contribution to uphold
the institutional complementarities (qt). Take-home income of the workers is
determined by wages for insider and outsider workers (wc and wu respectively),
and their share of cost of the social security system ((1 − γ)τt). Both insider
and outsider workers benefit from contributions made to this system in the
previous period (T (τt−1)). Additionally, inside workers are required to pay
contribution to uphold the institutional complementarities (q).
After describing the economic environment in the coordinated economy –
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institutional complementarities and an exclusive economy – the paper turns
to the strategic choice of the collective agents. At any given time t, firms and
workers collectively maximise their profits and their take-home income through
the policy choice of employer organisations and trade unions: inside firms
set the optimal level of high-technology investment (qt) though the employer
organisations. And inside workers choose the optimal level of skill investment
(st) though the trade unions.
max(pic,t) = max
q
[(1 + αt)y − wcl − γτt − qt]
max(c,t) = max
s
[wc − (1− γ)τt + T (τt−1)− st]
At the same time, the government decides on the existence of the social
security system (T (τ)) and the shape of its financing (γ). First, conservative
governments will again advance the interests of their constituents, namely firms
in the coordinated, inside section of the economy. The government can decide
to not maintain a social security scheme. However, setting τt = 0 will result
in T (τt) = 0 and αt+1 = g(·) = 0. That is, the economy will revert back to a
liberal market economy, in which firms profits are given by pis = y − wsl.
In case it decides to uphold a coordinated economy, it will choose γ to
maximise the profits of its constituents: It will set γ as small as possible and
hence (1 − γ) as large as possible. However, it has to take into account the
participation constraint of the inside worker.16 That is, the government may
not be able set the level of contribution for inside workers too high or the inside
workers will loose their incentive to invest in the complementarities and defect
from the cooperative equilibrium. The maximisation problem of a conservative
government is thus given as follows:17
max(pic,t) = max
γ
[(1 + αt)y − wcl − γτt − qt]
s.t. wc − (1− γ)τt + T (τt−1)− st ≥ ws
On the other hand, left-wing governments will advance the interests of
their constituents, namely workers in the coordinated, inside section of the
economy. The maximisation problem of a left government is thus equivalently
16Note that the participation constraint may become binding where coordinated wages
(wc) are relatively low vis-à-vis wages in the liberal economy (ws), where (1 − γ)τt and st
are large, and/or returns from T (τ) are low.
17 Note that it is assumed that governments – conservative or left – remain in power
after a regime switch from a coordinated to a liberal economy. Again this assumption is
without loss of generality. It can easily be shown that replacing conservative and left-wing
government choices of γ with a probabilistic alternative does not change the results.
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given as follows and is subject to the participation constraint of the inside
firm (where the superscript of e denotes expected contributions to the social
security system following a breakdown of coordination):
max(c,t) = max
γ
[wc − (1− γ)τt + T (τt−1)− st]
s.t. (1 + αt)y − wcl − γτt − qt ≥ y − wsl − γeτt
Given the assumptions, an equilibrium in this model is determined by the
expected profits of inside firms pic, the take-home income of inside workers c
as well as their expected profits and income in the liberal economy alternative.
Partisan governments – both left and right – take into account the payoff
functions of both firms and workers. This appropriately reflects the role of
governments as facilitator in coordinated economies.
Note that, at any given point in time, this coordinated economy has some
likeness to a prisoners’ dilemma game. At time t each agent has a short-
term incentive to defect from making contributions to maintaining the in-
stitutional complementarities. This would allow the agent to reap the full
benefits, for which contributions where made in t − 1, without incurring the
cost of contributing to the institutional complementarities in t. If one of the
three agents pays no contribution in t, however, this will leave the coefficient
αt = g(·) = 0 as well as as βt = h(·) = 0 in the following period t + 1. As
a result, Yc,t + Yu,t = θF (·) + (1 − θ)F (·) = Ys,t. In short, if the interaction
between the three agents – employer organisations, trade unions and the gov-
ernment – took place only once, no coordination would take place and the
liberal economy equilibrium would emerge.
Over an infinite horizon, however, there is more than this one equilibrium:
Again, agents can decide never to cooperate on the institutional complemen-
tarities. The economy will remain to the simple liberal market model as de-
scribed above. There will be no difference between the profits in the insider
and outsider sectors of the economy. Wages of outside and inside workers will
be ws. Left-wing governments will maintain a social security system, conser-
vative governments will not. There is, however, at least one other equilibrium.
Even though the prisoners’ dilemma setup of the model suggests that coor-
dination is difficult to sustain in the short-term, it can be shown that the
supermodular nature of the production coefficients allows a coordinated equi-
librium to be sustained in an infinite horizon setting.18 This equilibrium and
18 Milgrom & Roberts (1994) show that supermodular games have a largest and a smallest
serially undominated strategy for the players. That is, they have at least one ‘high’ and one
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the determinants for its stability will be discussed in the next section.
Comparative statics and determinants for reforms
Institutional change in this model interpreted as deviation from equilibrium.
Reforms thus result from instability of a particular equilibrium and, accord-
ingly, on the payoffs that one equilibrium provides to agents vis-à-vis an al-
ternative equilibrium. Starting from a cooperative equilibrium, for example, a
fall in expected payoffs will make the non-cooperative arrangement seem more
attractive. This may prompt agents to question the cooperative arrangement
and precipitate structural reforms.
To show this, we assume the coordinated equilibrium is sustained by a
simple ‘Grim Trigger Strategy’. This strategy prescribes the following actions:
‘If all agents cooperated in the last period, my strategy is to cooperate in
this period. If any agent defected in the last period, I defect in this and in
all following periods.’ This strategy is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
and upholds a cooperative equilibrium if the following condition is met for
the employer organisation, the trade union and the government: the sum of
all present and future discounted payoffs of cooperating must be larger than
the payoffs of defecting today plus the sum of all future discounted payoffs of
non-cooperation. For example, for the employer organisation this implies the
following.19
t→∞∑
t=1
δ((1 + αt)y − wcl − γτt − qt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
sum of payoffs from cooperation
≥ ((1 + αt)y − wcl − γtτ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
payoffs from defect
+
t→∞∑
t=2
δ(y − wsl − γeτ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
sum of payoffs from non-cooperation
Solving the above participation condition for the discount factor (δ) pro-
vides the below inequality. The discount factor can here be interpreted as the
patience of the agent to wait for future payoffs. The larger δ, the less the
agent’s discounted future payoffs vis-à-vis today’s payoff. It follows that the
larger the fraction on the right hand side of the inequality, the more patient
‘low’ Nash equilibrium, similar to the ones in a coordination game.
19 The symmetrical participation condition for trade unions and the government are omit-
ted for brevity.
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agents must be for the below inequality to be true and for the coordinated
economy to be stable:
δinside firms ≥ q
αy − (wc − ws)− (γ − γe)τ
In words, the willingness of the employer organisation to cooperate depends
negatively on the technology investment (q). It depends positively on the
positive revenue differential attained through coordination (αy) and negatively
on the wage differential between the wage in the inside, coordinated sector vis-
à-vis the wage in the uncoordinated, liberal economy (wc − ws). Finally, the
willingness of the employer organisation to cooperate depends negatively on
the difference between current social security contributions and those expected
in the liberal market economy (γ − γe)τ . Where the current and expected
share to the social security contribution are the same (γ = γe), the social
security system does not impact the strategic decision of firms. It is easy
to see, however, that lower expected social security contributions will make
the liberal economy economy more attractive vis-à-vis the coordinated market
economy.
The equivalent participation condition of trade unions can similarly be
solved for the discount factor of the insider worker:
δinside workers ≥ s
(wc − ws) + (γ − γe)τ + (T − T e)
In words, the willingness of the workers to cooperate depends negatively
on the skill investment (s). It depends positively on the wage markup in the
coordinated economy (wc−ws). Given that the share of social security contri-
butions not paid by workers is paid by firms, it is easy to understand that the
difference between current and expected contributions is included in the func-
tion with the opposite sign; a lower expected employer share of social security
contributions in the liberal economy ((γ − γe)τ) increases the attractiveness
of the coordinated equilibrium for workers. Equivalently, a higher (lower) ex-
pected return from the social security system (T −T e) will increase (decrease)
the attractiveness of the coordinated status quo. For example, in a situation
with a conservative government, a breakdown of coordination would imply the
dismantling of the social security system (T e = 0) and the economy reverts to
the liberal model.
Finally, we can solve the equivalent participation condition for the discount
factor of the government. Again, we take account of the partisanship of the
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government as well as the participation condition of the ‘other’ inside group. A
conservative government will thus participate in coordination if the following
condition is fulfilled:
δright government ≥ γτ
(αy − q − s)− (1− γ)τ
In words, the willingness of the government to sustain the coordinated equi-
librium depends positively on the net value added of coordination, that is, the
benefit of the economic upgrade less the cost of coordination to both inside
firms and workers (αy − qt − st). At the same time, the social security contri-
butions enter the inequality twice. They have a negative effect on equilibrium
stability as the numerator and positively as part of the denominator. The
‘main effect’ in the numerator marks the negative effect of the social security
contribution on the profits of the conservative government’s constituents, in-
side firms (γτ). The ‘secondary effect’ is the positive effect that higher social
security contributions for firms have on the income of inside workers ((1−γ)τ).
A left-wing government will participate in coordination if the following
condition is fulfilled, where variables are interpreted equivalently to the par-
ticipation constraint of conservative governments:
δleft government ≥ (1− γ)τ
(αy − q − s)− γτ
Note the policy implemented by a conservative government in a coordi-
nated economy resembles the policy of a left-wing government more than that
of a conservative government in a liberal economy. Recall that a left-wing
government provides social security in a liberal economy, while a conservative
government does not. In a coordinated economy, both types of government
provide a social security system. Thus, This difference in conservative gov-
ernment policy is explained as follows: The conservative government had no
motivation for providing a social security system in the liberal economy, given
that it provides no benefits and is costly for its corporate constituents. In the
coordinated economy, however, the government has an incentive to provide
a social security system because this acts as a complement to the high-tech
investment made by firms. The social security system is – from the perspec-
tive of the conservative government – transformed from a redistributive tool
in the liberal economy into a functional tool for skill-preservation in the co-
ordinated economy. Partisanship as a determinant for policy preferences for
socio-economic institutions is effectively reduced.
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A quick comparative statics exercise – the comparison of states of the world,
before and after a change of an underlying exogenous parameter – allows to
draw conclusions on determinants for institutional stability and change in co-
ordinated economies. First, an important determinant for policy continuity
and change is the size of the markup (α) through the production coefficient in
the coordinated equilibrium. Any exogenous drop in this coefficient – maybe
due to reduced demand for the goods produced by the inside sectors – would
make the cooperative equilibrium less attractive relative to the non-cooperative
equilibrium and increase the likelihood of a breakdown of cooperation. In em-
pirical terms, this would realistically imply that a drop in demand for luxury
cars and machine tools in Germany, for example, would increase the probability
of a significant overhaul of the country’s socio-economic institutions.
Note that economic crisis in a coordinated economy is a determinant for
reform if it results in a drop in the markup α, but not if it affects only the
markdown β. However, it is easily conceivable, that the economy is hit by an
exogenous shock, which predominantly effects the uncoordinated sector of the
economy, resulting in a negative change of the markdown (β), for example,
and a drop in outside profits and income. More competition through inter-
national economic integration, for example, is expected to have a negatively
effect predominantly in the outside, mass-production sectors of the economy.
The outside, uncoordinated sectors do not, however, play a role in the coor-
dination between employer organisations, trade unions and the government.
This explains why coordinated economies can go through extended episodes of
growth and employment crises without noteworthy reforms.
Second, it is easy to see that the stability of the system depends on the costs
of maintaining the high-quality equilibrium. The smaller the net benefit of
coordination for the inside sector of the economy (αy−qt−st), the more difficult
it is to sustain coordination. These costs are, in particular, the technology
investment costs incurred by the insider firms (q) investment costs incurred by
the insider workers (s).20
Third, the wage markup of workers in the inside sector has an ambigu-
ous effect. Greater wage differentials will reduce the employer’s incentive to
stick to the cooperative equilibrium, while increasing the worker’s incentive to
maintain the cooperative equilibrium. To sustain the cooperative equilibrium,
20 In a sense, contributions to the social security scheme could also be interpreted as
‘investment cost’ of the high-quality equilibrium, given that the motivation of the social
security scheme is not – as is the case in the liberal economy – primarily redistributive, but
rather a functional tool to sustain the coordinated equilibrium.
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the wage differentials may neither be too large nor too small. This follows
the same simple logic, put forward by Schmitter (1989) on the stability of a
coordinated wage bargaining system: ‘When the labour market is tight, capi-
talists see formally hidden virtues in corporatist compromises which encourage
wage restraint; inversely, when it is loose, trade unions find that they can use
these same arrangements to protect the concession they managed to extract
previously. The temptation to defect is greatest for both at the zenith and
nadir of the cycle.’
Fourth and finally, the effect of changes in the social security system on
the stability of the coordinated economy broadly also has an ambiguous effect.
On the one hand, an increase in the costs to the social security system (τ)
is likely to reduce the stability of the coordinated equilibrium and increases
the probability of reform.21 The effect of a change in distribution of costs of
the social security system on equilibrium stability is, on the other hand, more
ambiguous. An increase (decrease) of γ will both raise (reduce) cooperation
incentives for firms and reduce (raise) cooperation incentives for workers.22
Institutional adjustment and focal points
The above has provided a model of a coordinated market economy as a co-
operative equilibrium in a repeated game of strategic interaction using the
Folk theorem. Institutional change in this model occurs when one or more
agents defect from the cooperative equilibrium. In this case, the model re-
turns to its baseline, non-cooperative equilibrium; the economy switches from
a coordinated to a liberal market economy.
There is, however, little observable evidence of the transformation of coor-
21Note that τ has a negative effect on the participation constraint both of the inside firms
and workers.
22 The government will reduce the contribution share of its constituents and raise the
share of the other group. Recall, however, that governments may be constrained in the
degree to which they can pass on the cost of the social security system to non-constituents.
While a conservative government in a coordinated economy will want to reduce corporate
contributions (γ → 0), it will be constrained by the participation constraint of inside workers.
Vice versa, left-wing governments in a coordinated economy will want to reduce worker
contributions (γ → 1), but will be constrained by the participation constraint of inside firms.
Thus, not only does the coordinated economy in this model align the policies of conservative
and left-wing governments in providing a social security system. So some degree, it may also
align the way the financial burden of this system is divided on employers and workers. Note
that, where the operating surplus of inside firms ((1 + αt)y − wcl) is relatively small under
a left-wing government, workers may shoulder more of the cost of the system to uphold the
coordinated economy. Equivalently, where the gross income (wc + T (τt−1) − st) of inside
workers is relatively small under a conservative government, firms may shoulder more of the
cost of the system than workers.
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dinated market economies into liberal market economies. Rather, coordinated
market economies tend to adjust institutions to maintain their institutional
complementarities. Hancké et al. (2008, 13) find that ‘countries in Europe have
[...] altered their institutions in the face of domestic challenges and changing
international conditions, but those changes have been strongly conditioned by
past institutions and underlying complementarities have been maintained’.
This observation can be accommodated for in the model presented in this
paper by allowing for renegotiation after a departure from the cooperative
equilibrium. Indeed, after one or more agents have defected, there is – from
a rational choice perspective – no reason that agents cannot return to a new
cooperative arrangement.23 The problem here is not that no new cooperative
equilibrium can be found. Rather, there may be a large number of new ways in
which cooperation could be sustained. Indeed, ‘if cooperation is sustainable at
all there will normally be an infinite number of equilibria. Therefore, making [a
prisoner dilemma-type] game repeated is not necessarily a way of escaping its
conflictual nature’ (Leeson et al. 2006, 139). By itself, the model cannot pre-
dict what happens after a departure from the status quo, that is, a breakdown
of the cooperative equilibrium. In practical terms, there may be a significant
number of configurations in which institutions complement each other to sus-
tain a coordinated market economy. Indeed, none of the coordinated market
economies exactly resemble another.
Given that coordinated market economies look back on a long history,
however, the previous institutional equilibrium is likely to provide a starting
point for the renegotiation between agents. Such a starting point for nego-
tiation is known as a ‘focal point’ in game-theoretic terms. In his seminal
game-theoretic contribution, Schelling (1980, 57) finds that while formal game
theory does not allow for such, most real life situations ‘provide some clue for
coordinating behavior, some focal point for each person’s expectations of what
the other expects him to be expected to do’. They are a type of universally ap-
preciated ‘label’ that guides coordination or cooperation behaviour.24 Thus, a
new cooperative equilibrium in a coordinated economy is likely to be one that
resembles the previous equilibrium quite closely – making some adjustments
23 Note that the ‘Grim Trigger Strategy’ used in the above model prescribes a permanent
return to the non-cooperative equilibrium as a deterrence to prevent a defection by one of
the agents. This strategy provides a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and is sufficient to
sustain cooperation if it is credible. But it does not preclude the possibility of renegotiation
after one or more agents actually defected from the equilibrium.
24 Schelling’s most famous example of a focal point is the ‘universal’ meeting point in
Manhattan; the information booth at Grand Central Station.
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for the grievances of the defecting actors.
Note that focal points have a strong behavioural or sociological element
and cannot easily be modelled formally (Binmore & Samuelson 2006). The
following section will show how a temporary breakdown of the cooperation
between relevant agents in Sweden and Germany resulted in structural re-
forms and substantial institutional change. Both countries, however, seem to
have settled comfortably for a new, somewhat adjusted coordinated model af-
ter their departure from the original ‘Swedish model’ and the original Modell
Deutschland.
3.4 The narrative
Two phenomena would provide some indication for the conjecture that the
above model correctly describes the mechanism underlying reform inertia in
corporatist economies: first, we would expect to see periods of relatively poor
overall economic performance without major reforms. During these periods
structural reform initiatives of the government or other political actors would
be discouraged or openly blocked by corporatist stakeholders. Second, we
would expect to find that if and when major structural reforms are imple-
mented, these are preceded by a significant fall in the payoffs for one or more
insider agents and a breakdown of consensus on the prevalent institutional
structure.
The paper turns to Germany and Sweden as examples, two countries with
deep-rooted corporatist institutions. Both have experienced periods of modest
GDP growth and relatively high unemployment. More precisely, Germany has
commonly been identified as an underperformer in these terms for much of
the 1980s and 1990s; Germany’s GDP growth was below that of its OECD
counterparts throughout most of this period. As a result, between 2000 and
2002, income in Germany fell behind that of its neighbours – France, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Austria – for the first time since the
1950s.25 Unemployment rose sharply from below 4 percent in the 1970s to
almost 10 percent in the late 1990s. Sweden was in a similar situation to
Germany thoughout the 1980s. ‘Sweden was overtaken by 12 other OECD
countries between 1970 and 1995, and wound up with a level of per capita
GDP considerably below the OECD average.’ (Lindbeck 1997, 1288)
Structural reforms were on the political agenda in Germany from the early
25 GDP per capita in PPP, own calculations based on OECD Economic Outlook 2009
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1980s. However, in spite of the radical reform rhetoric of the Helmut Kohl’s
government, few liberal policies were implemented in the 1980s or early 1990s
(see Paper One of the PhD project). Germany became known as the ‘blocked
republic’.26 While much of the academic literature blames German federalism,
the trade unions and social interest groups, it has been established that the
government’s attempts to discard Germany’s socio-economic institutions were
also foiled by employer organisations, representing particularly the interests of
the large export-oriented firms (Wood 1997, Thelen 2000). Wood (2001, 388)
finds that ‘government overtures to increase the strategic flexibility of employ-
ers were rejected. Employers remained wedded to the institutional incentives
“high-skill/incremental innovation” production [...] and committed in partic-
ular to maintaining the collective strength of trade unions and the long-term
security of their workforce.’
Again, similar to the German case, Swedish corporatism – based on the
1938 ‘Saltsöbaden Agreement’ – was built on ‘the implicit “cooperative con-
tract” between labour and capital’ (Lindbeck 1997, 1293), giving the socio-
economic interest groups strong representation in administrative and judicial
government agencies. These interest groups were dominated by the export-
oriented industrial and engineering sector. The central component of the ‘co-
operative contract’ was wage moderation. ‘Export-oriented big business was
keen on hindering the sheltered sector from pushing wages up to levels incom-
patible with international competitiveness.’ (Berg & Traxler 2007, 301) Addi-
tionally, large, export-oriented firms were rewarded with government subsidies
for their employee-friendly conduct and, from the late 1960s, excess labour was
absorbed through public employment (Lindbeck 1997).
It is worth noting that, while the coordinated market arrangement in Ger-
many and Sweden was beneficial for the export-oriented industrial and en-
gineering sector, it is not clear whether and how far this arrangement was
optimal for the aggregate economy. The number of workers employed by the
service sector rose from 40 percent in 1963 to 65 percent in 2003 in Germany
and from 46 percent to 75 percent in Sweden over the same time period (Hall
2008, 67). The structural change in Germany and Sweden mirrors that of the
United Kingdom, an economy that has practically given up its industrial and
engineering sectors. The rise of the service industry implies that the industrial
and engineering sector is becoming less relevant to most European economies.
This, in turn, is an indication that the ‘coordinated economy’ may have become
26 Der Spiegel, 21 September 2002
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welfare-inferior.
Following periods of relatively low economic growth and high unemploy-
ment, both Germany and Sweden did implement significant structural reforms.
Sweden’s major socio-economic overhaul took place in the early 1990s. After
a short boom in the early 1990s, the country experienced a deep recession in
1993, from which it emerged following some drastic changes to the political
system introduced by the Swedish government under the conservative Prime
Minister Carl Bildt. The pension system was changed to become a mixed
contribution, private fund and public minimum system. The central bank was
made independent and monetary policy was geared towards inflation target-
ing. Fiscal policy became rules-based and the marginal tax rate was reduced.
Finally, changes to the security system significantly reduced the number of sick
days taken (Lindbeck 1997).
In Germany, structural reforms followed a decade later. After reunification,
the conservative government of Helmut Kohl attempted reforms of the labour
market and welfare institutions in the second half of the 1990s, but ultimately
failed due to the resistance of Germany’s strong veto clusters. A few years
later, however, the social democratic government of Gerhard Schröder suc-
cessfully introduced more far-reaching changes to the German economy. Most
prominently, the Agenda 2010 policies of 2003 – a bundle of socio-economic
reforms that comprised measurements in the labour market, the social secu-
rity system, the tax system and the research and education system – has been
described as ‘the most ambitious [reform] seen in post-war Germany.’27
What then determined the end to the reform inertia in Sweden and Ger-
many? Both instances of structural reform were linked to a slowdown in world
economic growth – due to the 1992/1993 European recession, and the 2001
bursting of the ICT bubble respectively – and a subsequent fall in demand
for high-quality, industry and engineering goods (αy). Indeed, the slowdown
in demand for exportable goods might have contributed to reform pressure in
Germany and Sweden. However, while short-term drops in demand for export
goods may have been a catalyst, these can hardly be the main cause for defec-
tion of insider firms from the cooperative equilibrium. Forward-looking agents
will anticipate a resurgence of demand for industry and engineering products
after a global slowdown and refrain from ‘throwing out the baby with the bath
water’ by dismantling the coordinated economy. Indeed, even severe economic
crises in Germany in the early 1980s and the early 1990s did not immediately
27 The Economist, 18 December 2003
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lead to structural reforms.
Rather, cost factors in the profit function of employers contributed to the
erosion of payoffs for employers in Germany, ultimately leading to their rejec-
tion of the cooperative status quo. In particular, mounting social expenditure
following German reunification meant that Germany’s employers had to shoul-
der an ever greater burden both in terms of taxes as well as in wages. Non-wage
labour costs rose from below 30 percent of overall wage costs in the early 1990s
to well over 40 percent after 2000. In terms of the model, this can be interpreted
a significant rise in contributions to the social security system (γτ).28 The first
signs of discontent among the employers emerged in the mid-1990s, surfacing
in conflicts between large and small firms. While large firms were able to relo-
cate labour intensive production abroad or pass on the costs to their suppliers,
small and medium-sized firms were suffering from the rising costs (Thelen &
van Wijnbergen 2003). By the early 2000s, however, an overwhelming number
of firms and employer organisations saw Germany’s socio-economic institutions
as a burden rather than an asset for their business operations. Subsequently,
the Agenda 2010 reforms introduced by Gerhard Schröder – who maintained
good contacts with the executive boards of Germany’s large corporations –
were significantly shaped along the lines of corporate interests.
While the structural reforms in Germany were largely induced by the fall in
payoffs for insider firms in Germany, the cause for the breakdown of the coordi-
nation in Sweden in the early 1990s was largely due to changes to the payoffs
for the insider workers. The Swedish ‘cooperative contract’ between capital
and labour, geared towards inter-occupational income equality and initially
helping the export-oriented sector to maintain international competitiveness,
developed unintended side-effects by the 1970s. By eroding the wage premium
on skilled labour, wage equalisation effectively led to the shrinking of the skilled
workforce. ‘The drastic squeeze of after-tax wage differentials among different
skill categories of employers during the 1970s [...] reduced the economic incen-
tives to acquire skills [and led to] a slowdown in the expansion of the supply
of educated labour’ (Lindbeck 1997, 1282). In terms of the above model, the
ratio between the wage premium for skilled workers (wh − ws) was too small
vis-à-vis the cost of acquiring these skills (s), leading inside workers to defect
from the cooperative equilibrium. By the early 1980s Sweden’s industry was
thus suffering from severe skills shortages.
Though the insider workers stopped investing in skills, it was the Swedish
28 Own calculations based on DESTATIS data
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insider employer organisations that called for reform, particularly regarding
the wage bargaining system. In 1983 the engineering employer organisation
(VI) pulled out of the centralised wage bargaining system and subsequently
offered its staff wage increases above the general collective agreement. By
1990, and after having regained control over the central Swedish employer or-
ganisation (SAF), ‘the engineering employers ultimately set about dismantling
the system’ (Swenson & Pontusson 2000, 103). The SAF effectively withdrew
from all central wage negotiations and the corporatist institutions, making a
continuation of the ‘Swedish model’ practically impossible (Martin 1995, 280).
Following the deep economic crisis of 1993, the employers supported the reform
policies of the conservative government.
In Sweden as well as in Germany, the reforms of the 1990s and early 2000s
have significantly changed the countries’ socio-economic institutions. In nei-
ther case, however, have the changes led to a complete deregulation of the econ-
omy towards the liberal market model. Rather, in Sweden the reform seems
to have been a readjustment of the economy’s institutional complementarities,
geared particularly towards improving the competitiveness of the export sec-
tor. Indeed, the economic performance of Sweden since the mid-nineties has
been ‘impressive’ (OECD 2005, 19). In Germany, the Agenda 2010 reforms
seem to have unfolded similarly benevolent effects, with growth levels seeing
significant improvements and unemployment levels gradually falling from the
second half of the 2000s onwards.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper has presented an explanation as to why the European socio-economic
model may be biased towards a status quo in spite of strong socio-economic
pressure to reform. It argues that this observation is closely linked to the par-
ticular nature of Europe’s coordinated market economies. More specifically,
this type of economy builds heavily on complementarities in its institutional
setup that provide particular sectors of the economy with a strong compara-
tive institutional advantages. As ‘collective constructs’, these institutions are
subject to being shaped and adjusted by socio-economic stakeholders – par-
ticularly employer organisations and trade unions – in close cooperation with
the government. At the same time, corporatism and the implied close integra-
tion of privileged stakeholder interests in the political decision-making process
results in institutional arrangements that may serve these particular groups
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more than they do the wider economy. Institutional stability and change then
depends on the expected benefits that a set of institutions provides these cor-
poratist actors with, relative to an alternative set of institutions.
A formal version of this argument has provides a rational choice intuition
for how conflicting political economy interests are reconciled in a coordinated
market economy. The model suggested a number of determinants for policy
continuity and change in this type of economy. These are, first, the net ad-
ditional returns that firms can expect from institutional complementarities,
second, the cost of maintaining these complementarities, third, the wage dif-
ferentials across sectors of the economy, in particular also the wage markup
that ‘inside’ workers can expect in a coordinated economy, and fourth and fi-
nally, the design of the social security system. Additionally, focal point theory
contributes to explaining why coordinated economies adjust complementary
institutions if and when the need arises rather than dismantling them alto-
gether.
A brief examination of Germany and Sweden from the early 1980s to the
early 2000s suggests that this model may indeed help explain episodes of in-
stitutional stability and change. More specifically, there are strong indications
that structural reforms in Germany were significantly determined by the rising
costs of the welfare state, borne by the corporate sector. In Sweden, on the
other hand, the compressed wage differentials between skilled and unskilled
workers led to a defection of the skilled workforce from the coordinated econ-
omy, inducing structural reforms.
More generally, the model of a coordinated economy presented in this pa-
per seems to capture the mechanism underlying the interest coordination on
institutional complementarities quite well. Some indicative empirical evidence
is easily found in its support. The model, however, consciously excludes some
important elements of modern European political economies for reasons of
parsimony. This, however, limits the model’s analytical leverage to address
broader questions pertaining to the political and economic behaviour of coor-
dinated market economies. Future versions of this model could easily enhance
its sophistication my one or more of the following routes.
First, the mechanism describing the coordination process and institutional
complementarities could be enhanced. The model in this paper, for example,
does not include capital. However, stable financing is, arguably, the corner-
stones of coordinated market economies that has come under most severe pres-
sure in the course of closer European and international economic integration.
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Also, the economic interpretation of the institutional complements are broadly
exogenous to the model. A more sophisticated model could attempt to endo-
genise these complements in the production and the labour supply functions
of the economy. For example, investment decisions of coordinating firms in
high-quality technology could enter the production function twice; as factor
for production (together with labour) and as a complementary institution that
upgrades the production function (together with, for example, skilled labour,
social security, stable financing etc.).
Second, the role of the government in the coordinated market economy
could be enhanced. In the current version of the model, governments are un-
realistically assumed to only cater for their constituents. It would be more
realistic to assume, however, that ‘political parties [...] have electoral objec-
tives as well as commitments to ideology and historically meaningful groups of
voters’ (Rueda 2008, 12). That is, when a political party gains office, it is likely
to face a trade-off between providing for its constituents as well as maximis-
ing its re-election probability. Future versions of the model could model this
trade-off, for example, by allowing the government to choose between different
forms of social security, some of which may serve the coordinating interests of
its constituents, while others help increase its voter base.
Third, ultimately the model could be enhanced also for macroeconomic
analyses. For this purpose, fixed or dichotomous variables in the model – the
two types of workers and firms, the level of skill or high-technology invest-
ment, and the fixed costs of the social security system – would need to be
made variable and continuous. This would allow to analyse, for example, how
changes in socio-economic variables change the size, but also income levels in
the coordinated, inside and the uncoordinated, outside sector of the economy.
Finally, in terms of empirical findings, the paper has been able to illustrate
the function of its model by means of a narrative of the reform trajectories of
Sweden and Germany. However, this leaves unanswered the question if and in
how far the model has more general significance for European countries with
similar corporatist, coordinated systems. These and other questions invite fur-
ther theoretical and empirical research into the interplay of corporatist agents
and the institutional environment in which they operate.
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3.A Welfare analysis
It can easily be shown that the coordinating high-quality equilibrium is not
necessarily the social optimum that maximises the aggregate welfare of the
economy. Aggregate welfare in the coordinated economy is the sum of income
created in the high-quality sector (θ) and welfare created in the standard-
quality sector (1− θ). If this sum is smaller than the sum of income when all
of the economy engages in standard-quality production, then the high-quality
equilibrium reduces the aggregate welfare:
θ[(1 + α)Y − wcL− Σ(γτ)]− Σq + (1− θ)[(1− β)Y − wuL− Σ(γτ)]
+θ[wcL− Σ((1− γ)τ) + ΣT ]− Σs+ (1− θ)[wuL− Σ((1− γ)τ) + ΣT ] ≤ Y
In words, the above inequality gives the aggregate welfare of the coordi-
nated economy on the left hand side: (1) the aggregate net profits in the inside
sector minus the sum of contributions to the complementarities, (2) the aggre-
gate net profits in the outside sectors, (3) the aggregate wages of inside workers
minus the sum of contributions to the complementarities, and (4) aggregate
wages of outside workers. The aggregate income of the liberal market economy
is given on the right hand side. Assuming that the social security system is
purely redistributive such that taxes and returns cancel out Στ = ΣT , this
inequality can be rearranged:
Q+ S ≥ θαY − (1− θ)βY
In words, the above inequality shows that if the sum of costs of maintaining
the coordinated equilibrium (left hand side of equation) is larger than the
additional productivity gained from coordination (right hand side of equation),
then the coordinated economy does not maximise the overall income in the
economy. Please note, however, that the inverse may just as well be true; the
coordinated economy may break down even if it provides for an increase in
aggregate income for the economy.
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Paper 3
Corporatism, the game changer: The
intermediating effect of privileged
interest representation on the
determinants of labour market reform in
Europe
Abstract
European countries that were long thought to be inherently biased towards
an institutional status quo have in fact exhibited unexpected and significant
labour market reform. Conventional theories on the determinants of institu-
tional stability and change fail to fully explain this observation. This paper
argues that these theories neglect the intermediating effect of corporatism on
the determinants of reform. Using new qualitative data on labour market re-
forms in Europe, the study interacts a selection of possible determinants for
structural reforms with a corporatism indicator. The result of this empiri-
cal investigation suggest that employer organisations and trade unions have
a significant influence on the labour market reform trajectories in countries
with corporatist institutions. At the same time, factors that are convention-
ally thought to be the drivers of reform – political partisanship and economic
crises – have a significant effect on reform trajectories in pluralist countries,
but are not significant in corporatist countries.
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4.1 Introduction
Up until the 2000s, conventional wisdom held that the European social model
– particularly its core elements, the regulation of the labour markets and the
generosity of the welfare systems – was resilient to change. In his seminal
contribution on the ‘new politics of the welfare state’ Pierson (2001a, 448)
finds, for example, that the European welfare state had ‘very modest capaci-
ties for restructuring’ (Scharpf & Schmidt 2000, Huber & Stephens 2001, for
similar arguments). Researchers commonly refer to the large number of veto-
yielding actors in the consensus-oriented political systems that stand ready to
oppose and effectively prevent change, particularly when and where welfare
retrenchment threatens entitlements of the veto players.
More recently, however, this conventional wisdom has been thrown into
question. The reform trajectory of labour markets and welfare systems across
Europe indicates that institutions are less stable than predicted. Researchers
were surprised by recent reforms particularly in continental European coun-
tries, such as Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, which were long thought
to be particularly resilient to change (Pierson 2001b, Esping-Andersen 1996).
In fact, Palier (2010, 19f.) finds that ‘all Continental European countries have
implemented important structural reforms of their welfare systems.’
In short, institutional reform in continental Europe is today understood to
be the rule rather than the exception. As a result, the academic debate has
shifted away from explaining institutional stability towards explaining insti-
tutional change (Starke 2006). A central problem of this research agenda is
the question as to what determines the reform trajectory – particularly the
highly controversial cutback of welfare entitlements – in countries with closely
interlocking socio-economic institutions and a high number of veto points.
Conventional determinants of structural reforms cannot easily account for
the reform paths observed in Europe. It has been argued, for example, that
exogenous factors, such as international economic integration or demographic
change, put pressure on the institutional structure of a country (Schwartz
2001). However, the conventional wisdom on the resilience of the European
social model emerged precisely because of institutional inertia in the face of
exogenous pressures. Many European countries, including Germany and Italy,
for example, exhibited a high degree of institutional stability even when faced
with persistently high unemployment rates and severe economic growth crises.
Unresponsiveness to exogenous socio-economic factors seems to be a distin-
guishing feature of European labour and welfare institutions.
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Similarly, the explanatory power of partisanship politics for reform poli-
cies in Europe is limited. Generally, government partisanship is expected to
matter for reform policies – beyond simple ideological inclinations – because
of the strong distributional effects of labour market and welfare institutions.
According to this logic, conservative governments would generally be expected
to pursue welfare retrenchment, while labour governments are expected to pur-
sue policies of ‘decommodification’ in the labour market, each catering to their
respective constituents (Bradley et al. 2003). In Europe, however, a number
of traditional social-democratic governments embraced a market-oriented re-
form agenda particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s, for example, in the
Netherlands and Germany (Schelkle et al. 2010). Generally, partisanship poli-
tics does not seem to be consistently correlated with particular labour market
and welfare reforms in Europe.
This paper argues that these inconclusive observations are explained by the
intermediating effect of corporatism on reform determinants in Europe. Con-
ventional determinants for structural reforms – economic crisis and government
partisanship, for example – can be expected to take effect in regular, pluralist
European political economies. In a neo-corporatist political economy, how-
ever, a particular form of politico-economic interest organisation and privileged
form of political interest representation intervenes between broader economic
and political pressures and reform policies. Corporatist interest organisation
and representation change the political economy game. To understand reform
trajectories in European countries, distinguishing features of their political
economy have to be taken into account.
In corporatist political economies, the tight interlock or ‘integration’ (Siaroff
1999) of organised interests – particular trade unions and employer organisa-
tions – allows these stakeholders to project their institutional preferences into
the policy-making process more continuously and effectively than in a plural-
ist system. To some degree, corporatist agents override the political decision-
making process, rendering factors such as general macroeconomic conditions
or partisan rifts of secondary importance. The policy outcome is thus expected
to significantly depend on the interest of the corporatist actors. When corpo-
ratist interests favour the institutional status quo – despite broader economic
and political pressures for reform – this may result in ‘institutional stickiness’
or blockade, as is commonly predicted (Pierson 1994, 1996, Bonoli 2001). At
other points in time, however, corporatist interests may favour institutional
change. Because interests of corporatist agents can change over time, this ap-
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proach to understanding institutional reform in Europe allows for episodes of
relative institutional stability and episodes of structural reforms.
Building on the broader political economy literature, Section 2 develops
testable hypothesis on the impact of politico-economic factors on structural
reforms in corporatist and pluralist European countries. Section 3 provides
a detailed discussion of the data used in the empirical study. It shows that
corporatist European countries have not enacted less structural reform to the
unemployment benefit system than pluralist countries. Section 4 specifies and
discusses an empirical model. Section 5 discusses the results of the regression
analysis: First, evidence suggests that corporatist interests do indeed have a
significant effect on the likelihood of structural labour market reforms in cor-
poratist countries, while they do not have this effect on reforms in pluralist
countries. Second, some of the conventional determinants for structural re-
forms – government partisanship and GDP growth crises – have a significant
effect on the prevalence of structural reforms in pluralist countries, but not in
corporatist countries. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical argument
Labour markets are shaped by a large number of institutions. These insti-
tutions include legislation and regulation that directly affects the workforce
in employment, such as employment protection legislation, the wage bargain-
ing system, work councils and minimum wages. They also include regulation
that is ex ante targeted towards the workforce without employment, but af-
fects their working environment nonetheless, such as unemployment benefits,
retirement schemes and family policies.
To show how corporatist interests affect labour market reforms across cor-
poratist and pluralist Europe, this paper will focus on the unemployment ben-
efit system. This institution offers itself for analysis because it has a defining
influence on labour markets across Europe. The generosity and design of the
benefit system impacts work incentives both of workers with and without a job
as well as employment incentives of firms. In contrast to other labour market
institutions, such as work councils or minimum wages for example, to varying
degrees all European countries have some system of support for citizens that
lose their workplace.
The following section develops four testable hypotheses on how the inter-
ests of corporatist actors are expected to affect unemployment benefit system
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reforms in corporatist countries and how other economic and political factors
– more specifically, political partisanship and economic crises – are expected
to matter for reforms in pluralist countries.
The role of privileged interests in corporatist European
countries
Although ‘corporatism’ is one of the most thoroughly studied concepts in the
research of Western Europe, the understanding of the concept remains very
broad (Molina & Rhodes 2002). With some stylisation, two broad approaches
can be distinguished: First, among political economists corporatism is under-
stood as a particular system of economic interest organisation – particularly
of workers and employers into trade unions and employer organisations – that
impacts on macro-economic outcomes such as inflation, growth and employ-
ment. Second, among democracy theorists corporatism is understood a system
of interest representation and a process of democratic policy-making. Irrespec-
tive of the different strands in the corporatism literature, however, corporatism
implies that interest organisation and interest representation provides these in-
terests with privileged access to the policy-making process. Thus, ‘important
political-economic decisions are reached via negotiation between or in consul-
tation with peak-level representatives of employees and employers (or other
interest groups) and the state’ (Kenworthy 2003, 11).
The archetypical corporatist actors in Europe are trade unions and em-
ployer organisations.1 They share some important common features. First, in
corporatist countries both trade unions and employer organisations are typi-
cally integrated vertically in peak associations, although the level of cohesion
varies across countries and across time. This coherent aggregation of labour
and business interests in a single, peak association is of central importance
for the effective representation of interests in the policy-making arena. Com-
petition of different business or labour interests for political control would
undermine their political credibility and power (Schmitter & Streeck 1981,
Schmitter 1982).
Second, peak level trade unions and employer organisations do not com-
monly represent the interests of all businesses and all workers equally, but are
1 Other interest groups, such as welfare or environmental organisations, can also be potent
corporatist interest groups. They are not part of this empirical study for two reasons. First,
the influence of other interest groups varies more widely across European countries. Second,
the objectives of other interest groups are more diverse and (even) more difficult to capture
than those of trade unions and employer organisations.
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typically dominated by the manufacturing sector (Crouch 2006). To a degree,
this is historically determined. The size of the manufacturing sector relative
to the services sector has shrunk over the recent decades in all European coun-
tries. However, the influence of management and work council representatives
from the manufacturing sectors in the executive structures of trade unions and
employer organisations has been retained. Additionally, the manufacturing
sector is typically more exposed to international trade than the service sector.
Following the logic of collective action, this sector has a stronger interest in
shaping the institutional environment to suit its needs (Soskice 1999). Thus,
‘the stronghold of all encompassing peaks is manufacturing’ (Traxler et al.
2001b, 55). And in spite of the gradual shift from manufacturing to services
in Europe, this influence has not waned. Traxler & Brandl (2010) finds that
the relative power of the exposed sector (typically manufacturing) vis-à-vis
the sheltered sector (typically the services and government sectors) within the
peak trade unions and employer organisations remained constant (e.g. Austria
and Sweden) or increased (e.g. Germany) in all European corporatist countries
(with the exception of Belgium).
Peak employer organisations and trade unions can be expected to use their
influence in the policy-making process to maximise the utility of their con-
stituents. In view of the above, these are firms and blue-collar workers in the
manufacturing sector respectively. For firms in the manufacturing sector, it
may realistically be assumed that their interests are congruent with those of
their owners or stockholders, and thus primarily a function of the firm’s profits.
The management of a company will attempt, on the one hand, to maximise
turnover, while, on the other hand, keeping expenses – investment, input and
wage costs, but also taxes and non-wage labour costs – at a minimum. Cor-
respondingly, a peak employer organisation’s utility will be a function of the
profitability of the manufacturing sector.
The utility of a representative manufacturing worker is somewhat less easily
determined than that of a representative manufacturing firm. It is commonly
assumed that two important components of his or her utility function are
the real take-home wage as well as his job and income security. Assuming
a downwards-sloped labour demand curve, trade unions thus face a trade-off
between wages and job security. To take account of this trade-off, Layard
& Nickell (1990) suggest a probabilistic utility function: the overall utility
for a representative union member is calculated by weighing the utility of
being employed and the disutility of being unemployed with their respective
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probability. Mares (2006) similarly suggests defining trade union utility as an
inflation-corrected sum of net wages to union members with employment and
transfers to union members without employment.2
Against the background of these stylised utility functions of manufacturing
firms and workers, it is possible to develop expectations of the interests that
trade unions and employer organisations will pursue with respect to labour
market institutions in general or the generosity of the unemployment benefit
system in particular.
Conventionally, employer organisations are expected to be in favour of re-
trenching unemployment benefits. It is easy to see why this is true in a simple,
purely wage-determined labour market model. Unemployment benefits provide
workers with an ‘outside option’ and thus set a minimum reservation wage, be-
low which workers are usually unwilling to accept a job. Lower unemployment
benefits reduce the reservation wage in the workforce, allowing employers to
squeeze wages. At the same time, the benefit system typically presents costs
in the form of taxes or contributions to social insurance. Lower unemployment
benefits reduce these non-wage labour costs and taxes.
However, preferences regarding unemployment benefits of employers are
in fact likely to be more complex, particularly in Europe’s quality-oriented
and skill-reliant economies. Political economists have argued that retaining
skilled labour is of pivotal importance for manufacturing firms in Europe’s
‘coordinated market economies’, a type of economy that is closely related to
or even dependent on corporatist institutions (Soskice 1999, Hall & Soskice
2001). Sufficiently high wage replacements were important to provide workers
with income security to incentivise them to invest time and effort in developing
highly specialised skills (Mares 2001). More specifically, Estevez-Abe et al.
(2001, 152) argue as follows:
A high replacement ratio, especially when the unemployment ben-
efits are earnings-related, rewards the worker for his or her specific
skill investment even when the worker is out of work. A high re-
placement ratio also eliminates the downward pressure on specific
skilled wages, as unemployed skilled workers do not have to take
job offers at discounted wages. Benefit duration and the adminis-
tration of requirements to accept a ‘suitable job’ further reinforce
this mechanism. [...] In short, these two components of unemploy-
2 Mares (2006) also includes social services, such as public works, security, schooling,
health care etc., in the utility function, which are omitted here for simplicity.
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ment protection – a high replacement ratio and ‘secure’ benefits –
guarantee return on skill investment sufficient to compensate for
economic fluctuations.
Accordingly, the preferences of quality-oriented manufacturers and their re-
spective representative body, the employer organisation, regarding unemploy-
ment benefits are less clear cut in coordinated market economies than a simple
economic market model would suggest. They are characterised by a trade-off
between the need to maintain specific skills in the workforce on the one hand
and low taxes and non-wage labour costs on the other hand.3 Assuming con-
vex indifference curves, employer organisations will balance considerations for
skill-formation and non-wage labour costs. This implies that manufacturing
firms are more likely to benignly neglect or even support a relatively generous
unemployment benefit system in good times, when profits are high. When
profits are low or negative, however, the probability increases that costs of
the unemployment benefit system outweigh benefits of maintaining high skill-
levels.4 Firms that were not opposed to generous unemployment benefits in
‘good times’ may find that the burden of non-wage labour costs weigh too
heavily on profits in ‘bad times’.
Thus, in times of relatively low manufacturing profits, employer organisa-
tions will be more likely to withdraw their support for unemployment benefits
or even actively pursue benefit retrenchment. At the same time, employer
organisations are closely integrated in the policy-making process through in
corporatist countries, but not in pluralist countries. Thus, the following hy-
pothesis can be formulated:
Hypothesis 1 If manufacturing profits fall in corporatist countries, the like-
lihood of structural reforms that reduce the generosity of the unemployment
benefit system significantly increases. If manufacturing profits change in plu-
ralist countries, however, this does not significantly impact the likelihood of
reform.
Turning to the other group of corporatist actors, trade unions are con-
ventionally expected to have exactly the opposite interests of employer or-
ganisations regarding the unemployment benefit system. They are thought
3 The effect of unemployment benefits on the reservation wage are unlikely to matter
for the preferences, given that wages in the manufacturing sector of these countries are set
according to export competitiveness considerations (see also the argument of preferences of
trade unions in coordinated market economies below).
4 Note that, in times of low or negative profits, manufacturers may also reconsider their
high-quality business strategy and their skill-reliant approach.
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to generally oppose labour market reforms that reduce unemployment bene-
fits and to be in favour of reforms that increase them; broadly for the same
reasons that employer organisations are conventionally thought to oppose gen-
erous unemployment benefits. However, as established above, the utility of
blue-collar workers – who make up the core of the trade union’s constituents
– is a function of their job or income security as well as their employment
income.
Following the discussion of labour market institutions by Saint-Paul (1996),
four channels through which unemployment benefits, in particular, may affect
the employed worker can be distinguished: First and most obviously, unem-
ployment benefits – the level of income replacement and conditionality at-
tached to receipts – shape the living conditions of persons without employ-
ment. Unemployment benefit are thus included in the insurance component of
the employed worker’s utility function. Higher unemployment benefits increase
the income security in case of an episode of unemployment.
Second, however, unemployment benefits potentially also enter the insur-
ance component of the employed worker’s utility function via a second channel,
namely by affecting the probability of unemployment. However, the effect of
benefit generosity on this probability is not clear cut. On the one hand, em-
ployer contributions to social insurance increases non-wage labour costs and
reduces labour demand, thus increasing unemployment. On the other hand, a
higher reservation wage implied by a more generous benefit system could, for
example, reduce competition for jobs from unemployed workers, thus making
jobs more secure for the employed.
Third, unemployment benefits – like other labour market institutions –
can affect the wage setting for an employed worker. Institutions meant to
protect the worker typically also shift the negotiating power away from the
employer and towards the worker. This will result in a higher wage share and
a lower profit share of the net value added. Higher unemployment benefits, in
particular, can be thought to improve the negotiating position of the worker
by raising the reservation wage, thus increasing the wages for the employed
workforce.
And fourth, unemployment benefits clearly have direct and indirect effects
on the level of take-home income of a worker. Unemployment benefits need to
be financed. Typically, employed workers pay at least part of this burden via
higher income taxes or contributions to the unemployment insurance scheme.
Additionally, unemployment benefits can also indirectly affect take-home in-
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come, given that higher non-wage labour costs for employers may well depress
wages.
The first two channels constitute the ‘insurance’ component and the lat-
ter two channels to the ‘wage formation’ component in the worker’s utility
function for the unemployment benefit system. In the particular case of man-
ufacturing workers in Europe’s coordinated market economies, the second and
third channels – affecting unemployment probabilities and wage formation –
play no decisive role for income insurance and wage formation. As argued
above, blue-collar workers with a high level of job-specific skills are pivotal
to the operation of firms in Europe’s high-quality manufacturing sector. This
implies, first, that changes in unemployment benefits are unlikely to affect
their probability of unemployment. Marginal change in non-wage labour costs
are more likely to affect the employment situations of unskilled or temporary
workers rather than that of the core workforce. Similarly, the core workforce
is unlikely to fear job competition from the unemployed. Second, the level of
unemployment benefits is unlikely to affect the wage formation process sig-
nificantly. Wages for this group of employees are set collectively. They are
determined by broader macroeconomic considerations for price stability or ex-
port competitiveness rather than by a power struggle between trade unions
and employer organisations (Franzese 2001).
The first and fourth channels thus dominate the insurance and wage forma-
tion components in the utility function of an employed manufacturing worker
and his or her representative body, the trade union: preferences for unemploy-
ment benefits will be largely determined by the level of replacement rates as
well as the effect of the benefit system on take-home income. It is easy to see,
that trade unions – not dissimilar to employer organisations – face a trade-off
in determining their preferred level of unemployment benefit generosity. As-
suming convex indifference curves, trade unions will balance the insurance and
the wage formation component in their utility function. In times of above-
trend take-home income, they are likely to be more willing to exchange higher
income insurance for part of their current income. Vice-versa, they are likely
to be more inclined to forgo the insurance effect of generous unemployment
benefits in times of below-trend take-home income.
Particularly in times of relatively low take-home income in the manufactur-
ing sector, trade unions will pursue a reduction in social security contributions.
In this situation, they may be more likely to accept or – given their close in-
tegration in the policy-making process through corporatist institutions – even
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actively support a reduction of the unemployment benefit generosity.5 At the
same time, trade unions are not integrated in the policy-making process in
pluralist countries. Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated:
Hypothesis 2 If the take-home income in the manufacturing sector falls in
corporatist countries, the likelihood of structural reforms that reduce the gen-
erosity of the unemployment benefit system significantly increases. If manu-
facturing income changes in pluralist countries, however, this does not signifi-
cantly change the likelihood of reform.
The role of political and economic factors in pluralist Eu-
ropean countries
The corporatist system stands in contrast to pluralist political systems, in
which a larger number of societal interests are thought to compete over influ-
ence from outside the policy-making system.
Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation
in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified
number of ordered multiple, voluntary, competitive, non hierarchi-
cally and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories
which are not created or specially licensed, recognized, subsidized,
otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation
by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representa-
tional activity within their respective categories. (Schmitter 1974,
95)
This implies, first, that there are no privileged interests included in the
political decision-making process (or, at least, that their influence is weaker).
Changes in manufacturing profits and income are not expected to significantly
change the likelihood of reform. Second, this implies that policy trajectories
5 Note that instead of supporting benefit retrenchment, trade unions could attempt to
shift the burden of social security contributions to the employers. There are limits to this
policy, however, given that it increases the non-wage labour costs for employers. have an
indirect negative effect on wages and may ultimately reduce the job security of workers.
Note further, that there is an alternative explanation for benefit retrenchment in times of
relatively low income in the manufacturing sector: Low income may lead to conflict over
policy within trade unions, to a loss in membership and subsequently to a loss in political
influence. Thus, even if trade union representatives are opposed to welfare retrenchment,
they may not be able to prevent it (see Paper One for a more detailed discussion of the case
of German trade unions).
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are determined by other political and economic factors. Two factors that are
frequently discussed in the political economy literatures on determinants of
structural reforms are government partisanship and economic crises.
The effect of government partisanship on structural reforms has been stud-
ied widely, with contradictory outcomes. Most empirical studies find a negative
relation between left-wing governments and reform or – more narrowly – wel-
fare retrenchment propensity (Helbling et al. 2004, Alesina et al. 2006, Duval
2008, among others). Allan & Scruggs (2004, 507), for example, find ‘reason-
ably strong partisan effects on welfare state retrenchment, even with controls
for the macroeconomic context and other common factors generally held to
impact the welfare state.’ A second set of studies studies, however, finds
a positive relation between left-wing governments and welfare retrenchment
(Høj et al. 2006, Green-Pedersen 2007, among others). This counterintuitive
relationship has been linked to an alleged erosion of the left-to-right political
spectrum (Huber & Stephens 2001, Belloc & Nicita 2011). Others argue that
left-wing governments can more credibly argue in favour of welfare cuts: ‘Cuts
imposed by the left may be viewed as trade-offs for increased spending in other
policy areas, absolute essentials, strategic necessities, or, at a minimum, lower
than those that would be experienced under parties of the right.’ (Ross 2000,
165)
These inconclusive empirical results on the effect of government partisan-
ship on welfare retrenchment may also be linked to the intermediating effect of
corporatism. Most studies do not account for the effect of privileged interest
representation in the political economies of many European countries.6 As one
of the exceptions, Pierson (2001a) argues that partisan control of government
may be more important in pluralist than in corporatist political systems. He
suggests that, in a pluralist setting, relatively low levels of welfare entitlements
imply that ‘pivotal voters are likely to possess weaker attachments to social
provision, and to be more susceptible to alternative political appeals’ (Pierson
2001a, 434). More generally, political power in pluralist systems is tied to suc-
cess in electoral competition. To ensure their continued support, parties need
to cater to their constituents. Broadly, left-wing governments are expected to
pursue labour market policies that cater to their constituents among workers
and employees. They will thus be more inclined to implement labour market
regulation and more generous welfare systems, and be less inclined to pursue
retrenchment than conservative governments.
6 Notable exceptions are Allan & Scruggs (2004) and Høj et al. (2006).
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Conversely, partisanship is expected to matter less in corporatist systems.
In corporatism, privileged interest groups have significant political influence.
This influence is broadly independent of the partisan composition of the gov-
ernment in office because the privileged interests commonly span political
camps in corporatist countries (Traxler et al. 2001a, 302). Given that the allo-
cation of political power is a zero-sum game, partisan interests have less room
for manoeuvre with regard to the implementation of labour market policies.
Corporatist interests acts as a constraint on partisan government (see Papers 1
and 2 for two more detailed discussions of how corporatism constrains partisan
governments). Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated:
Hypothesis 3 If a government is more left-wing in pluralist countries, the
likelihood of structural reforms that retrench unemployment benefits is signif-
icantly reduced. If a government is more left-wing in corporatist countries,
however, the effect on the likelihood of reform is not significant.
In addition to partisan politics, conventional wisdom holds that economic
crises are one of the most important determinants of structural reform. Tom-
masi & Velasco (1996, 200) find ‘[t]hat economic crisis seems either to facilitate
or outright cause economic reforms’. With different emphases and restrictions,
quantitative empirical studies confirm the ‘crisis hypothesis’ (Drazen & East-
erly 2001, Pitlik & Wirth 2003, Helbling et al. 2004, Høj et al. 2006, Alesina
et al. 2006, Duval 2008, amng others). Generally, it is argued that crisis raises
the social cost of the status quo institutional arrangements, which creates a
degree of urgency in the political arena and thus weakens opposition to reform
(Drazen 2000).
The ‘crisis hypothesis’ is likely to hold in a pluralist setting. More specifi-
cally, public policy on labour market and welfare institutions was – for the most
part of the past three decades – dominated by a broad international consensus
on the benefit of liberal market reform over the past decades. More specifi-
cally, a generous unemployment system was thought to distort labour markets
in a growth-unfriendly way, contribute to long-term unemployment and thus
present a heavy burden on public finances. Accordingly, economic crises in-
crease pressure to reducing levels of unemployment benefits and increasing
the degree of conditionality attached to benefit payments. They increase the
likelihood of a ‘re-commodification’ of the labour market in pluralist countries.
In a corporatist country, however, the political decision-making process is
influenced by a narrower set of privileged interests. As argued above, these
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privileged interests are those of particular sectors of the economy, typically the
exposed, manufacturing sector. In all European economies, the manufacturing
sector is relatively small compared to the services sector. That is, GDP growth
indicators – as a weighted measure of all sectors – reflect conditions in the
services sector more than they do in the manufacturing sector. It is thus
easy to imagine cases in which the economy as a whole is in crisis, while
the income and profit situation in the narrower manufacturing sector remains
stable. Privileged corporatist interests may thus oppose structural reforms,
even if institutional change would seem to favour the economy as a whole
in view of severe crisis (see Paper 2 for a more detailed exposition of this
argument).
Hypothesis 4 If a pluralist country is in economic crisis, the likelihood of
subsequent structural reforms that retrench unemployment benefits significantly
increases. If a corporatist country is in crisis, however, the effect on the like-
lihood of reform is not significant.
4.3 Data
To test the above hypotheses, the paper precedes with an empirical analysis
of the impact of political economy variables on the likelihood of structural un-
employment benefit system reforms in Europe. More specifically, the analysis
will focus on labour market reforms in the EU15 countries over 28 years, from
1980 to 2007.7 To some degree, the selection of countries and time period is
predetermined by the availability of data. The selection can, however, easily be
rationalised on methodological grounds. First, the EU15 countries represent a
relatively homogeneous group of countries in terms of basic economic and po-
litical characteristics, compared to the 34 OECD countries, for example, which
comprise developing and transition countries. At the same time, they contain
countries with corporatist and with pluralist politico-economic systems.
Second, the time period from 1980 to 2007 spans a time of broad consen-
sus on market-oriented economic policy-making. It broadly covers the ‘neo-
liberal era’ or the era of the ‘Washington Consensus’, the emergence of which
is commonly associated with the early 1980s and the end of which is arguably
7 The EU15 is a common statistical reference group (see for example the OECD’s Main
Economic Indicators), which include the European Union member countries prior to the
accession of ten Central and Eastern European countries in 2004. The EU15 comprise
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
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marked by the global financial and economic crisis 2007–2009. In this period,
market-oriented reform dominated the agenda of international organisations,
such as the European Union, presumably putting pressure on all European
governments to implement liberalising labour market policies. The time pe-
riod selected thus excludes large swings in economic policy-making doctrine
(for data sources and a data description, see Annex 4.B on page 192 and Table
4.4 on page 195).
An indicator for unemployment benefit system reform
In the absence of data measuring institutional change directly, empirical re-
search has – a priori, quite plausibly – resorted to choosing changes in the
prevalence of labour market institutions as a proxy for reform. More specifi-
cally, researchers use the year-on-year change of a measurement of the level of
market regulation or benefit generosity as data for a regulatory change (Allan
& Scruggs 2004, Helbling et al. 2004, Høj et al. 2006, Conway & Nicoletti 2006,
Alesina et al. 2006, Duval 2008, Belloc & Nicita 2011, and others).
Measuring reform as changes in levels is, however, not without risks. Clasen
& Siegel (2007a, 9) identify substantial ‘dependent variable problems’ in com-
parative welfare state research, pointing particularly to problems of compa-
rability with measurements of welfare state generosity across countries and
across time. Problems arise due to technical issues, such as discrepancies of
statistical definitions and the quality of measurement across countries. They
also arise due to conceptual issues of generalisation or oversimplification of
reform measurements. The authors thus call on researchers to invest in the
‘empirical infrastructure’ of comparative research and ‘move beyond a purely
expenditure based and macroscopic perspective of the “welfare state” and en-
gage in more detailed accounts of changes and policies at the level of individual
social policy programmes.’
A new database on social reforms, developed under the auspices of the
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) and Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti
(fRDB), contributes to addressing the data problems highlighted by Clasen
& Siegel (2007a). First, the database provides a direct record of regulatory
change (Anelli et al. 2011).8 More specifically, it provides a list and description
8 The creation of the database is a collaborative exercise, involving national labour market
experts from across Europe. Experts used existing qualitative data sources, such as the
International Labour Organisation’s Natlex collection of legislative changes or the European
Commission’s LABREF database. More often than not, information is obtained or verified
from comparative analytical studies on specific policy areas in select countries as well as
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of all regulatory changes to three important areas of labour market: employ-
ment protection legislation, the unemployment benefit system and the pension
system. Currently, the database lists all reforms for the EU15 countries, ex-
cluding Luxembourg, from 1980 to 2007. The unit of analysis of the database
is change to existing regulation in the form of ‘unique formally approved doc-
uments’ (Anelli et al. 2011, 4).9 Reform packages, which address more than
one of the three policy areas, are recorded several times accordingly. Planned
reforms, reform proposals or failed reforms are not included.10
A second central feature of the database is a qualitative assessment of each
observation of reform, both in terms of direction and scope. This assessment
indicates in what way the reform has changed the welfare state, increasing or
decreasing the degree of decommodification in the labour market. More specifi-
cally, the qualitative assessment indicates whether a reform has increased or de-
creased labour market flexibility, whether a reform has increased or decreased
rewards from labour market participation. A positive (negative) sign indicates
an increase (decrease) in flexibility, rewards and generosity in the three policy
areas. Additionally, each reform measure is assessed to be either ‘marginal’ or
‘structural’.11 A structural reform must be a ‘comprehensive reform, address-
governmental reports, institutional websites etc. The author of this PhD project was one of
the country experts who put together and cross-checked the database.
9 While structural reforms are typically defined as formally adopted changes to laws and
regulation, many socio-economic institutions exist not on the grounds of formal legislation,
but by convention. Examples are wage bargaining agreements, tripartite agreements on
work hours, etc. A good reform indicator will have to also incorporate changes to these
institutions. Accordingly, besides enacted national legislation, the database also records
other public acts and collective agreements.
10 The unavailability of data on failed reform is a fundamental problem of quantitative
research on the determinants of reform. An observation of ‘no reform’ may be either due
to opposition to the policy (a blocking veto) or due to the fact that there was no reform
initiative. Given that there is no data available on failed reforms, there is no immediate
methodological solution to the problem of ‘non-decision’ (Bachrach & Baratz 1962, 1963).
However, the problem is less relevant for a research agenda attempting to explain instances
of reform rather than instances of non-reform. First, to assess under which conditions reform
happens, the dependent variable has to capture instances of successful reform. ‘No reform
attempt’ and ‘failed reform attempt’ can simply be pooled together. Second, given that
the nature of the data is biased towards non-reform (reform attempts are not included),
the study is likely to produce type-II-errors (failure to rejecting the null-hypothesis that
is in fact false) if any. Arguably, the study thus stacks the cards against itself. Third,
Petring (2010) argues that using a probabilistic regression method – which does not infer a
definite relationship between the dependent and independent variable, but rather suggests
that the likelihood of reform is increased (reduced) in the presence (absence) of particular
independent conditions – further reduces the problem.
11 A legislative act often contains a bundle of measures, some of which increase, while
others decrease market freedom. In these cases, the database lists all measures as separate
reforms, attributing individual signs. At the same time, it also provides an overall sign to
the legislative act.
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rewards from labor market participation ueb
(1) structural increase 1
(2) marginal reform or no reform 0
(3) structural decrease -1
Table 4.1: Coding of the reform indicator ueb
ing the broader design of the existing system’ (Anelli et al. 2011, 7). Note that
structural reforms in the database are thus broadly congruent with the defi-
nition of structural reforms provided in the Introduction of this PhD Project,
namely implemented ‘government policies intended to fundamentally change
[...] the institutional structure governing a policy sector’.
For the unemployment benefit system, the database provides an assessment
of whether a reform increases or decreases benefit generosity and, with it, in-
dividual incentives to participate in the labour market. For example, a reform
increases rewards from labour market participation if it reduces the amount
or the duration of unemployment benefits, if it makes eligibility conditions
for unemployment benefits stricter, or if it introduces employment-conditional
incentives or activation schemes. Vice-versa, a reform decreases rewards from
labour market participation if unemployment benefits are increased or if eligi-
bility conditions are eased. Additionally, it provides an assessment of whether
each individual reform is of a marginal or a structural nature. The introduc-
tion of a universal early retirement scheme, for example, would qualify as a
‘structural reform’, expanding the unemployment benefit system. However,
the limitation of the eligibility criteria of the early retirement scheme would
be rated a ‘marginal reform’, retrenching unemployment benefits.
In the following, this empirical analysis will focus on instances of structural
reform.12 Further, the database is coded into an annual format, producing a
panel dataset of the 14 EU member states with a categorical indicator (ueb).
For the reform of the unemployment benefit system, one can thus distinguish
between three different states of the world: (1) a year with structural re-
forms increasing rewards from labour market participation, (2) a year with no
structural reforms, (3) a year with structural reforms decreasing rewards from
labour market participation (see Table 4.1 on page 157).
12 Marginal reforms to socio-economic institutions can – over time – have a transformative
impact on the institutional structure of a political economy (Streeck & Thelen 2005). A
chain of marginal changes to an early retirement scheme, each tightening the eligibility
criteria, may, for example, render the scheme meaningless over time. However, it is argued
that mechanisms determining marginal reform may differ significantly from the mechanisms
determining structural reforms (see Introduction to PhD project).
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How well does ueb reflect labour market reform trajectories in Europe?
For the case of Germany, for example, the indicator includes five instances of
reform that structurally changed the unemployment benefit system. First, it
captures a 1983 law, which – for the first time – links entitlement duration to
the record of social security contributions (ueb=1). Second, the introduction
of a general early retirement scheme in 1989 is listed (ueb=-1). Third, the
database includes the massive expansion of active labour market policies after
reunification in 1993 (ueb=-1). Fourth, it includes the labour market reforms
of the Kohl government, which significantly tightened the eligibility criteria
for unemployment benefits in 1996 and 1997 (each ueb=1). Fifth and finally,
the first overhaul of the broader politico-economic institutions in post-war
Germany with the so-called Agenda 2010 reforms of the Schröder government
is reflected with the ‘Hartz I Law’ in 2002, the ‘Hartz III Law’ in 2003 and the
‘Hartz IV Law’ in 2004 (all ueb=1). Marginal reforms to the unemployment
benefit system, such as the Job-AQTIV-Law of 2001, are not included. For the
sample of unemployment benefit system reforms in Germany, the data broadly
covers the reform instances also highlighted in other, qualitative studies of the
reform trajectory in Germany since the 1980s (for example in Paper One of
the PhD project).
Comparing the ueb indicator with level-changes in unemployment bene-
fit expenditure, an indicator commonly used to measure reform in qualitative
research, reveals substantial differences (see Figure 4.1 on page 159).13 The
correlation between ueb and changes of the level-change indicator is very weak
(-0.14), but mildly significant (p<0.05). This result may be explained by a
number of factors. Most importantly, the level-change indicator – like many
other macro-quantitative indicators – measures changes in the wage replace-
ments, but not other reforms of the unemployment benefit system, such as
changes to the eligibility criteria. Changes in unemployment numbers and
base effects (in GDP) are likely to be disturbing factors. These are likely
to explain the largest part of the difference between the two indicators. Ad-
ditionally, the level-change indicator records changes in replacement rates in
the year they are implemented, but not in the – politically more relevant –
year in which they were passed. Finally, the general quality problems of using
level indicators to measure reform discussed above should be kept in mind:
While ueb is a reform indicator that is based directly on ‘a detailed accounts
13 Level-change indicator is the year-on-year change in cash expenditure compensating
for unemployment as a percentage of GDP (public and mandatory private), calculated from
Armingeon et al. (2010).
158
Figure 4.1: Comparing ueb, an indicator for reform (blue line), with the
changes in unemployment benefit expenditure (red line)
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of changes and policies at the level of individual social policy programmes’ as
demanded by Clasen & Siegel (2007a), the level-change indicator is based on
a quantitative, socio-economic measurement, which is subject to technical and
conceptual problems when compared over time and across countries.
An indicator for corporatism
Reflecting the relatively heterogeneous field of corporatism research by politi-
cal economists and political theorists, among others, qualitative indicators of
corporatism are aplenty.14 However, many of these indicators present danger-
ous pitfalls. Most recent quantitative indicators of corporatism were developed
in the political economy rather than in the democracy theory strand of the lit-
erature. Accordingly, these indicators stress union density, wage bargaining
coverage and working days lost to strike. Høj et al. (2006, 73), for example,
uses a joint variable of union density, strike activity and a summary indicator
of the degree of wage centralisation, weighted by the prevalence of automatic
extensions of wage contracts. These indicators have a strong bias towards wage
setting arrangements (Christiansen et al. 2009, 26). A high degree of wage co-
ordination by itself, however, does not imply that important politico-economic
decisions are generally reached in consultation with employer organisations
and trade unions.
Fewer measures of corporatism stem from the democracy theory strand of
the literature and focus on the participation of employer organisations and
trade unions in policy-making.15 Visser (2009, 13) provides an indicator for
‘involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on social and
economic policy’. This indicator captures more of the political dimension of
corporatism. However, it is also inappropriate as a proxy for corporatism be-
cause of its bias towards formal involvement of unions and employers in the
political decision-making process. For example, the indicator captures mul-
tiple attempts of the Italian and French governments to to reach particular
policy objectives by means of concertation with the social partners. It ne-
glects, however, that one of the distinct features of corporatism is the deep
and involuntary integration of organised interests in the policy-making pro-
cess – beyond formal and voluntary initiatives of an incumbent government.
This study uses a dichotomised version (corp) of the indicator for politico-
14 Kenworthy (2003), for example, provides a survey and assessment of 42 such indicators.
15 Kenworthy (2003) only identifies two early, time-invariant quantitative indicators of
corporatism that address interest group participation in policy-making.
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economic ‘integration’, provided by Siaroff (1999, 177) and defined as the ‘the
co-ordinated, co-operative, and systematic management of the national econ-
omy by the state, centralised unions, and employers’. This definition clearly
goes beyond measurements of coordination between trade unions and employer
organisations, or sporadic policy coordination with the government. Rather, it
captures the close interlock of selected societal interests and political institu-
tions. It is a widely used (Allan & Scruggs 2004, Iversen 2005, Armingeon et al.
2010) and acclaimed (Molina & Rhodes 2002, 321). Eight variables enter the
indicator, which measure interest group organisation and social partnership
(annual average level of strike volumes, nature and goals of trade unions, le-
gal and state support for unions and union power), industry-level co-ordination
(nature of economic ties and outlook of firms, extent of co-determination in the
workplace) as well as national policy-making patterns (the nature of national
industrial adjustment and wage setting, the extent of exchange in industrial
relations and national policy-making, and the general nature of public-private
interaction). A composite indicator for the level of integration is subsequently
calculated for 24 industrialised countries, where “1” indicates a fully pluralist
and “5” indicates a fully corporatist country.
The dichotomised version of the ‘integration’ indicator (corp) devides the
EU15 (ex Luxembourg) into a corporatist and a pluralist group of countries
and provides a relatively robust dummy variable for corporatism. First, a
strong (0.95) and highly significant (p<0.001) correlation between corp and
the continuous Siaroff (1999) indicator indicates that not much information
is lost on account of the simplification. Seven of the 14 countries included in
the dataset on structural reforms display a high or very high integration score;
namely Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and
Belgium. Scores for the United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, France and
Italy are low or very low.16 Indeed, Siaroff (1999, 176) finds that ‘industrial
democracies have been neatly dichotomised between integrated (“corporatist”)
and non-integrated (“pluralist”) economies’. Second, every country in the cor-
poratist group scores above average in almost all other available corporatism
indicators. At the same time, countries in the pluralist group almost always
score score below the average.17 Third and last (but maybe not least), the
two groups of countries are broadly in line with a conventional classification of
16 While the indicator provided by Siaroff is time-variant, scores for the countries in the
sample do not change significantly. This is also true if the time series is extended through
the 2000s.
17 Indicators were taken from Leertouwer & de Haan (2002), Kenworthy (2003).
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Pluralism Corporatism Total
expansion 10 8 18
no reform 154 159 313
retrenchment 24 29 53
Total 188 196 384
Table 4.2: Frequency of ueb across systems
European countries into more corporatist and more pluralist politico-economic
systems.
The dummy indicator for corporatism (corp) allows for a group compari-
son of observations with and without integration of organised interests in the
policy-making process. This makes the interpretation of results considerable
easier than a time-variant indicator. Comparing, for example, the frequency
of reform years across politico-economic regimes in Europe produces the first
substantive empirical finding: In line with the new thinking about structural
reforms in continental European countries, labour market reforms have a sim-
ilar prevalence in corporatist and pluralist countries. In both regimes, govern-
ments implemented structural reforms to the unemployment benefit system
with a similar frequency (see Table 4.2 on page 162).
Measurement of employer organisation and trade union
utility
Finally, the paper turns to the measurement of employer organisation and
trade union utility. Section 2 established that trade unions and employer
organisations are expected to pursue the interests of their constituents, workers
and firms in the manufacturing sector.
First, an indicator of employer organisation utility (emplutil) is reason-
ably assumed to be a function of the profitability of manufacturing firms. Real
annual gross operating profits by sector can be calculated from the data pro-
vided by the OECD’s ‘STAN Structural Analysis Database’. To allow for
better comparability across countries and years, this study uses deviations of
real manufacturing profits from the long-term, linear trend. In other words, it
is assumed that the utility of firms is relatively high in years with profits above
trend and relatively low in years with profits below trend (for more details on
the calculation of employer utility please refer to Annex 4.B on page 192).
A graphical analysis of the indicator shows that deviations from trend can
be quite significant and typically persist over a number of years (see Figure 4.2
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on page 164). For example, in the case of Germany manufacturing profits were
above trend in the second half of the 1980s, fell below trend in the early 1990s
and only rose above trend again in the mid-2000s. According to Hypothesis
1, we would expect welfare retrenchment in the 1990s and early 2000s, which
is what the reform indicator (ueb) shows. In the case of Germany, the reform
data matches the prediction of emplutil well.
Turning now to the measurement of trade union utility (unionutil), Sec-
tion 2 established that trade unions represent the interests of their constituents,
blue-collar workers in the manufacturing sectors. Broadly following Layard
& Nickell (1990) and Mares (2006), the indicator of trade union utility ac-
counts for income of both of the employed and the unemployed manufacturing
worker.18 Accordingly, the paper calculates trade union utility as the sum of
real take-home income of a representative, employed manufacturing worker and
the real wage replacement payments to a representative, unemployed manu-
facturing worker, weighted with the probability of employment and unemploy-
ment respectively (for more details on the calculation of trade union utility
please refer to Annex 4.B on page 192).19 Again, the deviation of real take-
home income of a representative manufacturing worker from the long-term,
linear trend will be used.
Note, however, that the wage component outweighs the insurance compo-
nent in the utility function of the trade unions. The probability of unem-
ployment in most advanced European countries remains relatively low, with
unemployment rates over 10 percent for only a limited number of observation.
This implies that take-home income of a manufacturing worker is typically
weighted with 90 percent and more.20 Note that Saint-Paul (1996) similarly
finds that while the wage effect of labour market institutions is indeed impor-
tant for trade union policy, there is no evidence that the insurance component
matters. In other words, the utility function of trade unions is – first and
18 Note that including the income of unemployed manufacturing workers in the utility
function of the trade union can be interpreted in two ways: The trade union takes account of
the probability of unemployment (and the respective unemployment income) of an employed
worker (argument presented in Section 2). Alternatively, trade unions can the thought to
genuinely care for the utility of the unemployed fraction of the manufacturing workforce.
19 Obtaining data for take-home income of a manufacturing worker is not trivial. It
requires calculating the average income, the progressive income tax an national and in many
cases at regional level as well as the social security contributions (which are commonly also
calculated on a progressive scale) for a representative worker for each of the 420 observations.
20 It is thus assumed that trade unions are risk neutral regarding probability of unem-
ployment of their constituents. Changing the weighting towards a more risk-averse trade
union utility function – for example, utility function that weighs the wage component and
insurance component with 50 percent each – does not change the results.
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Figure 4.2: Index of the deviation from trend of real profits in the manufac-
turing sector, emplutil. Base year is 1980, except in the case of Greece and
Ireland, where time series start in 1985 and 1986 respectively.
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Figure 4.3: Index of the deviation from trend of trade union utility, unionutil.
Base year is 1981.
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foremost – a function of the real take-home income of employed workers.
The unionutil indicator has the advantage of capturing the income effect
of the trade unions utility function very well; changes in gross paid wages,
changes in income taxes as well as changes in the price levels (see Figure 4.3
on page 165). First, the indicator reflects major tax reforms. For example,
the time-series for Austria shows that a 1988 tax reform ‘brought a significant
drop in average and marginal tax rates for all income groups’ (Schratzenstaller
& Wagener 2009, 310). Similarly, both of the two major personal income tax
reforms in the Netherlands in 1990 and 2001 (Caminada & Goudswaard 2001)
are well reflected in the data. Second, the indicator also captures changes in
social security contributions. For example, the gradual (re-)introduction of
employee social security contributions in Sweden and in Finland in the mid-
1990s (Timonen 2003) show up as lower income growth levels in both countries.
Third, high nominal wage increases, particularly in Greece and Portugal, but
also in Italy and Spain, were to translated into high real wage growth rates.
Countries with high CPI inflation saw their real income growth depressed.
4.4 Empirical specification
To test the hypotheses put forward in Section 2, the following baseline model
will be estimated, using the data discussed in the previous section:
logit[Pr(ueb ≤ j)] = αj − β1corpi,t
−β2emplutili,t−1
−β3unionutili,t−1
−β4partisanshipi,t
−β5growthcrisisi,t−1
−β6, initialuebi,t−2
−β7corpi,t × emplutili,t−1
−β8corpi,t × unionutili,t−1
−β9corpi,t × partisanshipi,t
−β10corpi,t × growthcrisisi,t−1
−β11corpi,t × initialuebi,t−2
Note, first, that the dependent variable is ordinal, in that the values of ueb
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can be ranked from category −1 (indicating a structural regulatory reform)
to 1 (indicating a structural deregulatory reform). An appropriate model to
analyse this data is the ordinal logit model. In technical terms, this is specified
to provide the probability (in logit or log-odds) of ueb taking a value of j or
less, where j ∈ [−1, 0] (Agresti 2010). More informally, the regression output
(denoted in log-odds) can be understood as the probability of being in one
reform category rather in the adjacent, higher reform category (for a detailed
discussion of the econometric approach, see Annex 4.A on page 189).21
Second, the model includes the main explanatory variables: These are the
trend-deviation of utility of employer organisations (emplutil), the trend-
deviation of utility of trade unions (unionutil), and a dummy variable for
years in which growth negatively deviated from its (country specific) average
by more than one standard deviation (growthcrisis). These three variables
are lagged by one year to exclude the possibility of endogeneity of reform
policies. The fourth variable is the percentage of cabinet posts held by social
democratic and other left parties, weighted by days (partisanship).
Third, to correct first-order autoregressive errors in cross-country empirical
studies, including the lagged dependent variable as a covariate is commonly
suggested (Beck & Katz 1995). Initial regulatory conditions may have an
impact on the reform propensity. Relatively high levels of benefits relative to
other economies may increase pressures to reform, for example. To control for
this effect, the model includes a measure of the generosity of the unemployment
benefit system (initialueb), lagged by two year to account for endogeneity
and the biannual character of the data.
Fourth, to allow for a comparison between countries i and years t with and
without systems of corporatist interest representation, observations need to
be attributed to a group. A commonly used method is to produce regression
estimates for the data of each group separately, which has several disadvan-
tages, however. To include both groups in the same model, a dummy variable
and interactions are used, following Long (2009). More specifically, each of
the explanatory variables is interacted with the corporatism dummy (corp).
The regression thus produces estimates for coefficients in the group with plu-
21 Please take note of some further specifics of this ordinal logit or ‘proportional odds’
model: There is no j = 1, given that the probability of ueb taking the value of ‘1 or less’ is
equal to one. Rather than an intercept, the model provides ‘cuts’ between each of the ordinal
categories, denoted here as αj . The signs of coefficients for the exogenous variables have
negative rather than the usual positive sign. This is, so that positive coefficients indicate
that higher values of ueb are more likely, while negative coefficients indicate that lower
values of ueb are more likely (Norušis 2011).
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ralist interest representation, the so-called ‘main effects’ (where corp is equal
to zero). The regression also produces estimates for the so-called ‘interaction
effects’, which provide an indication on the difference of the coefficients when
moving from the group with pluralist interest representation to the group with
corporatist interest representation (where corp is equal to one). A linear com-
bination of the ‘main effects’ and ‘interaction effects’ estimators allows for a
calculation of overall coefficients also for the corporatist group of countries.
Finally, in a first and second extension of the baseline model, several co-
variates are included. These include, alternatively, the political and economic
institutions and conditions that are commonly subject to investigation in em-
pirical studies on the determinants of structural reforms. As covariates on po-
litical institutions, the study includes a measure of the number of veto points
in a political system (vetopoints) – for example a chamber of the legislature
held by the opposition, parties in the government coalition etc. – a dummy
variable for years preceding a national parliamentary election (electyear) and
a measure of the strength of trade unions (unionpower).
As covariates on economic conditions, the study includes the output gap
(outputgap), a measure of the difference between actual and potential GDP,
the annual unemployment rate (unemployment) and the deficit-to-GDP-ratio
(deficit). Again these covariates are lagged by one year to account for po-
tential endogeneity issues, given that substantially higher or lower unemploy-
ment benefits may well impact growth, employment and public finances. Eco-
nomic indicators are further calculated as deviations from trend to account for
country-specific effects.
4.5 Discussion of results
The following section provides and discusses estimation results. The discussion
is, however, complicated by the fact that – beyond sign and significance level of
coefficients – the log odds estimation results of an ordinal logit regression model
are difficult to interpret. The paper thus first only provides a short discussion
of sign and significance levels of the estimates as well as the two extensions of
the model. In a second step, the section then presents graphically and discusses
the marginal effects of corporatism on reform determinants in more detail.
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ueb Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
corp=0 corp=1 corp=0 corp=1 corp=0 corp=1
emplutil · – – – · – – – · – –
unionutil · – – · – – · – –
partisanship – – · – + – – – ·
growthcrisis + + · + + · + ·
vetopoints – – – ·
electyear – – ·
unionpower – – – – – –
outputgap – – ·
unemployment + + + – –
deficit · – –
Table 4.3: Main results of regression estimates for ueb. Note that · denotes
that there is no significant effect, + (–) denotes a positive (negative) effect at
p<0.1, ++ (– –) denotes a positive (negative) effect at p<0.05, and +++ (–
– –) denotes a positive (negative) effect at p<0.01.
Signs, significance levels and robustness
Table 4.3 on page 169 provides the results of the regression exercise. For
simplicity, the table only indicates the sign and significance levels of the coef-
ficients. The full regression table can in found in the Annex (see Table 4.5 on
page 196).
The table is to be interpreted as follows: A positive sign indicates that a
one unit increase (decrease) of the explanatory variable will increase (decrease)
the log odds of being in a higher reform category rather than a lower category
by the value of the coefficient, given that all the other variables in the model
are held constant. In other words, starting from a baseline with no reform
(ueb=0), a significant positive coefficient indicates that the probability of a
structural reform expanding unemployment benefits decreases and the prob-
ability of benefit retrenchment increases with an increase in the explanatory
variable (holding other variables constant). A significant negative coefficient
indicates that when the explanatory variable increases, the probability of a
benefit retrenching structural reform decreases, while the probability of bene-
fit expansion increases (holding other variables constant).
Model 1 includes only the main explanatory variables.22 It provides some
first evidence in favour of the hypotheses presented in Section 2: Privileged
interest representation has a significant impact on reform trajectories in cor-
22 All models also include the lagged variable on the wage replacement rate initialueb.
This is positive and mostly significant, indicating that high levels of ueb increase the likeli-
hood of welfare retrenchment and reduce the likelihood of further expansion.
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poratism, but no impact in pluralism. More specifically, the coefficients of
unionutil and emplutil are significant in the corporatist group of obser-
vations (where corp=1) and insignificant in the pluralist group of observa-
tions (where corp=0). The negative signs of the coefficients of emplutil and
unionutil indicate that – all other things being equal – a reduction in em-
ployer and trade union utility increases the likelihood of unemployment benefit
retrenchment in a corporatist setting. There is no evidence for such an effect
in a pluralist setting.
At the same time, partisan politics and economic crises matter for reform
trajectories in pluralism, but not in corporatism. In pluralist countries, the
coefficient of partisanship is negative and significant: More left-leaning gov-
ernments are less likely to retrench unemployment benefits. The coefficient of
growthcrisis is positive and significant: The ‘crises hypothesis’ seems to hold
in the pluralist group of countries and growth crises increase the probability of
unemployment benefit retrenchment. Both partisanship and growthcrisis
do not seem to have a impact on reform trajectories in corporatist countries,
given that their coefficients are not significant.
These results appear broadly robust against extensions of the model. The
addition of political covariates (Model 2) or economic covariates (Model 3)
does not change the signs and does not fully erode the significance of the
main explanatory variables.23 Further, the suggested post-estimation diagnos-
tics for ordinal logit models show no significant problems.24 Other statistical
regression models provide similar results for the core explanatory variables.25
It may be worth noting that Model 2 provides some further insights on
23 A positive and significant estimate for the coefficient partisanship in Model 2 indicates
that more left-leaning governments are more likely to retrench unemployment benefits in
this model specification. This result may capture the fact that a number of ‘new labour’
governments introduced benefit retrenching reforms in corporatist European countries.
24 First, an important assumption underlying ordinal logistic regression is that the re-
lationship between each pair of outcome groups is the same. In other words, ‘the coeffi-
cients that describe the relationship between the lowest versus all higher categories of the
response variable are the same as those that describe the relationship between the next
lowest category and all higher categories, etc.’ (‘Stata Data Analysis Examples: Ordinal
Logistic Regression’, UCLA Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group,
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/dae/ologit.htm, retrieved 12.01.2012 12:23) The
Brant Test for this proportional odds assumption shows up as non-significant. Second, the
model is tested for multicollinearity, also showing no significant violation of the assumption
of independent covariates.
25 Please note that running separate regressions for observations with corp=0 and corp=1
renders almost the same coefficients and very similar significance levels as running the model
with interaction effects. Also, broadly similar results – in terms of coefficient signs and
significance levels – are obtained when estimating this model with a ‘Linear Probability
Model’ (with robust standard errors) or an ‘Ordinal Generalized Linear Model’.
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the effect of political factors on structural reform trajectories across corpo-
ratist and pluralist countries. First, the negative and significant coefficient
of vetopoints in pluralist countries indicates that unemployment benefit re-
trenchment is less likely and benefit expansion is more likely in the presence
of a higher number of veto points in the political system.26 Second, the nega-
tive and significant coefficient of electionyear in pluralist countries indicates
that unemployment benefit retrenchment is less likely and benefit expansion
is more likely in times of electoral pressure. This may reflect government elec-
tioneering, and the attempt to increase chances of re-election. There is no
evidence that these two political factors – veto points and electoral pressure
– significantly determine reform trajectories in pluralist countries. Third, the
estimation of the coefficient unionpower indicates that higher union density
generally reduces the probability of unemployment retrenchment.27 Note that
the inclusion of unionpower does not diminish the significance of the main
explanatory variable unionutil. Assuming that union density is a reasonable
proxy for union power, this result provides some indication that a drop in
utility of representative manufacturing workers does not (or not only) reduce
union political influence, thus dissolving the trade union’s veto power over wel-
fare retrenchment. Rather a drop in the take-home income of representative
manufacturing workers may indeed prompt trade unions to push for a reform
of the unemployment benefit system.
Model 3 provides some further insights on the effect of economic factors
on structural reform trajectories in corporatist and pluralist countries. First,
the negative and significant coefficient for outputgap indicates that a drop
of GDP, relative to potential, increases the probability of welfare retrenching
structural reforms in pluralist countries, but not in corporatist countries. This
provides some further evidence that the general economic situation matters
for reform trajectories in pluralist, but not in corporatist countries. Impor-
tantly, outputgap does not diminish the significance of the variable for em-
ployer interest in corporatist countries, showing that emplutil is not merely
an alternative measure of economic activity. Second, the positive and signifi-
cant coefficient for unemployment for pluralist countries indicates that above
trend unemployment increases the probability of unemployment benefit re-
trenchment and reduces the probability of its expansion. It is easy to see why
26 This result could be interpreted to point towards the ‘new politics of the welfare state’
(Pierson 2001a), arguing that welfare retrenchment is more likely to be blocked by veto
players than the expansion of the welfare state.
27 The effect is smaller in corporatist countries, see full regression table on page 196.
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pressure may arise to reduce the generosity of unemployment benefits if un-
employment is above trend, given that lower benefits increase work incentives
and reduce the burden of the benefit system on public finances. Somewhat
surprisingly, the coefficient for unemployment is negative and significant in
corporatist countries. Third and also surprisingly, above trend deficit-to-GDP
ratios (deficit) do not seem to affect reform policies in pluralism, but do
have an effect in corporatist countries.
Marginal effects
To allow for a more in-depth analysis of these results beyond mere sign and
significance levels, a survey of the ‘predictive margins’ is commonly recom-
mended (Long 2009, Williams 2012).28 The paper provides an analysis of pre-
dicted probabilities of structural reforms retrenching unemployment benefits
to further verify the evidence for the hypothesis presented in Section 2.
More specifically, Figures 4.4(a) to 4.7(a) show predicted probabilities of
benefit retrenchment for the full range of values of the four explanatory vari-
ables in Model 1.29 Blue lines indicate probabilities in pluralist countries and
red lines indicate probabilities in corporatist countries. Figures 4.4(b) to 4.7(b)
show the difference between the predicted probabilities between corporatist
and pluralist countries. In other words, they provide a measure of how the
effect of an explanatory variable differs between pluralism and corporatism.
The confidence interval gives an indication for which range of values these
differences are significant.30
Starting with employer utility, Figures 4.4 on page 173 provides a graph-
ical illustration of predicted probabilities of unemployment benefit retrench-
ment (ueb=1) for the full range of values of emplutil, keeping all other vari-
ables constant. First, the red line in Figure 4.4(a) shows that, in corporatist
28 In more technical terms, the log odds results of the regression estimation can be ex-
pressed in probabilities for the materialisation of ueb = -1, 0 or 1 by means of a nonlinear
transformation. This implies, however, that the interactions between corp and the covariates
are no longer a simple linear function of the predictors. That is, predicted probabilities for a
particular covariate depend also on the value of all other covariates. Note that the graphical
analysis provides the population-averaged marginal effect. That is, it allows ‘comparing two
hypothetical populations [...] that have the exact same values on the other independent
variables in the model.’ (Williams 2012, 326)
29 Figures (a) provide the average predicted probability (y-axis) of a structural reform for
a given value of the explanatory variable (x-axis).
30 For values of the explanatory variable for which the confidence interval does not include
the zero baseline, the difference in the predicted probability is significant at the 90 percent
level.
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(a) Predicted probabilities for unemployment benefit re-
trenchment for the range of values of emplutil
(b) Difference in probabilities between pluralism and cor-
poratism for unemployment benefit retrenchment
Figure 4.4: Predictive margins of ueb for values in emplutil across corpo-
ratist and non-corporatist countries. Dashed lines indicate non-significant co-
efficients. Dotted lines indicate 90% confidence interval.
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countries, predicted probabilities for unemployment benefit retrenchment re-
main relatively constant for above-trend manufacturing profits (between zero
and 13 percent where emplutil is larger than zero). However, when emplutil
falls below zero, the predicted probability of reform increases significantly.
For extremely low values of emplutil, the predicted probability exceeds 50
percent. This is in line with expectations: in ‘good times’ employers are
more likely to accept unemployment benefits, while they will urge retrench-
ment in ‘bad times’. At the same time, the blue, dashed line shows that
there is no strongly discernible effect of emplutil on predicted probabilities
in pluralist countries. That is, predicted probabilities remain almost constant
around the unconditional probability of about 15 percent for different values
of emplutil.31
Second, Figure 4.4(b) confirms that the perceived difference in the effect of
emplutil on predicted probabilities between corporatist and pluralist coun-
tries – the difference between the red and the blue line in Figure (a) – are indeed
statistically significant. This is true across a relatively wide range of values
of emplutil. Most importantly, differences are significant for manufacturing
profits that are around five percentage points or more below trend.32
Overall, the graphical analysis further strengthens the evidence in favour
of Hypothesis 1: In corporatist countries, the retrenchment of unemployment
benefits is more likely when manufacturing profits are below trend than when
manufacturing profits are above trend. In pluralist countries, manufacturing
profits have no significant impact on the reform of the unemployment benefit
system.
In turn, Figures 4.5 on page 175 illustrates how the probability of struc-
tural reforms changes for the different values of trade union utility in Model
1. First, the red line in Figure 4.5(a) shows that in corporatist countries a
decrease in unionutil increases the probability of unemployment benefit re-
trenchment. Recall that in the utility function of the trade unions is dominated
by the take-home income of employed manufacturing workers. The graphical
analysis appears to confirm expectations: In times of below-trend manufactur-
ing income, trade unions are willing to reduce the generosity of unemployment
31 The unconditional probability is easily calculated from the frequency table 4.2 on page
162.
32 Predicted probabilities are also significantly lower in corporatism than in pluralism
for above-trend profits. Unsurprisingly, there is no significant difference in the effect of
emplutil on structural reform probability if manufacturing profit growth is close to its
trend.
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(a) Predicted probabilities for unemployment benefit re-
trenchment for the range of values of unionutil
(b) Difference in probabilities between pluralism and cor-
poratism for unemployment benefit retrenchment
Figure 4.5: Predictive margins of ueb for values of unionutil across cor-
poratist and non-corporatist countries. Dashed lines indicate non-significant
coefficients. Dotted lines indicate 90% confidence interval.
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benefits to reduce the negative effect of taxes and social security contributions
on their constituents’ income. Starting from an unconditional probability for
reform of about 15 percent in corporatist countries, the predicted probability
for extremely low values of unionutil rises above 30 percent. For positive
values of unionutil, predicted probabilities for retrenchment fall below the
unconditional probability of benefit retrenchment. This indicates that man-
ufacturing income above trend effectively reduces the probability of benefit
retrenchment. In good times trade unions are not willing to agree to retrench-
ment to ensure income insurance of their constituents. At the same time, the
dashed, blue line shows that in pluralist countries predicted probabilities for
unemployment retrenchment do not change at all with unionutil.
Second, Figure 4.5(b) confirms that differences in the effect of unionutil
on structural reforms are indeed significant between corporatist and pluralist
countries. At a time when income growth in manufacturing is more than
about five percentage points below trend, the effect of unionutil on reform
probability in a corporatist country is significantly different from that in a
pluralist country.
Together, Figures 4.5(a) and 4.5(b) confirm Hypothesis 2: In corporatist
countries, the retrenchment of unemployment benefits is more likely when
take-home income in the manufacturing sector is below trend than when man-
ufacturing income is above trend. In pluralist countries, manufacturing income
has no significant impact on the reform of the unemployment benefit system.
Turning to the effect of political and economic factors on reform probabili-
ties, Figures 4.6 on page 177 shows how predicted probabilities of reform change
for different partisan compositions of the government. First, the blue
line for pluralist countries in Figure 4.6(a) shows an almost linear, downward-
sloping relationship between the predicted probability of benefit retrenchment
and partisanship. As expected, more cabinet seats held by left-wing parties
reduces the probability of unemployment benefit retrenchment.33 The effect
is relatively small, however, changing predicted probabilities by only about 10
percent from an all-conservative to an all-left-wing cabinet. The red, dashed
line for corporatist countries seems to imply that this effect is almost the op-
posite in corporatist countries, raising predicted probabilities from about 14
percent in an all-conservative to around 17 percent in an all-left-wing cabinet.
33 In fact, for a cabinet composed of about 50% left-wing officials, the predicted probability
drops below the unconditional probability of benefit retrenchment in corporatist countries
of about 15%.
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(a) Predicted probabilities for unemployment benefit re-
trenchment for the range of values of partisanship
(b) Difference in probabilities between pluralism and cor-
poratism for unemployment benefit retrenchment
Figure 4.6: Predictive margins of ueb for values of partisanship across cor-
poratist and non-corporatist countries. Dashed lines indicate non-significant
coefficients. Dotted lines indicate 90% confidence interval.
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This effect is, however, not significant in a statistical sense.
Figure 4.6(b) reveals some important limitation to the results. It shows
that the negative effect of left-wing governments on the propensity to retrench
benefits in pluralism is significantly different from the effect of left-wing gov-
ernments in corporatist countries only for cabinets composed of more than
approximately 65 percent left-wing officials.
Overall, however, evidence remains for Hypothesis 3: In pluralist countries,
the retrenchment of unemployment benefits is less likely under a left-wing
government than under a conservative government. In corporatist countries,
government partisanship has no significant impact on the reform of the unem-
ployment benefit system.
Finally, Figures 4.7 on page 179 illustrates how the predicted probability for
structural reforms changes in the presence of a GDP growth crisis. First,
the Figure 4.7(a) shows that in a normal economic environment predicted
probabilities are both close to their unconditional probabilities of about 13
percent in pluralist and about 15 percent in corporatist countries. In average
pluralist countries, a crisis increases the predicted probability of unemployment
benefit retrenchment quite dramatically by almost 20 percentage points (blue
line). Again, the effect of growthcrisis on benefit retrenchment is much
weaker in the corporatist setting and is not significant in a statistical sense
(red dotted line).
Figure 4.7(b) shows that these differences in the effect of growthcrisis
on ueb between pluralist and corporatist countries are significant. There is
no significant difference in the predicted probability in an environment with-
out crisis, when predicted probabilities reflect unconditional probabilities of
benefit retrenchment in pluralist and corporatist countries. Following a crisis,
however, pluralist countries tend to implement more unemployment benefit
retrenchment.
This confirms evidence in favour of Hypothesis 4: In pluralist countries,
the retrenchment of unemployment benefits is more likely following a growth
crisis than following a year without a crisis. In corporatist countries, growth
crisis have no significant impact on the reform of the unemployment benefit
system.
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(a) Predicted probabilities for unemployment benefit re-
trenchment for values of growthcrisis
(b) Difference in probabilities between pluralism and cor-
poratism for unemployment benefit retrenchment
Figure 4.7: Predictive margins of ueb for values of growthcrisis across cor-
poratist and non-corporatist countries. Dashed lines indicate non-significant
coefficients. Dotted lines indicate 90% confidence interval.
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4.6 Conclusion
The new qualitative labour market reform data used for this paper confirms
that continental European economies have over the past thirty years enacted
a significant number of regulatory changes to the unemployment benefit sys-
tem. Reforms were not only of a marginal, but also of a structural nature.
This adds emphasis to the research question as to what drives controversial
structural reforms in Europe’s political economies. Starting point of the pa-
per was the observation that, in many European countries, corporatism grants
socio-economic interests – conventionally those of employer organisations and
trade unions – privileged access to the policy-making process. This gave rise
to the conjecture that reform trajectories of these countries are also a function
of these stakeholder interests. It also gave rise to the conjecture that factors
that are conventionally thought to determine structural reforms – government
partisanship and economic crises – are likely to play a less significant role in
corporatist countries than they do in pluralist countries.
Results of the empirical investigation can be summarised as follows: First,
privileged interests – the utility of employer organisations and trade unions – do
indeed matter for the reform trajectories of the employment benefit systems in
corporatist countries. There is also evidence for the reverse implication of the
theory, namely that corporatist interests have no effect on reform trajectories in
pluralist countries. More specifically, employer organisation and trade union
interests do not seem to affect the likelihood of employment benefit system
reforms in pluralist countries.
Second, the empirical investigation also revealed that broader political in-
stitutions and economic conditions – commonly held to be important determi-
nants for structural reform – do indeed matter in pluralist countries. However,
they do not (or at least not significantly) matter in corporatist countries. More
specifically, there is some evidence that government partisanship significantly
impacts labour market reform trajectories in pluralist systems, while there is
no such evidence for corporatist countries (Immergut & Abou-Chadi 2010, for
a similar finding). There is also evidence that growth crises has a significant
impact on structural reform trajectories in a pluralist countries, but not in a
corporatist setting.
These findings invite more empirical research on the impact that organised
interests have on structural reforms and other policies in European countries.
To begin with, the understanding of the political objects of these organised in-
terest groups remains limited. The employment relations literature holds that
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peak level employer organisations represent the interests of their constituents
in the manufacturing sector. This assumption may be too restrictive, particu-
larly for the past decade. Many European countries have experienced a gradual
transformation from manufacturing to service economies. Employer organisa-
tions may be pressed to incorporate the interests also of firms in other sectors
of the economy. Further, this paper used manufacturing profits as proxy for
the interests of firms. This approach may also prove to be overly simplistic.
Other success indicators – such as return on investment – or other indicators
entirely – such as management salaries – may well be important elements of
the employer organisation’s utility function.
Also, this study was limited to one particular labour market institution,
namely the unemployment benefit system. The question quickly arises whether
the findings also translate to other institutions of the labour market and wider
socio-economic structures.
In closing, it may be noted that the above regressions were also run for
the indicator of reform of employment protection legislation epl coded from
the fRDB/IZA database in the context of this study. They are not presented
here for reasons of parsimony. Results broadly confirm the findings presented
in this paper, confirming evidence that privileged interest representation does
indeed have a intermediating effect on the determinants of structural labour
market reforms in Europe.
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4.A Econometric considerations
Specifying a model for the data and hypotheses described in Sections 2 and 3
poses some technical challenges. First, the ordered, categorical nature of the
dependent variable – years with and without structural reforms – precludes the
use of standard linear regression models. While non-linear, logit and probit
models for binary outcomes are well established, this is somewhat less true for
non-linear models with ordinal dependent variables. The technical toolbox in
computational statistical packages is certainly relatively smaller. More gen-
erally, non-linear models bear more statistical pitfalls, including the problem
of how to correctly interpret coefficients or how to best measure the fit of the
model (Hoetker 2007). Given these challenges, Mood (2010) suggests using a
‘Linear Probability Model’ for regressions with ordinal dependent variables –
in effect a simple OLS model, in which coefficients are interpreted as probabil-
ities. However, the error terms of the ‘Linear Probability Model’ violate the
homoskedasticity and normality of errors assumptions of OLS regression, re-
sulting in invalid standard errors and hypothesis tests (Agresti 2010). This al-
lows only for the relative comparison of coefficients (Geishecker & Riedl 2010).
In short, there does not seem to be an easy way around applying a non-linear
regression model.
Second, the data is organised as panel data by years and by countries.
While regression models for panel data are relatively well established, this is
not true for logit and probit regression models with ordinal dependent vari-
ables. Luo & Wang (2008, 31) write that ‘compared with those extensively
studied panel data models for continuous response, much less has been done for
binary panel data, and even less has been done for ordinal panel data, which
are typically encountered in real practice (...). Thus, real applications call
for effective methods for ordinal panel data modelling.’ Several user-written
models are available for Stata, which are, however, either not well established
(such as regoprob2 by Pfarr et al. 2010 or feologit-buc by Baetschmann et al.
2011) or only allow for random effects estimation (gllamm by Rabe-Hesketh
& Skrondal 2004). This paper follows the recommendations of Rabe-Hesketh
& Skrondal (2008) for models with fixed effects estimation and uses country
cluster-robust standard errors in the standard ologit framework of Stata. Ad-
ditionally, country specific effects are absorbed by the wide use of indicators
that provide a measure of deviations from country-specific trends.
Third, to establish how determinants for structural reform vary across a
pluralist and corporatist system, the model specification requires a group com-
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parison. One possibility is to include a group dummy variable and then predict
the core variable effect on the dependent variable for the two different values
of group variable. This method gives an indication of how the group member-
ship affects independent variables. Including a group dummy variable changes
the intercept of linear estimator within the core function of the logit or pro-
bit model. It does not, however, allow for different coefficients across the two
different politico-economic groups. For this reason, this method is thought to
work best for studies interested in the outcomes across groups, rather than
studies investigating the difference of determinants across groups (Kleinbaum
2010).
A second, widely used possibility is to run two separate estimations for
observations in either of the groups. While this approach is generally permis-
sible, it has drawbacks particularly in non-linear models. Allison (1999) shows
that cross-estimation comparisons of coefficients are only viable for logit and
probit models if the variance of the error terms is the same. Hoetker (2004,
17) notes, ‘in the presence of even fairly small differences in residual varia-
tion, naive comparisons of coefficients [across groups] can indicate differences
where none exist, hide differences that do exist, and even show differences in
the opposite direction of what actually exists.’ Building on the work by Alli-
son, Williams (2009) suggests using heterogeneous choice models to compare
coefficients of non-linear regression models across groups.
A third possibility is to interact explanatory variables in the model with
the group dummy variable. This approach has been referred to as a ‘dummy-
variable-interaction model’ (Allan & Scruggs 2004) or a ‘fully dummy-interactive
model’ (Kam & Franzese 2007). Interaction models explicitly model the ‘mod-
erating’ or ‘intermediating’ effect of, for example, different institutional envi-
ronments on causal relationships. Further, pooling the data in a single esti-
mation ‘borrows strength from the other subsamples(s) to obtain better (i.e.,
more efficient) standard error estimates’ (Kam & Franzese 2007, 109). Prob-
ably also due to their intuitive appeal, interaction models are becoming more
widely used in the social sciences (Franzese 2003).
Interaction models are not without problems either, however. Interaction
terms have commonly been used and interpreted wrongly, even in linear mod-
els (Braumoeller 2004, Brambor et al. 2005). In the context of non-linear
models they are subject to on-going debate among statisticians. Ai & Norton
(2003) point out that the interpretation of interaction terms in linear models
does not carry over to non-linear models. The non-linear transformation of
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the linear core-function in logit and probit models means that a change of the
marginal effect of a covariate on probabilities depends not only on its own
value, but also on the values of all other covariates. Thus, ‘the group differ-
ences can be significant at some values of the predictor, while not significant
at others. This complicates things for the data analyst since there might not
be a simple answer to the question of whether the effects of a variable are
the same for both groups’ (Long 2009, 9). Whether this problem pertains
also to the group dummy-interaction model is contested (Kolasinski & Siegel
2010, Karaca-Mandic et al. 2012). Against this background, Buis (2010) calls
for the direct interpretation of odds ratios rather than the non-linearly trans-
formed probabilities. Most authors, however, suggest a graphical analysis of
predicted probabilities (Norton et al. 2004, Long 2009, Greene 2010, Williams
2012). Berry et al. (2010, 265) writes: ‘Testing the statistical significance of the
product term is necessary to confirm a hypothesis that independent variables
interact in influencing the unbounded latent dependent variable. But this test
does not shed light on the nature of the interaction between the variables in
influencing Pr(Y). Whether the variables interact in influencing Pr(Y) should
be tested by direct examination of estimated effects on Pr(Y).’
In summary, conducting a comparison of estimators across groups in a
model with an ordinal dependant variable and panel data requires an analysis
that is very much at the current frontier of statistical methods in the social
sciences. The paper uses a group dummy-interaction, ordinal logit model.
It exercises particular caution when interpreting results, providing a graphical
analysis of predicted probabilities to confirm evidence provided from regression
estimates. It runs the specification as a ‘Linear Probability Model’ and as
a heterogeneous choice ‘Ordinal Generalized Linear Models’ to ensure that
results are not an idiosyncrasy of the ordinal logit model (see Footnote 25 for
results).
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4.B Data sources
ueb The indicator is based on Anelli et al. (2011). For details of the coding
please refer to Section 3 of the paper.
corp The indicator is a dichotomised version of the corporatism indicator
provided by Siaroff (1999). This provides a binary indicator for pluralist
countries (corp=0) and corporatist countries (corp=1). For a detailed
discussion please refer to Section 3 of the paper.
emplutil The indicator for utility of employer organisations is based on sec-
toral data from the STAN Structural Analysis Database (OECD 2010a).
The database allows the calculation of gross nominal operating profits
(added value minus wage and non-wage labour costs) for the manufac-
turing sector. The emplutil indicator provides the percentage deviation
of gross real operating profits from the linear trend between 1980 and
2007.
unionutil The indicator for utility of trade unions is based on sectoral data
from the STAN Structural Analysis Database (OECD 2010a) and the
OECD Tax Database (OECD 2010b). More specifically, first, the take-
home income of a representative, employed manufacturing worker is cal-
culated, using data from from the OECD’s ‘STAN Structural Analysis
Database’ and Tax Database. The STAN data allows calculating the av-
erage gross nominal income of employees by sector by dividing the wages
and salaries by the number of employees in the sector. This average gross
income is used to calculate – for a representative worker – the income
taxes on national and sub-national level (the latter, where applicable)
as well as the social security contributions. Given that most taxes and
contributions are calculated progressively, this requires calculating the
public dues for each tax bracket individually. Taxes and social security
contributions are then subtracted from the gross income. Second, using
the average gross nominal income and information on the gross replace-
ment rate from the OECD Tax Database (OECD 2010b), income for an
unemployed manufacturing worker is calculated. Third, take-home in-
come for an employed manufacturing worker is weighted with percentage
of the workforce in employment, while income for an unemployed man-
ufacturing worker is weighted with the percentage of the unemployed
workforce, using data from Armingeon et al. (2010). Fourth, weighted
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employment and unemployment income are summated. Fifth and finally,
the sum is divided by price levels to obtain an indicator in real terms,
using OECD (2011). Finally, the unionutil indicator then provides the
percentage deviation of net real income from the linear trend between
1980 and 2007.
partisanship A commonly used measurement for government partisanship
is Beck et al. (1991), which provides a categorical variable for domi-
nant government party orientation with respect to economic policy. A
government may thus be ‘left’, ‘right’ or ‘centre’. This indicator, how-
ever, leaves relatively little scope for coalition governments, which are a
common feature of many European countries with a proportional repre-
sentation voting system. Armingeon et al. (2010) provides an indicator
that measures the percentage of cabinet posts held by social-democratic
and other left parties, weighted by days.
vetopoints Beck et al. (1991) provides an indicator that counts all formal
veto players in the system, adding veto points for an independent chief
executive, for a ‘cohabitation’ government, for each chamber of the leg-
islature held by the opposition and for every party in the government
coalition, among others.
electyear To account for electoral pressure, a dummy variable for years pre-
ceding a national parliamentary election is included. A list of all election
dates in provided by Armingeon et al. (2010).
uniondensity An indicator for union density – the ratio of the number of
workers and employees that are trade union members, and the total num-
ber of workers and employees in the workforce – is provided by Armingeon
et al. (2010).
outputgap An measure of the output gap, the difference between actual GDP
and potential GDP, is available from the Economic Outlook (OECD
2011). The indicator is calculated as the annual deviation from country-
specific trend over the available time series. Note that a positive output
gap indicates that the economy is growing above potential, while a neg-
ative output gap indicates that growth is below potential.
unemployment An annualised rate of unemployment is available from the Eco-
nomic Outlook (OECD 2011). The indicator is calculated as the annual
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deviation from country-specific trend over the available time series. The
time series starts for Greece in 1995 and for Ireland in 1990.
deficit An annualised measure of general government deficit/surplus as a
percentage of GDP is available from the OECD Economic Outlook (OECD
2011). The indicator is calculated as the annual deviation from country-
specific trend over the available time series. The time series for Greece
starts in 1993.
uebtotal An indicator for the summary measure of benefit entitlements for
1961 to 2012 on a biannual basis from (OECD 2010b). Missing data for
the even years are imputed.
General note: Data up until 1990 is for West Germany.
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4.C Figures and tables
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
corp 420 0.500 0.500 0 1
emplutil 395 0.000 0.137 -0.468 0.403
unionutil 381 0.000 0.048 -0.143 0.173
partisanship 420 0.404 0.383 0 1
growthcrisis 406 0.189 0.392 0 1
uebtotal 406 31.573 13.004 0.347 64.944
electyear 420 0.290 0.454 0 1
vetopoints 420 4.454 1.578 2 16
uniondensity 420 42.627 21.944 7.6 87.412
outputgap 420 0.000 2.154 -7.924 7.520
unemployment 393 0.000 1.995 -7.685 9.160
deficit 371 0.000 2.408 -10.04 7.1
Table 4.4: Data description
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UEB Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
corp=0 corp=1 corp=0 corp=1 corp=0 corp=1
emplutil 1.101 -5.913∗∗∗ 1.265 -6.791∗∗∗ 0.080 -4.509∗∗
(1.235) (0.946) (0.999) (1.130) (1.069) (1.968)
unionutil 0.000 -6.850∗∗ -0.484 -8.449∗∗ -2.454 -7.203∗∗
(2.364) (3.219) (2.691) (3.301) (3.114) (3.414)
partisanship -0.598∗∗ 0.282 -0.704∗ 0.592∗ -1.177∗∗∗ -0.032
(0.242) (0.326) (0.430) (0.361) (0.300) (0.204)
growthcrisis 1.398∗∗ -0.565 1.499∗∗ -0.677 1.382∗ -0.424
(0.660) (0.560) (0.654) (0.605) (0.743) (0.654)
vetopoints -0.052∗∗∗ -0.071
(0.019) (0.121)
electyear -1.193∗∗ 0.204
(0.564) (0.285)
unionpower -0.031∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
outputgap -0.253∗∗ -0.061
(0.125) (0.254)
unemployment 0.286∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗
(0.096) (0.047)
deficit 0.073 -0.204∗∗
(0.089) (0.096)
uebtotal 0.017∗∗ 0.015 0.039∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.010 0.007
(0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.016)
corp 0.001 1.660∗∗ 0.077
(0.712) (0.858) (0.924)
cut1 -2.588∗∗∗ -1.875∗∗∗ -2.669∗∗∗
(0.486) (0.692) (-5.584)
cut2 2.474∗∗∗ 3.498∗∗∗ 2.170∗∗∗
(0.416) (0.650) (0.406)
N 353 353 331
McFadden 0.066 0.103 0.092
Table 4.5: Regression estimates for epl, SE in brackets below the coefficients,
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Note: To facilitate the analysis, tables
present overall effects of the explanatory variables on unemployment benefit
system reforms in the pluralist group and the corporatist group, rather than the
interaction coefficients. Overall effects for the group corp = 1 were calculated
by means of a linear combinations of estimators (‘lincom’ command in Stata).
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Conclusion
A new view on the political economy of
structural reforms in neo-corporatist
European countries: summary of
findings, limitations and implications
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5.1 Summary
Scholars across the social sciences accept that the institutional structure of
a political economy matters for its socio-economic performance. If institu-
tions matter, so must institutional change: ‘Institutions provide the incentive
structure of an economy; as that structure evolves, it shapes the direction of
economic change towards growth, stagnation, or decline.’ (North 1991, 97).
Governments must therefore have an immanent interest in benignly shaping
the institutional structure of their countries by designing structural reform
policies – be they regulatory or deregulatory – with the aim of steering the
political economy towards economic growth and prosperity rather than decline
and poverty.
This PhD project began with two observations on the reform trajectories
of Europe’s political economies that are puzzling in light of this considera-
tion. First, none of the continental countries in Western Europe followed the
paradigmatic liberal market reforms of the Anglo-Saxon countries in the 1980s.
This observation raised questions because – in the three decades following the
emergence of the so-called ‘neo-liberal’ paradigm – these supply-side reforms
were widely held to enhance growth and employment. The broad policy con-
sensus also informed international policy coordination, such as the European
Union’s Lisbon Strategy.
Second, non-convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon liberal market economy
model was long interpreted by social scientists as institutional inertia in con-
tinental European countries. This has turned out to be incorrect. Rather,
reform paths of this group of countries exhibit considerable variation in terms
of extent and timing of structural reforms. Hemerijck (2012, 40) confirms that
‘[t]he overall scope of social reform across the member states of the European
Union [...] is heterogeneous, disparate, and uneven.’ This is puzzling, given
that many of the continental European countries are conventionally thought
to be quite similar regarding their political and economic structures and are
thus expected to react similarly to a changing socio-economic environment.
These observations motivate research as to the factors that determine
whether or not structural reforms are implemented in European countries. The
discussion of the political economy literature and its findings in the Introduc-
tion to this PhD project revealed that none of the conventional approaches to
explaining structural reforms – macroeconomic conditions in general and eco-
nomic crises in particular, government partisanship, electoral pressures, the
veto power of governmental bodies or interest groups – can, by themselves,
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account for the diverse reform trajectories in Europe.
Against this background, this PhD project presented three research pa-
pers on the political economy of structural reforms in Europe. It started off
with an in-depth examination of Germany in the first paper, in many ways
an exemplary continental European country. Before the overhaul of many of
its welfare and labour market institutions in the early 2000s, the country was
known for its enigmatic resilience against reform in spite of long periods of
low growth and growing unemployment. With the help of an augmented veto
player framework, the paper identifies three pivotal veto clusters within the
German political economy – namely the veto points within the federal gov-
ernment, the federal legislative system and the system of corporatist interest
representation – that determine institutional stability and change. Based on
expert interviews, news media coverage, policy documents and findings in the
literature, the paper compares four distinct political phases between the early
1980s and 2005, assessing the contribution of the three veto clusters on policy
stability and reform.1
Drawing on insights of Paper One on the Modell Deutschland as well as
the wider comparative capitalism literature, Paper Two developed a model of
institutional stability and change in Europe’s ‘coordinated market economies’.
Coordinated market economies are typically characterised by strong institu-
tional complementarities that allow for a high-quality production regime. Pa-
per Two argued that further characteristics of this economic model are the
close coordination of interests that sustain these institutional complementari-
ties and a divided economy that discriminates between so-called ‘insiders’ and
‘outsiders’. The paper consolidated these defining elements of a coordinated
market economy in one formal, rational choice model. The comparative statics
of the model allow identifying key political economy variables that determine
institutional stability and change in this politico-economic model. The results
of the model are applied to the reform experience of two countries, namely
Germany and Sweden.
Paper Three widened the angle from narrow individual cases in the first two
papers to a broader European perspective. The paper employs a new database
on social reforms and a probabilistic regression model to conduct a quantitative
investigation into the determinants of unemployment benefit system reforms.
1 In that it compares four distinct episodes of policy-making in Germany, Paper One is
a comparative case study. It could almost be described as a very rudimentary Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA), ‘comparing cases as configuration of set memberships and for
elucidating their patterned similarities and differences.’ (Ragin 2000, 120)
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More specifically, it argues that a different set of political economy factors are
likely to affect structural reform probabilities across different types of political
economies across Western Europe. In corporatist countries, the institutional
preferences of interest groups with privileged access to the political decision-
making process are expected to significantly impact reform trajectories. In
pluralist countries, conventional political and macroeconomic factors – such as
government partisanship and economic crises – as expected to matter more.
The juxtaposition of the three papers of the PhD project highlight clear
linkages and a certain logical relationship: First and most obvious, all three
papers set out to contribute to the understanding of reform trajectories in one
or more countries of continental Western Europe. Second, it could be argued
that the three papers loosely follows a ‘inductive-deductive research’ approach
(Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009). They contribute to understanding institutional
stability and change by progressing from a theory-building case study (of the
German political economy) to the development of generalisable hypotheses (by
means of a rational choice model) and then to the broader corroboration of
these hypotheses (in a quantitative study). Third, the PhD project could be
interpreted as taking a ‘Mixed Methods Research’ (Tashakkori & Teddlie 2003)
approach, in that it combines qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis as well
as formal modelling in the three papers. Creswell & Clark (2010, 5) argues
that this approach ‘provides a better understanding of research problems than
either approach alone.’
The linkages between the three papers should, however, not obscure the
fact that the three papers exhibit important differences with regard to research
question, setup, definitions and result. Table 5.1 on page 204 summarises some
of the key elements of the three papers.
Differences relate, first, to the questions addressed by the papers. Each
of the three papers addresses a different empirical puzzle. More specifically,
Paper One addresses the puzzle of one particular, counterintuitive instance
of structural reforms in Germany. Paper Two – more broadly – seeks to un-
derstand the impact of interest coordination on the divergence of structural
reform trajectories across similar, that is, coordinated market countries in
Europe. Finally, Paper Three addresses the puzzle why conventional determi-
nants for structural reforms cannot explain reform trajectories equally across
European countries. Dissimilar empirical puzzles result in a slightly different
governing question that guides the research in each of the three papers.
Second, distinct research questions subsequently result in a different re-
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search setup, with respect to research method, analytical framework and data.
Paper One conducts a single country case study of Germany. In terms of
analytical framework, it develops an augmented version of the Veto Player
Model to systematically evaluate primary and secondary qualitative sources on
the German political economy. Paper Two embarks on a theoretical, rational
choice exploration of coordination behaviour in coordinated market economies.
The resulting game-theoretic model is employed as a analytical framework for
a short comparative case study of Germany’s and Sweden’s reform trajec-
tory. This takes the form of an analytical narrative, which aims ‘to assess
the predictions and to arbitrate among possible explanations in instances of
observational equivalence.’ (Arias 2011) Finally, Paper Three uses regression
analysis to analyse large-N, cross-country panel data in a probabilistic model.
Results from these three types of analytical frameworks are not easily com-
parable. While Paper One, for example, establishes a deterministic, causal
relationship between structural reforms and political economy conditions in
the three veto clusters, Paper Three merely provides evidence of a probabilis-
tic relationship between particular politico-economic conditions and reform
outcomes.2
Third and arguably most importantly, the papers do not follow the same
definition of the subject of investigation, namely institutions and institutional
change. Institutions in Papers One and Three are broadly congruent. They
are understood to be ‘implemented government policy’, that is, formally ap-
proved rules and procedures that govern the political economy. Institutional
change requires an active and explicit change of these rules and procedures.
Recall from the Introduction that these two papers follow a historical strand of
institutionalism in their conceptualisation of institutions. By contrast, Paper
Two squarely follows a rational choice institutionalism tradition by conceptu-
alising institutions as ‘equilibrium ways of doing things.’ (Shepsle 2006, 23)
Institutional change in Paper Two is thus understood as the move from one to
another equilibrium.
However, much care is taken to avoid letting the conceptualisation of insti-
tutions guide the understanding of institutional change. To varying degrees,
all three papers take into account of changes in power relations and changes
in institutional preferences – balancing structure and agency – to explain the
absence and presence of structural reforms.
2 For example, the paper does not claim that structural reforms inadvertently follow after
an economic crisis in pluralist countries. Rather, economic crisis increase the probability of
unemployment benefit retrenching reform, all other things being equal.
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Fourth and in consequence of the above, the results of the three papers dif-
fer. Paper One identifies political factors in Germany’s policy-making process
as decisive determinants for institutional stability and change. With its veto
cluster analysis, it emphasises the importance of relative political power and
institutional preferences as causal for Germany’s structural reform trajectory.
In Paper Two, political factors play a much less pronounced role. On account
of its game-theoretic approach, the paper emphasises strategic choices of politi-
cal economy actors: trade unions, employer organisations and the government.
Strategic choices, in turn, are determined by expected payoffs (given the ex-
pected reaction of counterparties). Finally, Paper Three shows that factors
for institutional stability and change are distinctly different in corporatist and
pluralist political economy regimes. On account of its probabilistic regression
model, the paper identifies political and economic conditions which increase
or decrease the likelihood of (a certain type of) structural reform.
It should be noted that, while not congruent, results across the three pa-
pers are not necessarily inconsistent. Paper One started off with the observa-
tion of two decades of institutional stability in the German political economy
in spite of repeated growth and unemployment crises. The model in Paper
Two explicitly picks up this puzzle and provides a theoretical explanation for
the phenomenon. Paper Three shows, more generally, that growth crisis do
not seem to impact reform probabilities in corporatist economies. Similarly,
Paper One observes that the supply-side Agenda 2010 reforms were imple-
mented by a social democratic rather than – as conventional wisdom would
have suggested – a conservative government. Again, Paper Two provides some
theoretical intuition for this phenomenon. Paper Three shows, more generally,
that government partisanship does not seem to impact reform probabilities in
corporatist economies.
While political institutions feature more prominently in Paper One than in
Paper Two, the two papers link with respect to the role of corporatist interest
representation. By investigating the conditions under which coordination in
coordinated market economies is sustained, Paper Two can – to some degree –
be understood to provide a more in-depth analysis of the behavioural dynamics
in the third, corporatist veto cluster presented in Paper One. Note, particu-
larly, that the constraining power of the corporatist veto cluster in Paper One
and the stability of complementary institutions in Paper Two both depend on
a social consensus on the economic model.3 The role of corporatist actors in
3 In Paper One, the weakening of the consensus on the Modell Deutschland led to a
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Europe’s corporatist, coordinated market economies also features in the third
paper, which finds evidence that the institutional preferences of trade unions
and employer organisations change the likelihood of structural reforms.
Nonetheless, the three papers are, first and foremost, stand-alone academic
contributions. With different research questions, setups, definitions and re-
sults, the scope and target audience of the contributions are different. Papers
One and Three are a qualitative and a quantitative empirical contributions
to the political economy literature respectively. By contrast, Paper Two is
primarily a theoretical contribution, which is also targeted towards a public
choice readership. The scope of Paper One is clearly limited to the German
political economy. With its addition to the Veto Player Model, the paper also
makes a theoretical contribution to the political science literature. With the
political economy mechanism described in Paper Two, the scope of the con-
tribution is limited to the complementary institutions in coordinated market
economies. Paper Three has the widest scope by addressing a number of reform
determinants both in corporatist and pluralist political economies in Western
Europe.4
The following conclusion to the PhD project will embark on drawing some
synthesising conclusions from the three papers and develop some theoretical
and policy implications. It can be read as an attempt to bridge some of the
differences across the three papers.
More specifically, Section 2 presents a synthesis of the findings of these
three research papers. It shows how they contribute to answering the questions
that the PhD project raised in the introduction, and how they more generally
contribute to the understanding of the political economy of structural reforms
in Europe. Section 3 will point to some of the important limitations of the
research projects and possible avenues for future research. Methodological
approach and the findings of the research project also have wider theoretical
and policy implications. Section 4 develops some thoughts on the implications
of the findings for the established theories of institutional change, drawing in
particular on the result of the different theoretical approaches taken in Paper
erosion of inner cohesion of corporatist interest groups and subsequently to a weakening of
the corporatist veto cluster. In the game-theoretic model of Paper Two the breakdown of
consensus leads to a disintegration of the coordinated economy more directly. Paper Two has
a much higher degree of abstraction, which factors out many empirically important political
institutions and processes. For a more detailed discussion of how these two approaches may
be bridged, please refer to the following Section 5.4.
4 For a more general discussion of the limitations of the research project, please refer to
the following Subsection 5.3.
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One and Paper Two. Section 5 provides some thoughts on possible implications
of the research findings for public policy-making in the Europe.
5.2 Synthesis of findings
The key findings of the three papers relate to the pivotal effect of politico-
economic systems on structural reform trajectories. More specifically, the re-
search project broadly finds that, in many European countries, neo-corporatist
interest representation in the political sphere and interest coordination in the
economic sphere significantly affect structural reform policies. An explanation
of structural reform trajectories in Europe thus requires an understanding of
the functioning of corporatism both in the political and the economic sphere.5
Corporatist interest representation in the political sphere
A first conclusion that united the three research papers is that, within cor-
poratist countries, special interest representation in the political sphere deter-
mines structural reforms to a significant degree.
Corporatism typically allows specific societal interest groups – convention-
ally employer organisations and trade unions – institutionalised and privileged
access to the process of policy formulation and implementation (Christiansen
et al. 2009). Recall that in its discussion of the ‘corporatist veto cluster’ in the
augmented veto player framework, for example, Paper One described in some
detail this integration of corporatist actors and the government, which may
take the shape of the formal involvement of employer organisations and trade
unions in public management, as well as of a strong, informal interlocking
between these interest groups and governmental bodies.
To varying degrees, this privileged access allows the corporatist groups to
impose their interests on the policy outcome. Paper One explained how both
employer organisations and trade unions prevented an overhaul of the German
political economy in the 1980s due to their strong vested interests in the well-
functioning Modell Deutschland. Only after the consensus on an integral part
of this model – Germany’s ‘welfare corporatism’ – broke down, did more far-
5 Note that this reflects the two main strands of corporatism research in political science
and political economy, as indicated in the introduction to the research project. The first
strand of research investigates corporatist systems of interest representation and its effect on
the process of policy-making. The second political economy strand of research places more
emphasis on the effect of corporatist institutions on the economic systems, focusing on the
effect of (wage) negotiation on productivity, inflation and unemployment.
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reaching socio-economic reforms follow. Similarly, Paper Two contended that
the stability of institutions in the ‘coordinated market economy’ depends on
the support of corporatist actors. Finally, Paper Three provided some robust
evidence that, when employer organisations and trade unions are involved in
the policy-making process, they significantly determine the direction and scope
of labour market reforms.
By itself, the finding that ‘corporatism matters’ is certainly not new. The
importance of corporatist structures for policy outcomes and social welfare
in Europe has been the emphasised by a large political science and political
economy literature (Molina & Rhodes 2002). However, as discussed in the
introduction to the research project in some detail, the effect of corporatism
on reform trajectories remains contested in the political economy literature.
One strand of literature interprets corporatist actors – having attained signif-
icant formal or informal political power – as additional veto players. It thus
attributes an inherent status quo bias to corporatist political economies. A
second strand of literature, focusing more on the cooperative nature of the
socio-economic decision-making process of corporatist countries, emphasises
the tradition of cooperative policy-making in corporatist countries which fa-
cilitated rather than obstructed agreement on institutional change.
In contrast to previous contributions, this research project finds that cor-
poratism does not a priori imply an inherent bias towards either institutional
inertia or flux. Rather, corporatist interest representation is best understood
as an overriding of the political interests that conventionally dominate the po-
litical sphere, rendering electoral pressures and partisan rifts, for example, less
important. Structural reforms are, in consequence, also a function of the in-
terests of corporatist actors. Institutional change depends on whether or not,
in the eyes of these actors, an alternative set of institutions seems preferential
to the institutional status quo. Countries may thus demonstrate a high degree
of institutional stability when structural reforms are expected in view of the
broader socio-economic conditions and political debate, and vice versa.
This is not to say that other factors do not continue to play a role in
structural reform policies, also in corporatist systems. For example, Paper One
described how, apart from the corporatist veto cluster, the inner cohesion of
the government and the diffusion of political power to the German Länder were
important explanatory factors for the reform trajectory of Germany over the
past decades. Similarly, there was some evidence in Paper Three that political
and economic variables may also be significant determinants of unemployment
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benefit system reform in corporatist countries.
Nonetheless, the understanding of how corporatist interest representation
impacts on the policy-making process goes some way to explaining the large
variation in the reform track record of continental European countries. In fact,
two components may contribute to this variation, namely the mechanism of
policy-making in corporatist countries, and the differences in the policy-making
mechanism between corporatist and non-corporatist countries.
First, reform trajectories across corporatist countries may diverge even in
view of the same international pressures or symmetric socio-economic shocks.
Institutional stability and change is closely related to changes of the preferences
of the corporatist actors, rather than broader political or economic factors. For
example, the narrative presented in Paper Two described how, on the one hand,
a change in corporatist institutional preferences emerged and subsequent led
to reform in Sweden in the early 1980s, following the increased compression of
wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers. In Germany, on the
other hand, a significant structural reform was a longer time coming, in spite
of severe socio-economic pressures as both Papers One and Two demonstrate.
Here, a change of institutional preferences occurred only in the course of the
1990s, following the rising costs of the welfare state after reunification.
Second, not all continental European countries have corporatist structures.
Institutional change in pluralist countries, however, follows different mecha-
nisms than in corporatist countries. Pluralist political economies are charac-
terised by disorganised and competing interests, which are not systematically
integrated into the policy formulation and implementation process. This im-
plies that conventional political interests play a bigger role than in a corporatist
setting. It can be conjectured, for example, that the interests of government
officials are typically linked to party ideology and re-election probability, imply-
ing that these factors will be more decisive determinants for structural reform
policies. Indeed, Paper Three provided some evidence that variables such as
government partisanship and GDP growth crisis have more explanatory power
for reform trajectories in pluralist countries.
Interest coordination in the economic sphere
A second summary finding of the research project is that within corporatist
countries, the coordination of socio-economic interest in the economic sphere
guides the institutional preferences of the special interests to a significant de-
gree.
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As described in more detail in Paper Two, on the basis of the Varieties of
Capitalism literature (Hall & Soskice 2001b), corporatism allows for the close
coordination of interests among corporatist interest groups – conventionally
employer organisations and trade unions – and between corporatist interest
groups and the government. Coordination replaces the market as an instru-
ment for the allocation of resources in these economies6, providing the foun-
dation for a particular type of high-quality production regime. One example
of this is the Modell Deutschland, as described in Paper One. Soskice (1999,
119) accordingly describes ‘coordinated market economies’ as ‘descendants of
corporatist economies.’
This industrial regime will significantly steer the institutional preferences
of the coordinating interest groups. More specifically, the interest groups will
have strong preferences for institutions – labour market regulation, social in-
surance, and education and training, for example – that complement their
particular high-quality industrial strategy. Correspondingly, institutional pref-
erences of corporatist actors will change when a set of institutions no longer
complements their strategy. Paper One argued that the coordinating actors
withdrew their support for some of the central institutions of Germany’s wel-
fare corporatism because the cost of maintaining the institutional status quo
became relatively expensive vis-à-vis alternative institutional arrangements.
More generally, Paper Two contended that the preference for coordinating ac-
tors for a particular set of institutions depends on expected manufacturing
profits and blue-collar wages from these institutions. Finally, Paper Three
found that, within a corporatist setting, a deviation from long-run trend of
manufacturing profit or a deviation from long-run trends of manufacturing
workers’ income increases the probability of employment protection legislation
reform.
It is easy to see that this finding – in conjunction with the findings on
corporatist interest representation in the political sphere – suggests that cor-
poratism provides the relevant actors with more influence over the design of the
institutional environment in which they operate than is conventionally allowed
for in the literature. In particular, it suggests that institutional complemen-
tarities are the result of design or re-design just as much as the result of mere
6 For example, trade unions and employer organisations centrally negotiate agreements
on wages, working hours and conditions for industries or the whole economy. At the same
time, the public-sector share in the economy is typically higher in corporatist countries.
More areas of public life are organised by the state or para-public bodies in coordinated
than in liberal market economies.
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‘discovery’ (Streeck 2004).
This understanding contributes to explaining the puzzling institutional
non-convergence of continental European countries towards a liberal market
model in spite of strong international pressures and episodes of economic under-
performance. Coordinated economies did not follow their Anglo-Saxon coun-
terparts in implementing far-reaching deregulatory reforms, simply because
this was not in the interest of the coordinating actors. More specifically, a
situation is easily conceivable in which corporatist agents retain their prefer-
ence for a particular institutional status quo even in view of low or negative
economic growth and rising unemployment. This would be the case if adverse
economic developments remained contained within segments of the economy
that are not represented by the corporatist interest groups. As long as the set
of institutions complements the strategy and thus maximises the utility of the
coordinating actors, this set of institutions will enjoy support. Using the same
argument, even further institutional divergences of European economies from
the liberal market benchmark can plausibly be explained.
In that it explains the non-convergence of the continental European socio-
economic model towards its Anglo-Saxon liberal market counterpart, this ar-
gument is congruent with the Varieties of Capitalism literature. However,
this literature also argues that by exploiting its ‘comparative institutional ad-
vantage’ in international trade, the coordinated market economy presents a
second, welfare-maximising type of economy next to the liberal market econ-
omy. Accordingly, Hall & Soskice (2001a, 58) argues that governments may
be expected to ‘be less sympathetic to deregulation because it threatens the
nation’s comparative institutional advantage.’
In this particular aspect, this project follows a slightly different line of
argument than the Varieties of Capitalism literature, relaxing its relatively
strong assumptions on the welfare implications of a coordinated market econ-
omy. By combining the concept of institutional complementarity with non-
encompassing corporatist interest representation, it entertains the possibility
that the comparative institutional advantage pertains only to part of the econ-
omy – typically the export-led manufacturing sectors. It is thus easy to imagine
a situation in which non-convergence – while in the interest of the corporatist
actors – does not maximise the welfare of the whole country.
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5.3 Limitations of the research project
The following section will discuss some of the most important limitations of
the research projects regarding the scope of its explanatory power as well as
the exclusion of considerations regarding welfare implications of corporatist
structures and structural reforms.
Scope of the research project
The inductive-deductive approach taken by this research project has the draw-
back that it narrowed the focus of the research project on a particular explana-
tory variable in particular policy field, namely the effect of privileged interest
representation as it prevails in continental Europe on labour and welfare re-
forms. More specifically, the study in the first paper of the project narrowed
the focus of the project to the ‘corporatism’ variable, which was found to be
a decisive determinant of institutional stability and change in Germany over
the past decades.
Note that starting off with a case study of a pluralist country would have
produced very different findings on the determinants of structural reforms and
resulted in a different focus of the PhD project in the subsequent research
papers. Although the third paper was able to generalise some hypotheses on
the significance of corporatist systems of interest representation for reform
trajectories, the setup of the research approach clearly limited the scope of the
research findings, in terms of geography and policy area.
The main finding of the research project pertains first and foremost to
countries with corporatist traits. Clearly, the findings of Papers One and Two
in particular have little to no explanatory power for the reform trajectories of
countries without privileged and institutionalised interest representation. Pa-
per Three does find some evidence that in more pluralist European countries
conventional determinants for policy-making, such as macroeconomic condi-
tions and government partisanship, are significant factors for reform policies.
However, the project refrains from developing more explicit and elaborate the-
ories on what determines structural reforms in this second group of European
countries.
Strictly speaking, the PhD project thus only answers half of the question on
reform trajectories in European countries that it laid out in the Introduction.
While it helps to explain reform trajectories in countries such as Germany,
the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Sweden, Finland and possibly others, its
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contribution to the understanding of reform trajectories in the more pluralist
countries of Europe remains limited. To fully understand the diverse reform
trajectories in Europe, more research is also needed on the political economy
of structural reforms, particularly in this second group of countries. Impor-
tant questions for future research relate particularly to the difference between
corporatism and other forms of interest representation in their effect on reform
trajectories. Under which conditions, for example, do interest groups in plu-
ralist countries develop veto powers that could potentially explain the reform
inertia in Southern European countries such as Greece, Italy and Portugal?
Second, this PhD project has focused on the organisation of the labour
market as well as some of the adjacent policy areas, including the social secu-
rity systems (unemployment and pension insurance), which also have signifi-
cant impact on the incentives in the labour market. These policy areas have
been identified as most controversial politically in the introduction of the PhD
project.
A priori, it is not clear, however, if and how far the findings on the deter-
minants of structural reform in this policy area will hold in other policy areas.
Not only may the interests of corporatist actors vary significantly across pol-
icy areas. There may indeed be policy areas on which the typical corporatist
actors – employer organisations and trade unions – have no dedicated policy
preferences. In these policy areas, other societal interest groups – for example,
the churches, environmental and conservation organisations or the organisa-
tions of ethnic minorities – may be important corporatist actors. Alternatively,
and if no such privileged interest representation exists in a particular policy
area of an otherwise corporatist country, the policy-making may follow more
pluralist ways.
Third and as indicated in the introduction, the research project has focused
on Europe. However, corporatism as a politico-economic system is not limited
to this continent. Japan and South Korea are commonly referred to as typical
examples of the Asian variant of corporatism, in which social partnership plays
a prominent role (Kim 2008). In Latin America, a unique form of state-led cor-
poratism has developed, which diverges from European corporatism (Wiarda
1997, 77ff.). Future research will have to investigate if and how far the find-
ings on the impact of corporatism on reform trajectories are transferable to
corporatist systems outside of Europe.
211
Welfare implications of corporatist structures and struc-
tural reform
The main focus of this research project has been the positive effect of corpo-
ratist structures on the political economy of structural reforms. Normative
considerations on the effect of corporatist structures on social welfare in the
political economies of Western Europe have played a subordinate role.
A normative discussion of neo-corporatist structures can be traced back,
for example, to the Ordo-Liberal School of the early 20th century in Germany
and Austria. Eucken, for example, criticised the systematic interlock of the
political and the economic system in the political economy of the Weimar
Republic. He argued that the system was abused to ‘improve the position of
one group in the capitalist markets’ (Eucken 1932, 306, original in German),
which not only impaired the functioning of the market economy – Eucken sees
a causal link with the Great Depression – but also undermined the stability of
the democratic system. In this seminal contribution on the ‘Rise and Decline
of Nations’, Olson similarly argued that ‘special-interest organizations and
collusions reduce efficiency and aggregate income in the societies in which
they operate and make political life more divisive.’ (Olson 1982, 47)
Others, however, have defended the European socio-economic system and
the corporatist structures for their ability to produce more stable and equitable
democratic societies. Prominently, Lijphart (1999, 301) finds that ‘consensus
democracies do clearly outperform the majoritarian democracies with regard
to the quality of democracy and democratic representation as well as with re-
gard to what I have called the kindness and gentleness of their public policy
orientations.’ As discussed in Paper Two, the comparative capitalism litera-
ture, in particular, has argued that economies in which socio-economic groups
strongly coordinate their interests do not necessarily perform worse in terms
of economic welfare than economies in which resource allocation is organised
purely by the market mechanism.
Some reflections on the economic welfare performance are included in the
model presented in Paper Two. Following the logic of Olson (1982), it provides
a consolidation of the two arguments, namely that – depending on the degree
to which the corporatist groups encompass larger or smaller proportions of
interests – corporatist structures may be either welfare improving or welfare
reducing. However, this merely indicative normative finding features only in
the sidelines of this research project. More research on the overall welfare
effects of corporatist, coordinated market economies vis-à-vis pluralist, liberal
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market economies would be of significant academic and public policy interest.
It should not be left unmentioned that the research project remains almost
entirely agnostic to the normative question as to whether supply-side reforms
are at all desirable in continental Europe. The project started out on the
premise that there has been and – as it turns out – there remains a broad
European and international political consensus on supply-side reforms. The
project subsequently investigated positivist issues of reform implementation
only.
Many economists, in particular, maintain that Germany’s bloated welfare
state and labour market overregulation, for example, continued to weigh on
economic growth and employment (Siebert 2003, Sinn 2007). In France, rem-
nants of the ‘dirigiste’ economic system and militant trade unions had similarly
adverse effects (Baverez 2003, Duhamel 2003, Levy 2008). Overregulation,
public mismanagement and insufficient legal security had made Italy the ‘sick
man of Europe’ (Ariemma 2003, Della Sala 2004, Simonazzi et al. 2009). The
2003 ‘Sapir Report’ on how to improve the economic performance in the EU
finds that ‘what is required is a massive change in economic institutions and
organisations, which has not yet occurred on a large scale in Europe’ (Sapir
2003, 2). Similarly, Alesina (2006, 3) warn that ‘[w]ithout serious, deep, and
comprehensive reforms Europe will inexorably decline, both economically and
politically.’
On the whole, there are, however, surprisingly few academic studies on the
effect of liberal market reforms on economic prosperity. Some contributions
have argued that liberalisations will improve the economic performance in
Europe (Blanchard & Giavazzi 2003, Blanchard 2004, OECD 2005, Ernst et al.
2006, Berger & Danninger 2007, Tressel 2008) and others that there is no
evidence for an improvement of economic conditions through liberal market
reform (Baker et al. 2004, Orenstein 2009). Tommasi (2004) points to the
fact that institutional change may both improve or worsen the institutional
structure of an economy, and warns that structural reforms should not become
an end in themselves.
5.4 Implications for the theories of institutional
change
A first set of broader implications of this research project relates to the the-
ories of institutional change. The introduction to this PhD project provided
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a discussion of different conceptualisations of institutions and institutional
change in the political economy literature, particularly in the rational choice
institutionalism and historical institutionalism strands of the literature. This
research project put forward papers that follow these distinctly different the-
oretical approaches. Using the two approaches to address a similar research
question, while making no claim to provide a synthetic theory of institutional
change, highlights some important theoretical implications.
Implications for theorising the time perspective on insti-
tutional change
The first theoretical implication of contrasting a historical and rational choice
approach to institutions is that it may be appropriate to attribute – quite
counter-intuitively – a short-term perspective to historical theories of institu-
tional change and a more long-term perspective to rational choice theories of
institutional change.
Conventionally, rational choice or ‘calculus’ approaches to institutions are
thought to relate to a short-term time horizon, while historical or ‘cultural’
approaches are thought to relate to the longer-term. Katznelson & Weingast
(2005, 5), for example, finds that ‘[r]ational choice scholars especially prize the
analysis of specific time-bound, events – an election or a piece of legislation,
for example. The penchant of historical institutionalists for longer temporal
horizons spanning decades or more makes them a good deal more likely to
encounter and analyze situations in which preferences on several dimensions
evolve over time and in which the set of actors is less likely to remain stable.’
(Bannink & Resodihardjo 2006, for a similar argument)
However, this research project would suggest reversing this perspective,
particularly in the analysis of institutional change. As discussed above, institu-
tional change in historical institutionalism is, on the one hand, linked to power
constellations. These typically relate to a particular political context and may
change relatively quickly, for example, due to electoral outcomes or changes in
political leadership. Institutional change in the rational choice framework, on
the other hand, requires shifts in institutional preferences, which are linked to
more gradual changes in institutional complementarities and – consequently
– to the expected payoffs from institutional arrangements. Roland (2004)
similarly distinguishes between ‘fast-moving’ and ‘slow-moving’ institutions,
formal rules adopted by a centralised, political process and cultural norms and
pattern behaviours respectively.
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To illustrate this difference, consider the differences in the theoretical ap-
proaches taken in Paper One and Paper Two of this PhD project. In that
these rules and procedures are assumed to be carried forward from past politi-
cal choices, Paper One broadly follows a historical institutionalist tradition. In
its analysis of institutional stability and change, the paper accordingly anal-
ysed the balance of power between the ‘blocked’ government and coalition
partners, federal entities and corporatist actors in particular. Note that this
analysis relates to four relatively short episodes of policy-making in Germany,
in which power relations shifted significantly.
Note further that Paper One also finds evidence of more subtle shifts
in institutional preferences and a weakening of the consesus for the ‘Mod-
ell Deutschland’ that only subsequently contributed to the shifts in relative
power. More specifically, the loss of constraining power of the corporatist veto
cluster, which opened a window of opportunity for the passing of the Agenda
2010 reforms in the early 2000s, was the result of growing discontent with
the institutional arrangements. ‘Declining support for the German economic
model and its cooperative institutions substantially weakened the stability of
its corresponding corporatist structures.’ (Paper One, 91)
This finding corresponds with the tradition of rational choice institution-
alism, which construes institutions as equilibrium behaviour and institutional
change is determined by shifts in the preferences of politico-economic actors.
Paper Two, for example, describes how shifts in the cost and benefit struc-
tures for corporatist agents resulted in a denial of support for the cooperative
institutional equilibrium, and were thus important underlying drivers of insti-
tutional change. These shifts of institutional preferences could be interpreted
as declining support for the institutional status quo, which would gradually
increase the socio-political pressures for structural reforms. In other words, if
one or more agents want ‘to play according to different rules [...] then the rules
are not in equilibrium and the “institution” is fragile.’ (Shepsle 2006, 26)7
Against this background, one could go so far as to suggest that the combi-
nation of the two time perspectives on institutions and institutional change –
namely, ‘institutions as equilibrium behaviour’ in the long-term, ‘institutions
7 To refer again to the simple example of traffic rules for the purpose of illustration:
It was argued that right-hand or left-hand driving can be conceptualised as equilibrium
behaviour. Should – for one reason or another – particular interest groups feel that it would
be better to switch to the alternative side of the road, over time political pressures would
arise to change the driving side. However, power relations between the actors at a given
time will decide whether a country continues driving, say, on the left-hand-side or – as did
Sweden, for example, in 1967 – switch to the right-hand-side.
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as exogenous constraints’ in the short-term – may present a way forward to
construct a comprehensive theory of institutional change, taking into account
both ‘the willingness to act (agency) and the ability to do so, as a result of
diminished limits of action (structure)’ (Bannink & Resodihardjo 2006, 11).
Implications for theorising the change of complementary
institutions
Second, the change of a set of institutions that provide actors with comple-
mentarities may be better understood in a rational choice than in a historical
institutionalism framework.
As indicated above, institutions can generally be construed either as an ex-
ogenous constraint on actors’ choices or as endogenously defined, equilibrium
behaviour, broadly following historical or rational choice institutionalism re-
spectively. In Paper One and Paper Two, the complementary set of institutions
of a coordinated economy – the wage bargaining system, the vocational train-
ing system, labour market regulation, unemployment benefits, the corporate
and personal income tax system etc. – were alternatively conceptualised as the
former and the latter. More specifically, in Paper One these socio-economic
institutions are interpreted as exogenous, formal rules and procedures that
govern the German political economy. In Paper Two, they are interpreted as
an ‘equilibrium ways of doing things’ (Shepsle 2006, 23). Namely, the set of in-
stitutions is understood as contributions of the agents in the model to maintain
a high-quality, coordinated economy. The two interpretations are congruent,
in that they guide and constrain the behaviour of individuals or groups within
society.
However, the two conceptualisations are very different in terms of their im-
plications for institutional change. While power relations remain an important
determinant for institutional stability and change of ‘historical institutions’,
the key determinant for change of ‘rational choice institutions’ is preferences.
In terms of their influence over institutional stability and change, one could
speak of the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ veto power of the politically relevant ac-
tors. In the interpretation of positive veto power, institutional change requires
the agreement of all actors. In other words, all actors with veto power need
to say ‘yes’ to institutional change for this to occur. In the alternative inter-
pretation of negative veto power, institutional stability depends on the active
support of the actors. Institutional change follows the withdrawal of support
– a ‘no’ vote – from one or more of the actors.
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In view of this finding, there are two points in favour of a rational choice
approach to conceptualising the change of complementary institutions. First,
an equilibrium approach to institutions allows the capturing of the knock-on
effects that the change of one institution is expected to have on other insti-
tutions in the presence of complementarities. While generally self-reinforcing,
Hall & Soskice (2001a, 63f.) find that institutional complementarities ‘raise the
prospect that institutional reform in one sphere of the economy could snow-
ball into changes in other spheres as well.’ (Deeg 2007, for a similar argument)
As Paper Two demonstrated, an equilibrium approach to a set of institutions
captures very well how the defection of one actor will lead to a breakdown of
the institutional status quo. Note that the ‘historical’ conceptualisation of in-
stitutional complementarities does not provide for this endogenous link within
a set of institutions.
Second, the nature of complementary institutions suggests that institu-
tional change is determined more by the presence of a negative veto than the
absence of a positive veto. In other words, their change is the result of lack of
support from political economy actors. Accordingly, Hall & Thelen (2009, 11)
find that ‘the durability of an [complementary] institution can rest substan-
tially [...] on how well it serves the interests of the relevant actors. Where an
institution fails to serve those interests well, it becomes fragile and susceptible
to defection from its rules.’
To understand this, consider that institutional complementarities imply
that the presence of one institution reinforces the ‘functional performance’
(Höpner 2005) of another institution. Where these institutions serve a benign
purpose, their co-action thus exponentially increases the welfare of the relevant
social entity. It is thus a priori in the interests of the relevant actors to
coordinate their efforts to build and sustain these institutions. Given that
the nature of complementary institutions is ‘collective’ or ‘aggregative’, the
process of institutional change – at least one that avoids a breakdown of the
complementarities – is likely to be cooperative. This suggests an equilibrium
approach to these institutions, in which institutional preferences decide on
stability and change.8
Conversely, institutional substitutes imply that the presence of one institu-
tion reduces the functional performance of another institution. These institu-
8 Note that Paper Two discussed the possibility that a set of institutions may provide
benevolent complementarities to one part of the economy, while being costly to another part.
In this case, the set of institutions is of a substitutive nature when considering the whole
economy.
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tions are conflicting, in that one institution or set of institutions infringes on
the functional performance of another institution or set of institutions. In con-
sequence, one group is likely to reject institutions that are favoured by another
group in the social entity. Given that the nature of substitutive institutions is
essentially distributive, the process of institutional change in the case of sub-
stitutive institutions is thus likely to be full of conflict. This, in turn, suggests
that power relations are important in determining the institutional outcome
and that a historical institutionalism approach may be more appropriate in
explaining stability and change.
Implications for theorising incremental institutional change
Third, construing institutions as equilibrium behaviour may allow for the con-
ceptualisation of incremental institutional change, shifting the focus away from
power-distributional questions to conflicting interests.
Recent contributions to historical institutionalism have criticised the pre-
vious literature on institutional change due to its inability to explain reform
in the absence of significant exogenous shocks, such as economic or political
crisis. However, Streeck & Thelen (2005, 18) find that ‘transformative change
[is] often the result from an accumulation of gradual and incremental change.’
The reasons for this incrementalism may be of a political and/or economic
nature. North (1993, 64) writes that ‘that the economies of scope, the comple-
mentarities, and the network externalities that arise from a given institutional
matrix of formal rules, informal constraints, and enforcement characteristics
will typically bias costs and benefits in favor of choices consistent with the ex-
isting framework.’ The literature on gradual institutional change thus argues
that change occurs as incremental adjustments to accommodate the changing
requirements of the relevant politico-economic actors. Opportunities for these
adjustments open up ‘when problems of rule interpretation and enforcement
open up space for actors to implement existing rules in a new way.’ (Mahoney
& Thelen 2010b, 4)9
The literature also argues that a rational choice conceptualisation of insti-
tutions is less suitable for explaining incremental gradual institutional change
(Mahoney & Thelen 2010b). This is due to the fact that institutions, inter-
preted as social equilibria, are extremely stable in the absence of significant
9 More specifically, the mechanisms by which institutions are adjusted are ‘displacement’,
the gradual replacement of existing with new rules and regulations, ‘layering’, the introduc-
tion of rules in addition or in accompany to existing ones, ‘drift’, a change in the way rules
and regulation are implemented, and ‘conversion’, the redeployment of existing rules.
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exogenous shocks. More specifically, rational choice equilibria are highly self-
enforcing in that each agent’s behaviour is the best response to the behaviour
of the other agents. Quasi by definition, rational choice equilibria preclude the
possibility of gradual change. ‘[I]nstitutional change happens only when ceteris
is no longer paribus, i.e. when shocks exogenous to the system of institutions
itself alter the context. Institutional change becomes a response to shocks.
Such analyses posit a radical separation between periods of institutional sta-
bility and of change [...] that rarely explain well how institutions emerge from
disequilibrium at such junctures.’ (Hall 2010, emphasis in original)
Paper Two of this research project, however, provides a rational choice
framework in which incremental change can be understood. First, the model
presented in the paper portrays institutions not as an inherently stable, but
as a relatively fragile equilibrium. More specifically, a set of institutions is
modelled here as a cooperation game (an infinitely repeated prisons’ dilemma-
type game), in which agents forgo short-term interests to reap the benefits of
coordination. This type of game is intrinsically unstable because each agent
has significant incentives to defect, and cooperation only rests on a careful
balance of expectations on future benefits and costs of cooperation. In an
influential paper on institutional change, Greif & Laitin (2004, 647) argue
that ‘repeated game theory seems to capture the way that people view their
environment and make decisions.’
Second, small changes in the expectations of agents may require an ad-
justment to the equilibrium to sustain cooperation in this framework. These
adjustments can be interpreted as a breakdown of the institutional status quo.
This was the approach in Paper Two. Alternatively, however, the breakdown
itself could be neglected as a ‘theoretical moment’, after which a new equilib-
rium emerges. Given that the old equilibrium will – in most cases – function
as a focal point, the new equilibrium is likely to closely resemble the former,
however, now taking into account the changed institutional preferences of the
relevant actors. Analysing the shift in preferences that causes the equilib-
rium breakdown and the changes that underpin the new equilibrium allows for
a better understanding of the causes of ‘dynamic tensions and pressures for
change’ (Mahoney & Thelen 2010b, 14) that remain side-lined in the historical
institutionalism approach to incremental change.
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5.5 Implications for public policy in Europe
A second set of broader implications of this research project relate to public
policy-making.
Implications for macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro
area
First, the findings suggest that introducing a common currency for plural-
ist and corporatist political economies in Europe may be problematic for the
diverging mechanisms of structural adjustment, among other reasons.
A key factor contributing to the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the Euro-
pean single currency area is the accumulation of significant current account im-
balances across the Euro area. In the decade before the crisis, current account
deficits were commonly attributed simply to economic catch-up processes in
the currency area. Fiscal positions markedly deteriorated across Western Eu-
rope during the Great Recession of 2008/2009.10 However, the public finances
of countries with high current account deficits were particularly hard hit. In-
vestors realised that ‘the pattern followed by some countries in the last decade,
with growth driven by domestic demand and financed with foreign borrowing,
was unsustainable, and that the heavy imbalances which had accumulated [...]
signalled the existence of solvency problems.’ (Giavazzi & Spaventa 2011, 112)
Note that there is a startling congruence in the Euro area between countries
with current account surpluses and deficits, and countries with more corpo-
ratist and more pluralist political economies. The cumulated current account
deficits of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy since the introduction
of the Euro are the highest within the currency union – in fact, they rank
among the highest of the world – while the highest cumulated current account
surpluses are reported by Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Austria.11
To a significant degree, these imbalances can be attributed to overly op-
timistic economic forecasts and the subsequent build-up of economic bubbles
– particularly in the real estate sector – in the deficit countries (Lane & Pels
2011). However, the imbalances also reflect more structural divergences in
overall competitiveness across countries of the Euro area (Belke & Dreger
2011). These have been attributed also to corporatist institutions, for example
10 This was owing to budgetary effects of automatic stabilisers in the tax and benefit
systems, fiscal stimulus packages as well as support provided to the banking sector.
11 Data source: OECD World Economic Outlook 2011.
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in the wage-setting system. Johnston & Hancké (2009) argue that wage nego-
tiations are led by the export sector, wage-setters are likely to practise wage
restraint and keep wage growth in line with productivity growth to maintain
international cost competitiveness (Boeri et al. 2001, for a similar argument).
In view of the findings of this research project, the divergence in current
accounts is likely to additionally be related to the countries’ ability to adjust
their institutional structure. Paper Three, in particular, provided some evi-
dence that, in more corporatist countries, the scope and direction of structural
adjustment is determined to a significant degree by the export-led manufac-
turing sector. Similar to the logic of competitive wage setting, it is expected
that corporatist actors will adjust the institutional structure of their political
economy – if and when necessary – with the aim of maintaining or improving
international competitiveness. More specifically, corporatist actors will aim
to uphold or strengthen the institutional complementarities, thus maintaining
the countries’ competitive advantage in manufacturing.12
More pluralist countries are likely to find it difficult to develop or maintain
an institutional structure with complementarities to support a particular type
of comparative advantage. As indicated in Paper Three, structural policies
in these countries are commonly linked to broader societal interests, electoral
pressures and/or partisan politics. For example, labour market reforms – be
they regulated or deregulated – following ideological guidelines or median voter
preferences rather than considerations of export competitiveness.
In a flexible exchange rate mechanism, the resulting competitiveness im-
balances can be equalised though the occasional competitive devaluations of
the deficit countries. This route is blocked in a currency union. To prevent a
breakup of the Euro area, mechanisms will have to be devised to deal with the
competitiveness divergences that result from assembling in a currency union
countries that can systematically optimise cost and institutional structures for
export competition, and countries that cannot.
Implications for European policy coordination
A second implication of the research project is that European policy coordina-
tion – such as the Lisbon Strategy – to bring about structural reform in indi-
vidual European Union countries is unlikely to work in countries with strong
12 ‘Comparative advantage’ is taken to mean a relative (cost) advantage in a particular
sector of an entity in international trade. ‘Competitive advantage’ refers to the (cost)
advantage of one entity over another entity within a particular sector. It is equivalent
to an ‘absolute advantage’.
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corporatist traits, unless corporatist actors are either overruled or integrated
into the policy formulation process at European level.
In 2010, the European heads of state and government agreed on a successor
for the Lisbon Strategy of the period 2000-2010. The European Commission’s
‘Europe 2020’ initiative, a 10-year strategy, aims at supporting ‘smart, sus-
tainable, inclusive growth’ in Europe. The better coordination of national and
European policies is supported by the ‘European Semester’, a yearly cycle of
economic policy coordination, by which the European Commission analyses
the Member States’ programmes of economic and structural reforms and pro-
vides them with country-specific recommendations.13 Like its predecessor the
new European reform agenda contains explicit recommendations on structural
reforms of the labour market, welfare institutions and the tax system, among
others, which the government of the Member States are asked to implement.14
The introduction to this PhD project found that the Lisbon Agenda is com-
monly perceived as a failure. In view of the insights of the research project, the
prospect of the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy – particularly with regard to its imple-
mentation in corporatist countries – is uncertain at best. More specifically, the
European system of policy coordination – the Open Method of Coordination
(OMC) – is highly unlikely to effectively impact the policy-making process in
corporatist countries. The OMC relies on soft law mechanisms such as indi-
cators, benchmarking and sharing of best practice. While there are no hard
sanctions, the compliance with mutually-agreed policy targets relies on peer
pressure and so-called ‘naming and shaming’. These are instruments that de-
pend mainly on reputational costs and benefits for governments. These ‘soft
sanctions’ will, however, be relatively ineffective in countries in which privi-
leged interests dominate the policy process.
Irrespective of the question as to whether it is desirable to implement the
European structural reform agenda in corporatist European countries from a
welfare perspective, this leaves European policymakers with broadly two ap-
proaches. First, the European level can overrule the national policy-making
process to ensure the implementation of European policies in corporatist Mem-
ber States. More specifically, rather than relying on the commitment of the
13 Again, the European growth strategy combines several economic and social targets, such
as raising the employment rate, increasing investment in R&D, reducing levels of poverty,
improving levels of education and improving environmental sustainability (Marlier & Natali
2010).
14 cf. the country-specific recommendations of the Council 2012-2013, http://ec.
europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/
index_en.htm, retrieved 28.06.2012 2:18
222
governments to implement the policies agreed at European level, economic pol-
icy recommendations can be made binding, reducing the ability of corporatist
actors to prevent the structural reform implementation. The recent reform of
the European economic governance framework has already seen a move away
from the OMC’s ‘soft’ and towards more ‘hard’ policy coordination. More
specifically, the so-called ‘Six-Pack’ adopted in December 2012 strengthened
the debt and deficit rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which had
been considerably been watered down in its 2005 reform, introduces a mech-
anism with the aim of preventing and correcting competitiveness imbalances
when and where they emerge with the new ‘Macroeconomic Imbalance Proce-
dure’.15
There is a second possibility for the European-level to improve reform im-
plementation in corporatist countries. Namely, European policymakers could
integrate the privileged interest groups – national employer organisations and
trade unions rather then the European-level umbrella associations – more
closely in the policy formulation process at European level. Involving these
actors in the policy formulation process at European level may help to increase
political ownership of the reform agenda, thus reducing the likelihood of resis-
tance during the implementation phase of the reform policies at national level.
More importantly, involving socio-economic interest groups in the formulation
of structural reform programmes formulated at European level would allow
the institutional complementarities of the political economy to be taken into
15 Importantly, it increases the European Commission’s powers to impose sanc-
tions on euro area Member States that persistently breaks the debt and deficit
rules of the SGP. The so-called ‘reverse qualified majority’ specifies that a finan-
cial sanction recommended by the European Commission can only be prevented if
a qualified majority of Member States vote against it. ‘EU Economic governance
“Six-Pack” enters into force’, European Commission press release, MEMO/11/898,
12/12/2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/898, re-
trieved 28.06.2012 2:18. In case persistent divergences in competitiveness are identified and
countries do not follow the reform recommendations of the Commission, financial sanctions
can be imposed on euro area Member States, similar to those foreseen in the fiscal surveil-
lance procedure. Whether these instruments will suffice to overcome the political power of
special interests in all Member States will remain to be seen.
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Implications for the limits to corporatist policy-making
A third policy implication from this research project is that there are likely to
be limits to corporatist policy-making, depending on the degree to which the
system can accommodate societal interests and on the degree of divergence of
interests in society.
Recall that the model presented in Paper Two distinguished two groups
within a corporatist political economy, one represented by employer organisa-
tions and trade unions and one not represented by the corporatist organisa-
tions. Typically, the former group encompasses the large firms and blue-collar
workers in the export-led manufacturing sector, while the latter includes small
firms and white-collar workers in the services sectors. Paper Three provided
evidence for the influence of the former over the structural reform policies in
corporatist countries. The services sector has, however, grown substantially in
recent decades and represents the bigger share of the economy in all European
countries.
This raises the question at which point societal pressures emerge to with-
draw the privileged access of the employer organisations and trade unions to
the policy-making process. Paper Two argued that welfare systems can be
interpreted as mechanisms to pay off outside workers to ensure their support
for the ‘coordinated economy’, which benefits the insider firms and workers.
Corporatist policy-making may reach its limits if corporatist organisations en-
compass a decreasing proportion of the population. Payoffs to the outsiders
may be infeasible if the losses for the outsiders from the institutional status
quo become too large.
16 Past efforts to include the social partners in the policy formulation process at European
level, particularly through the European Social Dialogue, are commonly seen as window-
dressing rather than real stakeholder involvement. Social partners ‘have no part whatever
to play in the setting of the various guidelines, pillars and targets [...], and their partici-
pation has been moved “downstream” to national level, where they are merely expected to
implement the policy that has been established well “upstream”.’ (Gold et al. 2007, 12). It
should be noted that according to Article 138 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, however, the EU ‘recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its level,
taking into account the diversity of national systems’ and ‘shall facilitate dialogue between
the social partners social dialogue’ with the aim of improving economic governance and
promoting social and economic reforms.
17 At the same time, however, it has to be noted that involving national employer organ-
isations and trade unions which represent the export-oriented manufacturing sector in the
policy in formulation at European level also risks reinforcing institutional complementarities
that do not or no longer maximise the welfare of the economy as a whole.
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The formation of protest and political parties independent of the estab-
lished corporatist interests could be the result of a growing discontent with
the corporatist systems. The currently active ‘Occupy Movement’ presents a
model of the shape that this anti-corporatist protest may take. A prime con-
cern of the ‘Occupy Movement’ is that the privileged access of large firms and
financial institutions to the policy-making process favours a few, while being
disadvantageous to the broader population. more specifically, policy outcomes
– particularly the policy reactions to the on-going crisis – are thought to dis-
proportionately benefit firms and banks, while undermining democracy and
the market economy.
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